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When biological information about an individual is produced in healthcare or research settings, 
ethical questions may arise about whether the individual herself should be able to access it. 
This thesis argues that the individual’s identity-related interests warrant serious attention in 
framing and addressing these questions. Identity interests are largely neglected in bioethical, 
policy and legal debates about information access – except where information about genetic 
parentage is concerned. Even there, the relationship between information and identity, and the 
interests involved, remain unclear. This thesis seeks to fill this conceptual gap and challenge 
this exceptionalism. It does so by developing a normative account of the roles that a wide 
range of information about our health, bodies and biological relationships – ‘personal 
bioinformation’ – can play in the construction of our self-conceptions. 
This account is developed in two steps. First, building on existing philosophical theories of 
narrative self-constitution, this thesis proposes that personal bioinformation has a critical role 
to play in the construction of identity narratives that remain coherent and support us in 
navigating our embodied experiences. Secondly, drawing on empirical literature reporting 
individuals’ attitudes to receiving three categories of personal bioinformation (about donor 
conception, genetic disease susceptibility, and neuroimaging-based psychiatric diagnoses), the 
thesis seeks to illustrate, demonstrate the plausibility of, and to refine this theoretically-based 
proposition. From these foundations, it is argued that we can have strong identity-related 
interests in whether and how we are able to access bioinformation about ourselves.  
The practical implications of this conclusion are then explored. It is argued that identity 
interests are not reducible to other interests (for example, in health protection) commonly 
weighed in information disclosure decisions. They, therefore, warrant attention in their own 
right. An ethical framework is developed to guide delivery of this. This framework sets out 
the ethical responsibilities of those who hold bioinformation about us to respond to our identity 
interests in information disclosure practices and policies. The framework is informed by 
indications from the illustrative examples that our interests engaged as much by how 
bioinformation is communicated as whether it is disclosed. Moreover, these interests are not 
uniformly engaged by all bioinformation in all circumstances and there is potential for identity 
detriment as well as benefit. The ethical framework highlights the opportunities for and 
challenges of responding to identity interests and the scope and limits of potential disclosers’ 
responsibilities to do so. It also makes recommendations as to the principles and characteristics 








This thesis argues that information about our own health, body or biological relationships (our 
‘personal bioinformation’) can have significant impacts on our identities – in the sense of who 
we understand ourselves to be. It proposes that when personal bioinformation is produced, for 
example in healthcare or research settings, the identity-related interests of the individuals to 
whom the information relates ought to be taken into account by policies and decisions about 
whether and how they are able to access it.   
Currently, the potential impacts of bioinformation on individuals’ identities are largely 
neglected in policy and legal debates about their own access to it. One exception is knowledge 
of genetic parentage, where identity interests ground legal entitlements to information. This 
thesis holds that this is a peculiarly narrow focus and the reasons why knowledge of genetic 
parentage engages significant identity-related interests have not been adequately articulated. 
It seeks to address these gaps by offering a particular conception of the relationship between 
personal bioinformation and identity development. This both explains why access to this 
information might make a significant difference to our lives, and also accounts for the potential 
identity significance of a wider range of bioinformation. 
The thesis develops this argument in two steps. First it looks to philosophical theories which 
hold that our identities are constituted by our own evolving accounts of who we are, which 
provide the foundations for our self-understanding, values and actions. It builds on these 
theories by arguing that personal bioinformation can help us to develop and maintain the 
coherence of our identity narratives in the context of our experiences of biological existence. 
The second step, draws on empirical literature reporting individuals’ attitudes to receiving  
three kinds of bioinformation (about donor conception, genetic disease susceptibility, and 
neuroimaging-based psychiatric diagnoses) in order to illustrate, test the plausibility of, and 
refine the preceding theory-based argument.  
On this basis, the thesis proposes that we have significant identity-related interests in our 
access to bioinformation. However, the illustrative examples highlight that how these interests 
are engaged can vary in different circumstances. Furthermore, they may involve protection 
from bioinformation as well as accessing it. And the way in which bioinformation is 
communicated to us may be as important as whether we receive it. The thesis concludes by 
providing an ethical framework that sets out the disclosure-related responsibilities of those 
 
 
who hold our personal bioinformation. This framework is intended to guide the delivery of 
policies and practices that protect our identity interests. In particular, it makes 
recommendations about approaches to communicating bioinformation in a way that supports 
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CHAPTER 1: THE AIMS AND SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
 
SECTION 1: THE MOTIVATION FOR THIS INQUIRY 
This thesis is a bioethical analysis concerned with individuals’ access to information about 
their own health, bodies and biology. It addresses the ethical question of which interests should 
be taken into consideration by laws, policies and practices that determine whether and how an 
individual may access these kinds of information. Specifically, the central contention that I 
will defend over the following chapters is that an individual’s identity-related interests should 
be key consideration in decisions about disclosure to her of – what I shall term – her ‘personal 
bioinformation’.1 
This contention is based on my argument (which I present in Chapter 3) that, given the 
embodied nature of our existence, personal bioinformation can play a crucial part in the 
construction of the narratives that constitute our identities. I will go on to provide grounds for 
holding that this conception of the relationship between bioinformation and identity is 
commensurate with evidence of people’s lived experiences. I shall argue that this relationship 
carries the requisite normative weight to explain why access to personal bioinformation can 
give rise to ethically significant interests. By ‘ethically significant’ I mean that these interests 
pertain to our capacities to lead rich and fulfilling lives and, as such, are sufficiently great to 
give rise to responsibilities amongst those who might be in a position to disclose personal 
bioinformation to us.  
My impetus for developing this argument arises from the debate in bioethical, social science 
and policy-focused literature about the value of knowledge of one’s genetic parentage – often 
discussed specifically in relation to donor-conceived individuals’ access to information about 
their donor origins.2 The idea that knowledge of our genetic origins is important to our 
identities is also reflected in European human rights law and UK policy on donor conception 
(as I will outline later in this chapter).3 However, this thesis does not unquestioningly accept 
the (diverse) existing arguments for the identity significance of this particular kind of 
information.  
                                                             
1 I explain what I will mean by ‘personal bioinformation’ and ‘identity’ in Section 2 below.  
2 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. 
3 See Section 3. 
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On the contrary, I will suggest that, as they stand, many of the arguments relating to genetic 
origins exhibit one or more of the following three limitations.4 The precise nature of the 
relationship between information about genetic origins and identity often remains 
underdeveloped. Alternatively the value of this information is premised on questionable 
assumptions about the necessity of this information to a ‘complete’ identity. The third problem 
is the implied exceptionalism of many these arguments, which are presented as applying 
narrowly to information about our genetic origins. It seems arbitrary and implausible that this 
is the only kind of information about our biological existences that is, or could be, significant 
to our identities. My suspicion about this exceptionalism is one of the central motives for the 
present research project. But this suspicion is twinned with an optimistic rather than sceptical 
stance towards intimations of identity-significance. The arguments to be presented in this 
project are an attempt to rectify the peculiar exceptionalism of the genetic-origins-focused 
arguments. I seek to extend claims of possible identity-significance to information about our 
health, bodies and biology more widely, while demonstrating that the assertion of even strong 
interests in this information need not entail a bio-essentialist or bio-reductive picture of 
identity.  
My research questions  
This inquiry is not an abstract exercise. It has a practical and ethical implications for how 
individuals’ access to personal bioinformation is managed and regulated.  In Section 3 of this 
chapter I will illustrate the relative lack of legal or regulatory attention to individual’s identity-
related interests in accessing bioinformation about themselves.5 I suggest that the problem is 
not only one of scope – again, the purview is chiefly confined to information about genetic 
parentage – but also in the lack of adequate articulation of the relationship between information 
and identity in these provisions. 
The problems or gaps that that this research seeks to address, therefore, are twofold. The first 
is the limitations of existing normative conceptions of the relationship between identity and 
personal bioinformation. The second, is the inadequacy of the protection currently offered to 
information subjects’ identity-related interests in respect of their access to personal 
bioinformation.6 The second cannot be rectified without addressing the first. This project seeks 
                                                             
4 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
5 I restrict my discussion here to examples of policies and laws that apply or have some influence 
within UK jurisdictions for pragmatic reasons of limited space. The conceptual and ethical 
conclusions drawn in this project however are intended to be applicable beyond any specific 
jurisdiction. 





to address the first gap, by developing and defending a plausible, normative account of the 
role that information about our health, bodies and biology can play in identity – one which 
explains the ethical significance of this role and avoids arbitrary exceptionalism. This provides 
a robust basis for starting to address the second gap. To that end, I develop an ethical 
framework to inform the protection of identity interests through practices and policies 
governing access to personal bioinformation.7 To reach that point, this thesis will address the 
following four headline research questions: 
i. How might the relationship between personal bioinformation and our identities 
be conceptualised? (Chapters 2, 3 and 8) 
ii. What grounds are there for holding that the conception of the relationship 
proposed in this thesis is robust and plausible in light of people’s actual 
experiences? (Chapters 4-7) 
iii. Building on the answers to these questions, what are the nature and scope of our 
identity-related interests in accessing personal bioinformation? (Chapters 8 and 
9) 
iv. Given these interests, what ethical responsibilities for disclosure accrue to those 
who hold personal bioinformation about us? (Chapter 9) 
Aims of this chapter 
Having established the defining aims of this research, there are three remaining tasks for this 
opening chapter. In Section 2, I will set out the scope of this project by clarifying what I will 
mean by the two phrases/terms that lie at its heart: ‘personal bioinformation’ and ‘identity’. In 
doing so, I will also indicate the kinds of circumstances which I will take to be paradigmatic 
of the instances in which identity interests might arise and warrant attention. In Section 3 I 
will provide the grounds for my assertion that any identity-related interests that information 
subjects might have in respect of access to their own bioinformation currently remains 
inadequately articulated or protected and in law and policy. Finally, in Section 4, I will provide 
a brief overview of the matters covered in each of the subsequent chapters.  
SECTION 2: DEFINING TERMINOLOGY AND SCOPE 
My initial task is to set the scene by clarifying the kinds of information and circumstances that 
I have in mind in posing the research questions above. None of the lines of demarcation 
suggested in this section are intended to be unique to an inquiry about identity-related interests. 
                                                             
7 See Chapter 9. 
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My aim in this thesis is to interrogate how identity interests operate in broadly the same kinds 
of circumstances as those in which questions about the ethical uses and handling of 
information about our health, bodies or biological relationships currently arise. 
What is personal bioinformation?  
First it is necessary to explain what I will mean by the term ‘personal bioinformation’. My aim 
is not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a precise definition, but rather a 
practical, working understanding which will inevitably leave some fuzzy edges. The term is 
intended simply as a contraction of ‘personal biological information’. It is used in this thesis 
for purposes of brevity – grouping together diverse information, arising in varied contexts. It 
is not intended to signal a special subcategory of health-related or biological information. On 
the contrary, it is intended to capture something relatively straightforward and familiar – that 
is, information about ourselves as individual biological beings.  
One example of a description of the cluster of information I have in mind is provided by the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics report ‘The Collection, Linking and Use of Data in Biomedical 
Research and Health Care: Ethical Issues’. That report set its sights on the “…growing 
accumulation of data, of increasing variety, about human biology, health, disease and 
functioning, derived ultimately from the study of people.”8 The report notes that these data are 
generated, accumulated and used in and for a number of contexts including: clinical care; 
research including clinical trials and observational studies; commercial direct-to-consumer 
(hereafter ‘DTC’) testing services; device-enabled “life-logging”; laboratory analysis; and 
administrative functions. 9 The Council’s report concerned the use of large data sets, rather 
than matters of individual access. Nevertheless, this description of its scope provides a useful 
sketch of what I intend to capture under ‘personal bioinformation’ in this project. Innocuous 
though the words ‘personal’, ‘biological’ and ‘information’ might seem, it is necessary to say 
a bit more about what each denotes in the present context. 
Information 
According to information systems theory the ‘information hierarchy pyramid’ comprises, in 
ascending order, data, information, knowledge and wisdom – where each layer depends on the 
                                                             
8 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'The Collection, Linking and Use of Data in Biomedical Research 
and Health Care: Ethical Issues' (2015), p.7. I shall return to unpack the distinction between data and 
information below. 





preceding one and adds value or meaning.10 In both ordinary and regulatory usage there is 
often slippage between the terms ‘data’ and ‘information’, with data often used to mean 
information. 11 This project is concerned with transactions in information as defined by the 
‘General Definition of Information’, according to which, “information = data + 
interpretation”.12 
Data may be thought of as observed states of affairs that provide raw material for 
interpretation. Interpretation involves the processing, organisation, structuring, classification 
and aggregation of data in a particular context and with a particular purpose such that it 
becomes about something.13 I will follow Mark Taylor in terming this context and purpose, 
the “interpretive framework”.14 Interpretation transforms data into potentially meaningful and 
useful information.15 Different interpretative frameworks may be applied to the same data. The 
nature of the information derived, therefore, depends on the nature of the framework applied, 
such that “…different individuals may extract different realized information from the same 
fact.”16 Furthermore, interpretation is not a one-off transformation as the pyramid model might 
imply. Taylor suggests that we can usefully think of information as having both an 
“interpretive pedigree” (i.e. the interpretation(s) which have already been applied to it) and 
“interpretive potential” (i.e. the ways that could go on to be further interpreted).17 Information, 
therefore, is not an inert artefact with a fixed meaning, but dynamic and changeable as 
successive layers of interpretation supplant each other or accumulate like a palimpsest.  
This project is concerned with information about our biological existence, particularly insofar 
as it contributes to knowledge and understanding of this existence. In line with common usage, 
I will take it that personal bioinformation, like any other information, can be true or false, and 
more, or less, specific, reliable or comprehensible. As I will argue in Chapters 8, insofar as 
personal bioinformation’s veracity, specificity, reliability and intelligibility are pertinent to its 
                                                             
10 J. Rowley (2007), "The Wisdom Hierarchy: Representations of the DIKW Hierarchy" Journal of 
Information Science, 33(2): 163-80. 
11 One example of using the term data to refer to information is the Data Protection Act 1998.  
12 M. Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy Protection (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.42. 
13 G. Bellinger et al., "Data, Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom," www.systems-
thinking.org/dikw/dikw.htm (accessed 9 June 2017). 
14 Taylor (2012), p.53.  
15 Rowley (2007), p171. 
16 R.H. Wagner and É. Danchin (2010), "A Taxonomy of Biological Information" Oikos, 119(2): 203-
09, p.207.  
17 Taylor (2012), p.41, p.42. 
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capacity to support knowledge of biological states of affairs, these qualities will also be 
relevant to its value to our identities.18   
Biological 
By ‘bioinformation’ I intend a category much wider than that about our health. In his analysis 
of what constitutes genetic data, Mark Taylor proposes that this category includes not only 
data derived from analysis of our genetic material, but also that which has been interpreted to 
be about genetic states of affairs.19 Borrowing Taylor’s approach, I shall take personal 
bioinformation to include both that which has been obtained by observation of, or tests upon, 
someone’s body or tissues, as well as that which is understood to convey something about 
someone’s (past, present and possible future) biological existence. Adopting Taylor’s two-
strand definition means that, for example, information about a donor-conceived individual’s 
conception counts as bioinformation, insofar as it is understood to speak to her origins as an 
organism and her genetic relationships, even if the source of this information in a particular 
instance is administrative records or parents’ memories (rather than for example a genetic 
paternity test).20 And mental health diagnoses based upon analysis of data about neural activity 
would also be included. Of course, information’s biological ‘interpretive pedigree’ in no way 
precludes further ‘interpretive potential’ of a distinct kind. In this project I am specifically 
interested in subsequent interpretations that add identity significance to biological significance 
(as I will discuss in Chapter 8).  
Personal 
Expressed in the most straightforward way, the ‘personal’ aspect of bioinformation is intended 
here to signal that the information has been interpreted to be about the biology of an 
identifiable individual. It purports to reveal something about an individual’s health, body or 
biological existence. This is not to overlook that some personal (most notably, genetic) 
bioinformation is inherently and inescapably shared with others.21 This sharing need not 
undermine its labelling as ‘personal’ – it can be personal to more than one person. Furthermore, 
genetic bioinformation about me could be derived from analysis of a tissue sample from a 
close relative, or from studying my family history.22 And in many areas of contemporary 
                                                             
18 For the purposes of what follows I will take it that knowledge cannot be premised on false beliefs. 
See, J.J. Ichikawa and M. Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy ed. E.N. Zalta (Winter, 2016).  
19 Taylor (2012). 
20 This is not to say that information about donor origins is only or chiefly about someone’s biology.  
21 H. Widdows, The Connected Self: The Ethics and Governance of the Genetic Individual 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 





biomedicine, such as genomics or functional neuroimaging, individual disease susceptibility 
estimates rely on risk profiles built from data collected from many other individuals.23 Being 
personal, therefore, does not preclude the derivation of information wholly, or in part, from 
data from sources other than the body or tissues of the individual in question or being shared 
with others. What is relevant is whether it is then interpreted to be about one or more particular, 
identifiable individuals. The focus of this project is on the interests of these individuals in 
respect of accessing this information. I shall refer to these individuals as ‘information 
subjects’.24 
Recognition of the often inherently shared nature of some personal bioinformation 
notwithstanding, the present focus on its personal nature and the access interests of particular 
subjects/recipients might still seem unhappily individualistic. As Heather Widdows has 
argued, conceiving of genetic information as belonging to someone and engaging her interests 
qua discrete individual can lead us to miss or to misrepresent the shared values and interests 
at stake – including those relating to identity – and thus fail to ground adequate protection for 
them.25 This is an important objection. Identity-related interests in the uses of bioinformation 
are indeed not limited or reducible to those incurred by their impacts on individual information 
subjects qua individual recipients. For example, research conducted using genetic data 
collected from the North American Havasupai people revealed genetic markers that indicated 
their origins were not in the Grand Canyon as their origins stories told.26 As Widdows argues, 
the impact of this revelation on the identity and lives of the Havasupai people cannot be 
captured by thinking of this in terms of its relevance to or impact upon individual members of 
the tribe.27 If it matters to any individual it does so because it matters to the group. 
Having acknowledged this, though, I must set aside issues of the collective identity-related 
interests of groups here as lying beyond the scope of this project. This is not because they are 
not real or important, but because the starting point for my research questions is not to ask in 
what myriad ways bioinformation can affect identity, but to examine the key interests in play 
                                                             
23 See, for example, D. Cooper et al. (2013), "Towards Clinically Useful Neuroimaging in Psychiatric 
Practice" The British Journal of Psychiatry, 203(4): 242-44; A. Vieth (2010), "Conceptual and Ethical 
Problems in the Epistemology of Genetic Information" New Genetics and Society, 29(1): 103-16. 
24 I shall use the term ‘information subject’ in this thesis to refer to the individual to whom the 
personal bioinformation pertains. It is not my intention to import the specific definition or 
connotations of this term as used in data protection law. 
25 Widdows (2013). 
26 K. Van Assche et al. (2013), "Protecting Dignitary Interests of Biobank Research Participants: 
Lessons from Havasupai Tribe v Arizona Board of Regents" Law, Innovation and Technology, 5(1): 
54-84. 
27 Widdows (2013). 
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when providing or denying an individual access to bioinformation about herself. However, 
the account of identity to be presented in this project (and the role of information in this) is not 
an individualistic one. It will be central to what I will argue that, first, identity development is 
inherently relational and not something we can undertake in isolation from others.28 And, 
secondly, how we interpret personal bioinformation and, specifically, the significance and 
value we understand it as having for our own identities cannot be separated from, inter alia: 
our identification as members of groups and in relation to others; how other people interpret 
the significance of particular bioinformation; and how bioinformation might impact on the 
lives and identities of those with whom we share it.29 Widdows contends that genetic 
information “is not only, and arguably not even primarily, about the individual”.30 While 
recognising this, I would suggest, there are still important ethical matters to attend to in respect 
of the impacts of genetic and other bioinformation’s on individual information subjects’ 
identities, even if in order to understand these we often need to look beyond the individual 
herself.   
What kinds of information and in what contexts? 
It is of course possible that some kinds of personal bioinformation that fulfil the above 
description will be available to us though our own direct observations and experiences. 
However, because the central ethical question of this project concerns information subjects’ 
interest in accessing information, it will focus upon personal bioinformation that is not readily 
observable by or directly accessible to the information subject herself, but rather that 
generated, acquired, or held by other parties. This includes information that requires specialist 
knowledge or techniques for its generation – for example, where it requires analysis of 
genomic markers. But it is not confined to this - for example, where parents know that they 
used donor gametes to conceive, while their offspring do not. The category under scrutiny is 
also not restricted to information that brings radically new news. For example, it could include 
diagnostic information that adds a fresh angle to someone’s existing understanding of her 
symptoms.  
The focus, then, is upon information about our health, bodies and biology that is in the 
possession of, or available to, others because of the roles, skills, or opportunities that their 
positions afford them. These other parties could include those acting in a professional or 
institutional capacity, such as clinicians, researchers, providers of commercial testing services, 
                                                             
28 See Chapter 2. 
29 See Chapter 8. 





or regulators (for example where the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(hereafter ‘the HFEA’) administers a register of those treated and gamete donors).31 It could 
also include private individuals, for example, if they are in possession of genetic health 
information about themselves that also applies to close relatives, or if they have undisclosed 
knowledge about genetic relationships within their family.  
Some examples of the kinds of personal bioinformation with which this project is concerned 
include the following: 
 The results of medical examinations and diagnostic tests;  
 Findings from screening for disease susceptibility; 
 Probabilistic genomic information about physiological, behavioural or dispositional 
traits; 
 Findings from health-related research that are relevant to individual research 
participants (both results that the research intended to deliver and incidental 
findings);32  
 Accounts of treatment and other interventions held in patients’ records; 
 Information about inherited disorders in family member’s health records or 
memories; and  
 Information about genetic relationships in administrative records or family memories.  
This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. And it is pertinent that it includes information 
that is readily available to us – such as the findings from diagnostic tests; that which we are 
entitled to access even if it is not routinely supplied to us – such as the contents of our health 
records; 33 and that which we may have neither routine access nor entitlement in law – such as 
clinically insignificant incidental findings from health research in which we have 
participated,34 or genetic information about a family member.35 The research questions 
addressed in this project are relevant across all of these circumstances. They are intended to 
offer fresh, robust identity-based ethical grounds for providing access to information when the 
dominant current position is to not to do so (or vice versa). And, in addition, they aim also to 
                                                             
31 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended), Section 31. 
32 Incidental findings are findings, pertaining to individual participants, generated during research that 
were not amongst the research’s intended aims or outputs. 
33 Patients have a legal right to apply for access to their own patient records (subject to some 
conditions and exemptions) under Section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
34 S.M. Wolf et al. (2008), "The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing 
Researchers' Duties" The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 36(2): 361-83. 
35 R. Gilbar and C. Foster (2016), "Doctors’ Liability to the Patient's Relatives in Genetic Medicine" 
Medical law review, 24(1): 112-23. 
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signal where attention to identity-interests in the manner of disclosure would be warranted, 
even if they do not provide new positions on whether to disclose (as I discuss further in Chapter 
9).   
The arguments and recommendations of this thesis are intended to apply to information 
generated in diverse fields of healthcare, medicine and bioscience. It could include, for 
example, physiological, genetic, neurological, reproductive, metabolic, and developmental 
information. And it could pertain to facts about individuals’ past, present and possible future 
health, the states, functioning and dispositions of their bodies and biology, and their biological 
relationships to others. The intention is to start with an inclusive category. However, in chapter 
8 I will consider what might account for some categories of personal bioinformation being 
seen as having greater significance to our identities than others. Crucially, the arguments that 
I will offer are intended to apply far beyond the usual suspects of circumstances in which 
connections between bioinformation and identity are most commonly invoked – namely, in 
relation to genetic parentage, genetic traits, or genetic markers of ancestral provenance.36  
Having said this, it is my hope that the analysis offered in this thesis will contribute a fresh 
and robust perspective to those existing debates, as well as opening up new areas that warrant 
attention from an identity perspective. Although space precludes specific analysis here, 
contemporary debates to which the arguments of my thesis might usefully contribute include, 
for example, those about: the extent of researchers’ responsibilities for returning individually-
relevant research findings to participants; the interests of mitochondrial donor-conceived 
individuals in knowing about their donors; ethical issues raised by the introduction of routine 
non-invasive prenatal testing or whole genome screening at birth; concerns relating to the 
emerging market in DTC neuroimaging; and the collection and analysis of increasing 
quantities of data by smart wearable (or implanted) health monitoring technologies.  
What do I mean by identity? 
This interdisciplinary project spans philosophical and bioethical fields of enquiry, while also 
drawing on social science literature and legal, regulatory and policy texts. Across these 
contexts ‘identity’ is used in a number of different ways. And, in some contexts there may be 
slippage or ambiguity about which of these different senses is intended.37 The matter of what 
                                                             
36 See, for example, C. Hauskeller, "Human Genomics as Identity Politics," in Award Paper for Young 
Scholar Conference, Cornell University 7-9 April 2006 (2006); A. Nordgren and E.T. Juengst (2009), 
"Can Genomics Tell Me Who I Am? Essentialistic Rhetoric in Direct-to-Consumer DNA Testing" 
New Genetics and Society, 28(2): 157-72. 
37 For example, as noted in Section 3 below, in human rights law there may be an elision of numerical 





I will mean by identity in this project will receive detailed attention in Chapter 2. Here, 
however, I wish to draw some basic lines of distinction between the conception of identity at 
the heart of this project and some other senses in which ‘identity’ may be invoked in relation 
to personal bioinformation.  
Identity as characterisation 
This thesis is concerned with identity as characterisation. ‘Identity’ in this sense is understood 
to refer to ‘who someone is’ in terms of the totality of the characteristics with which she may 
be identified and that define her as an individual. As such, identity is used in a global or holistic 
sense, rather than just to refer to aspects of who someone is or specific identifiers. Identity, in 
this sense is what is at stake in what Marya Schechtman’s terms, the “characterization 
question” – that is, the question of which characteristics, beliefs, values and actions are “truly 
attributable” to a person.38 This is the way in which ‘identity’ is perhaps most commonly used 
in everyday contexts. For example, it is what is understood to be in jeopardy when we talk 
about someone having an ‘identity crisis’, or acting in a way that is ‘true to who she is’.39  
I shall argue in this thesis that it is identity in the characterisation sense that is at stake where 
matters of an individual’s own interests in access to her own personal bioinformation are 
concerned (as contrasted with the six other senses of identity outlined below). This is the sense 
of identity that is (for the most part) at the heart of the academic and policy discussions about 
the importance of knowing one’s genetic parentage, in which the value (or lack thereof) of this 
information to an individual’s ability to make sense of or develop who she is as an individual 
that is debated.40 For reasons I outline in Chapter 2, this thesis will take as its theoretical and 
normative foundation a conception of identity as constituted by our own self-constructed 
narratives of who we are.  I will argue over the coming chapters that personal bioinformation 
can play a critical part in our abilities to construct, make sense of and inhabit our own self-
narratives. To be more specific, then, this thesis is concerned with identity in the sense of self-
characterisation.  
To further demarcate my focus on identity as self-characterisation, I will briefly say something 
more about some others senses in which identity may be invoked in relation to personal 
                                                             
38 M. Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.74, p.76. 
39 D. DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
40 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing' (2013). 
See Section 3 of this chapter and Chapters 3 and 5 below for examples of such arguments.  
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bioinformation, and how these intersect with, or should be distinguished from identity of the 
kind on which this thesis will concentrate.  
First there are three senses that intersect to some degree with self-characterisation.  
Social identity 
‘Social identity’ refers to the ways in which we are defined – by ourselves and others – by 
reference to our membership of specific social groups – for example, gender, ethnicity or 
health-status.41 A number of authors whose work informs this thesis have arguments that 
particular kinds of bioinformation – such as the results from genomic testing – may play a 
roles in, variously, establishing, shaping, reinforcing, reifying or naturalising categories of 
social identifiers. I will outline some of these arguments further in Chapter 2. 
Practical identity 
‘Practical identity’ refers to a means of characterisation that is more than just a descriptive 
label, it has a normative component connected to agency. A practical identity is, in Christine 
Korsgaard’s terminology, “a role with a point”.42 That is to say, it provides an individual with 
reasons to act in ways that are characteristic to that a role, and it is reinforced, or undermined, 
to the extent that we do, or do not, act in such ways.43 ‘Practical identity’ may be used to refer 
to unitary characteristics, of which we may have several (someone is a daughter and an 
athlete), or with reference to the overarching whole of who someone is.  
Personal identity 
This sense of identity is at stake when questions arise – chiefly in philosophical contexts, but 
also legal ones – about the individuation and temporal continuation of persons. For example, 
what makes an elderly person with severe dementia the same person as the seventy year old 
who wrote an advance directive regarding her care in the event of loss of capacity?44 Whether 
and how personal bioinformation could be implicated in such questions will depend on the 
definition of person and the identity criterion posited. 
                                                             
41 M.A. Hogg, 'Social Identity Theory', in Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, ed. P.J. 
Burke:.11-136 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
42 C.M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p.21. 
43 C. Mackenzie and M. Walker, 'Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of 
Authenticity', in Handbook of Neuroethics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015). 






My focus on self-characterisation does not exclude concern with identity understood in the 
social, or practical senses. There is considerable overlap between these and identity as self-
characterisation. On some views (including that which I defend in this project) one’s self-
characterisation as a whole may be seen as a composite practical identity.45 And our broad 
self-characterisations are very likely to be constituted, in part, by specific social identifiers and 
normative roles. Nevertheless, over the following chapters I shall demonstrate that the role 
that personal bioinformation can play in our self-characterisations extends far beyond the 
ascription of discrete self-descriptors.  
Similarly, matters of self-characterisation closely connected to matters of personal identity. 
Schechtman has maintained that self-characterisation captures the respect in which “personal 
identity matters to us at all”.46 By this she means that many the ethical and practical questions 
with which theories of personal identity tend to be concerned – for example, the questions of 
whether I would still exist following loss of cognitive capacities, and which of my behaviour 
I may be held morally responsible for – may be answered by reference to the degree of 
continuity and coherence of my self-characterisation.47 
There are also the following three senses in which identity may be used, which are not relevant 
to the present thesis.  
Numerical identity  
This sense of identity concerns logical question of whether one thing is literally one and the 
same thing as another (not just qualitatively the same). Personal bioinformation might be 
implicated in identity in this sense, for example, when biometric information is used on an ID 
card to verify that the person in possession of it is the legitimate card-holder, or when genetic 
analysis is used to ascertain whether, for example, someone is the individual who left a blood 
stain at a crime scene.48 
                                                             
45 C. Mackenzie, 'Introduction: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency', in Practical Identity and 
Narrative Agency, ed. C. Mackenzie and K. Atkins (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
46 Schechtman (1996), p.1. In this respect, the argument I shall present in Chapter 3 entails that access 
to personal bioinformation could have implications for how we constitute ourselves as persisting 
persons, but not how we ascertain our own persistence.   
47 In her more recent work Schechtman’s position on has changed somewhat. She still holds that our 
narrative self-characterisations are germane to the phenomenology of selfhood and to practical 
questions about agency and concern for our own futures, but no longer maintains that they are 
sufficient to answer address all metaphysical questions about the “literal” identity of persons. See M. 
Schechtman, Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 





Species identity  
Questions about whether something – for example, an embryo, or a cyborg – is or is not a 
member of the human species might plausibly be settled by appeal to personal bioinformation, 
such as genomic information or phenotypic characteristics. 
Public image 
In some contexts – for example human rights law – an individual’s public image or persona is 
referred to as her identity. Personal bioinformation might be taken to engage interests relating 
to identity in this sense when, for example, images of someone’s face or body are used or 
disclosed without their consent.49 
In excluding these three senses from my discussion, my intention is not to deny that personal 
bioinformation might be implicated in important interests we might have in respect of 
numerical identity, public image or species questions – for example, where its misuse permits 
identity fraud, or where public knowledge of one’s health history affects one’s reputation, or 
even (just about conceivably) where it speaks to the impact of chimeric organ transplants on 
our human identity. But I would contend that these are unlikely to be engaged by the matter 
of our own access to personal bioinformation about ourselves. Therefore, I will proceed on the 
basis that if someone has an interest in accessing her own bioinformation for identity reasons, 
that these reasons are overwhelmingly likely to pertain ultimately its impacts on her self-
characterisation. 
Questions lying beyond the scope of this thesis 
It will be helpful here to clarify some questions that lie outwith the scope of this research. My 
task will be to conceptualise the nature of an information subject’s own interests relating to 
the impacts that her own access to personal bioinformation could have on her self-
characterisation. This means that this inquiry is not directly concerned with matters of privacy 
or confidentiality, or with how other peoples’ access to personal bioinformation might impact 
upon the information subject’s identity.50 For example, I will not address concerns about 
                                                             
49 For example, Von Hannover v Germany (Application no. 59320/00) (2004) 40 EHRR 1. 
50 See, for example, B. Ajana (2010), "Recombinant Identities: Biometrics and Narrative Bioethics" 
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 7(2): 237-58. Ajana address ways in which biometric data may impact 
indirectly upon the identity narratives of asylum seekers, when these data are used by immigration 





matters such as the use of health information to discriminate against individuals, or the 
potentially stigmatising effects one’s genetic data being retained on a forensic database. I will 
similarly not be directly concerned with how other people’s interests might be affected by an 
individual’s access to her own personal bioinformation – for example, the distress that parents 
may feel upon their daughter learning she is donor conceived. Although each of these scenarios 
raises important ethical questions, they lie beyond the scope of this inquiry.  
Having said this, a central aspect of the account to be developed here is that we do not and 
cannot build our identities in isolation from our relationships with others and the ways that 
they use or react to information about us. Therefore, despite not addressing others’ uses of 
information or their interests directly, the following three considerations will be key to what I 
have to say. First, the interpretations that others apply to, or meaning that they invest in, our 
personal bioinformation may well inform or shape the relevance and value we invest in it for 
our own identities (see Chapter 8). Secondly, genetic information is personal bioinformation 
we share with others and this may shape the role it plays in our identities (see Chapters 5 and 
6). Thirdly, in disclosure decisions, individuals’ interests in (not) accessing their own personal 
bioinformation must be weighed against the impact this has on the interests of others (see 
Chapter 9). 
Having clarified the scope of this project, I will now turn to consider one of the central gaps 
that this project seeks to help to address – the paucity of adequate recognition in law or policy 
of information subjects’ identity-related interests in accessing their personal bioinformation. 
The following section poses the more general question of the extent to which the potential 
value of personal bioinformation to identity (understood broadly as self-characterisation) is 
recognised or articulated in law or policy at all.  
SECTION 3: EXISTING LEGAL AND POLICY PROTECTION OF IDENTITY-RELATED 
INTERESTS IN ACCESSING PERSONAL BIOINFORMATION  
It would be unwarranted to claim that attention to identity-related interests in accessing 
biological information about oneself is wholly absent from the legal and policy landscape in 
the UK. But, as this section will illustrate, the conception of the relationship between 
bioinformation and identity underpinning the protected interest(s) is problematically narrow, 





International human rights law 
International instruments concerned with human rights and biomedicine 
Two international instruments may be seen as drawing a broad, high level connection between 
the identity significance of genetic or health data and the entitlement of individuals (not) to 
access it – one more explicitly than the other.  
The first is the European (Oviedo) Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which has 
the central aim of protecting the “dignity and identity of all human beings”,51 and holds that: 
“Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his health. 
However the wishes of an individual not to be so informed shall be observed.”52  
This entitlement is not absolute, but may be overridden in “interests of the patient”.53 
The second is the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data holds that: 
“No one should be denied access to his or her own genetic data or proteomic data 
unless such data are irretrievably unlinked to that person … or unless domestic 




This right is associated with the “special status” of human genetic data, which is held to relate, 
inter alia, to its predictive capacities and “cultural significance” in ways that can have a 
“significant impact” on individuals, families and groups.55  
These instruments have marked limitations with respect to the protection of a putative identity-
related interest in accessing one’s own bioinformation. Not only do they lack direct 
enforcement routes (indeed, the UK has neither signed nor ratified the Oviedo Convention), it 
is also unclear exactly what is meant by ‘identity’, ‘significant impacts’ and ‘cultural 
significance’ in these contexts, or how (in)access one’s own health or genetic information is 
seen as impacting upon them. Hauskeller has suggested that these instruments instantiate a 
problematic genetic essentialism:56 that is, they reflect an unwarranted assumption that our 
genetic heritage defines who we are – either as individuals or qua human persons. 
                                                             
51 Council of Europe, 'Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine' (4 April 1997), Article 1. 
52 Ibid., Article 10(2). 
53 Ibid. 
54 UNESCO, 'International Declaration on Human Genetic Data' (16 October 2003), Article 13. 
55 Ibid., Article 4. 
56 C. Hauskeller (2004), "Genes, Genomes and Identity: Projections on Matter" New Genetics and 





UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter, UNCRC) recognises a 
child’s right “to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations”, 
and Article 7 protects a right to birth registration.57 ‘Identity’ as used in this context refers to 
some extent to the administrative details that track the numerical sameness of individuals. 
However, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted Article 7 as protecting 
a child’s right to know her genetic parentage.58 And George Stewart argues that Article 8 of 
the UNCRC includes the right to know one’s “biological identity”.59 In this he includes 
entitlements to medical information, but only insofar as these directly pertain to conditions 
inherited from one’s genetic parents. Thus, he effectively reduces the protection offered to 
information-related identity interests to genetic information with clinical utility. This 
instrument too lacks direct means of enforcement. 
European Convention on Human Rights and the ‘right to identity’  
I will turn now to look at the ‘right to know’ that falls under the ‘right to identity’ in European 
human rights law.60 I shall dedicate more space to this provision for two reasons. First, the 
sense of identity in play is related, if not identical, to the idea of self-characterisation on which 
the present project is based (although as I outline below the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(ECtHR) conception of this is somewhat problematic). Secondly, because the ECtHR provides 
the highest appellate court in Europe and is charged with adjudicating on matters of core 
human value, what it has to say about the relationship between identity and bioinformation 
really matters. It not only influences domestic law and policy but also has the capacity to 
promulgate ethical norms.61 In the UK, the rights conferred under the ECHR are given further 
effect under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The ‘right to identity’ is one of the constituent rights nested within the Article 8 right to respect 
for private and family life.62 This right has been interpreted in a number of ways, including 
                                                             
57 United Nations 'Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1989) 
58 S. Besson (2007), "Enforcing the Child's Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting Approaches 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights" 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 21(2): 137-59; J. Fortin (2011), "Children's 
Right to Know Their Origins - Too Far, Too Fast?" Child and Family Law Quarterly, 21(3): 336-55. 
59 G.A. Stewart (1992), "Interpreting the Child's Right to Identity in the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child" Family Law Quarterly: 221-33. 
60 J. Marshall, Human Rights Law and Personal Identity, Routledge Research in Human Rights Law 
(London, New York: Routledge 2014). 
61 Ibid. 
62 D. Feldman (1997), "The Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights" European Human Rights Law Review  3: 265-74; N.A. Moreham (2008), "The Right to 
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those concerned with public image, the right to retain one’s name, and cultural, religious, 
gender and sexual identity.63 However, a further sense in which the right to identity has been 
invoked is that in self-development.64 This sense of the right to identity is of particular interest 
here because it has been held to be engaged by denial of access to information about oneself, 
specifically, information about one’s early life or parentage.65  The ECtHR has described this 
information as having “formative implications for [the applicant’s] personality”.66 And the 
interests in accessing such information have been linked to the entitlement, under the right to 
respect for private life, that “everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as 
individual human beings”67 and to the “right to personal development and to self-fulfilment”.68 
Within the right to identity a specific kind of informational right has evolved – the “right to 
know [one’s] origins”,69 or “the right to know one's parentage”.70 The vast majority of 
jurisprudence relating to this right concerns applicants’ right to know (or have confirmed in 
law) their genetic parentage. This right has been held to be engaged, for example, when 
children or adults have been denied the opportunity to confirm the identities of their genetic 
fathers,71 or where domestic law permits mothers to give birth anonymously.72 Accessing 
information about one’s origins “and thereby acquiring the ability to retrace one’s personal 
history”73 has been held to engage a “vital interest… in receiving the information necessary to 
uncover the truth about an important aspect of their personal identity.”74 
As noted above, rights under Article 8 of the ECHR are not absolute. Interference with the 
right to know one’s origins can be justified under Article 8(2) where lawful and necessary to 
protect a specified suite of other public and private interests. For example, in one case the 
privacy interests of the applicant’s genetic mother and siblings, alongside the public interest 
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in providing opportunities for anonymous birth, were judged to outweigh the applicant’s right 
to know who her genetic mother was.75 Nevertheless, the underlying right to identity has been 
described as an “essential feature” and “within the inner core” of the right to respect for private 
life.76 And it is held to be a positive right, with horizontal effect.77 This means that states’ 
obligations extend not only to refraining from obstructing access to this information in their 
own activities, but also to take steps supporting citizens in their enjoyment of this right, and to 
“secur[e] respect for private life in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves.”78 Two significant consequences being considered part of the ‘inner core’ are that 
“the fairest scrutiny” must be applied in balancing this right against countervailing 
considerations and in allowing states a margin of appreciation (local discretion) in discharging 
their obligations.79 So, at first sight it looks as if Article 8 could offer broad and robust 
protection for interests in accessing bioinformation about oneself. However, the status of the 
entitlement to information is problematic for four reasons:  
 ambiguity about nature of identity interests;  
 implications of a genetically essentialist conception of identity;  
 remedies that seem to belie the significance of the purported interests; and  
 the surprisingly narrow the scope of the right to know.  
I shall address these in turn. 
The first shortcoming is that judgments appear to slip between, or even elide, various different 
senses of identity without signalling their very different personal and ethical implications. For 
example, the judgment in Daróczy v Hungary moves between discussion of identity in the 
numerical sense and self-characterisation.80 Judgments also often use the terminology of 
identity, autonomy and integrity seemingly interchangeably.81 This signals a lack of clarity 
about what the right to identity means or covers.  
                                                             
75 Odièvre v France. 
76 Odièvre v France., Dissenting opinion [11] and [3]; Callus (2004). 
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Secondly, even where it is clear that the interest at stake is viewed as one in self-
characterisation, the way the court represents this interest may be problematic. Jill Marshall 
argues that the ECtHR jurisprudence reflects a view of identity as pre-ordained rather than 
self-constructed, and that knowledge of genetic origins is presented as not merely useful for 
knowing who one is, but necessary. This is indeed suggested by the language of the judgment 
in Mikulic v Croatia, which held that information about origins is “information necessary to 
uncover the truth about an important aspect of their personal identity” [emphasis added].82 
Meanwhile the dissenting judgment in Odièvre v France described this information as 
pertaining to the “essence” of identity.83 Marshall argues such a view is potentially 
stigmatising – implying that those unaware of their origins have incomplete identities – and 
that by enforcing an idea of identity as “fixed and unchanging”, determined by our genes, the 
ECtHR “unduly restrains the development of our freedom to be and become our own 
persons”.84 
I would suggest that the evidence of such an essentialist conception is more equivocal than 
Marshall suggests. The jurisprudence refers not only to discovery but also the developmental 
and “formative” value of information to identity.85  And some judgments have held that denial 
of confirmation of genetic parentage did not engage the right to identity – for example, where 
sought for inheritance purposes,86 or where a child’s interests were held to lie in the 
undisturbed ‘social reality’ of her family.87 This suggests that the ECtHR has taken the view 
that identity is not invariably harmed by not knowing. These counterexamples to Marshall’s 
critique notwithstanding, there is undeniably ambiguity in the Court’s reasoning about the 
relationship between information about origins and identity, which is in itself a problem for 
clarity about what is protected and where (non)access constitutes an identity harm.  
The third limitation to the protection afforded under Article 8 is that there seems to be a 
mismatch between the ‘vital interest’ in self-shaping that this right is intended to protect and 
the perfunctory remedies permitted by the ECtHR. For example, at its most stark, in Mikulic v 
Croatia it is held that, if the presumed genetic father would not comply with genetic testing, 
then a presumption of parentage by domestic courts would fulfil the appellant’s right to 
identity.88 Richard Blauwhoff suggests that the moral right invoked by the origins cases is that: 
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“not to be left to one’s own imagination as far as the story surrounding the 
circumstances at conception and birth”.89   
And it is indeed questionable whether this interest is really met by the mere results of a DNA 
test, or by amendments to an administrative record. In Chapters 8 and 9 I will consider the 
importance how bioinformation is presented to whether it is valuable to our identities.  
The fourth (and most significant as far as this project is concerned) limitation of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence is that the kinds of information recognised as engaging the right to identity-as-
self-shaping are strikingly narrow. It appears to include no categories of personal 
bioinformation other than that about genetic parentage.90 For example, cases concerning denial 
of access to health records have not invoked the right to identity. This is absence is perhaps 
most striking in a case concerned with access to records of non-consensual sterilisation.91 One 
instance in which non-biological information has been held to be engaged the right to identity-
as-self-development was that in which the identity-based right to know originated. In that case 
the information sought was local authority records of the appellant’s upbringing in care.92 But 
this judgment appears isolated. If the right to know one’s origins is derived from its 
instrumental role in fulfilling the right to identity then, I would suggest, one would expect to 
encounter a wider range of information also fulfilling this role, and perhaps even identity being 
invoked where a right not to know has been recognised under Article 8.93 Such absences are 
peculiar and lend some weight to Marshall’s critique about the ECtHR’s essentialist 
conception of identity. The significance of this narrowness for the present project is that we 
cannot assume that the Article 8 right to identity would cover access to any wider categories 
of personal bioinformation.   
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Each of these shortcomings in what, at first sight, looks like a promising source of protection 
for individual’s identity-related interests in accessing their personal bioinformation provides 
further impetus for the central aims of this research: to propose a robust, plausible and – 
importantly – inclusive account of the relationship between identity and bioinformation; and 
to characterise the associated interests relating to information access. 
Regulation of donor conception in the UK 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the right to identity may be seen as having influenced the law 
on donor-assisted conception in the UK. In the 2002 case of Rose and Another v Secretary of 
State for Health and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority – in which the donor-
conceived claimants sought information about their gamete donors – Justice Scott Baker held 
that this case  was “really an identity case and involves the Claimants’ rights to know about 
their origins”.94 The judge found the right to identity under the Article 8 was engaged, but 
deferred judgment on whether breach was lawful because a UK government public 
consultation about donor anonymity was imminent.95  
Following this case and public consultation, revised Regulations came into force in 2005.96 
These remove donor anonymity, permit donor-conceived individuals to request some 
information about their donors from the HFEA, and facilitate contact between donor siblings.  
Access entitlements, however, extend only to those conceived through regulated treatment in 
the UK who meet statutory age thresholds. Donor-conceived individuals can request non-
identifying donor information from sixteen years of age, and identifying information from 
eighteen, if they were conceived with gametes donated after April 2005.97 However, being 
able to request this information depends on prior parental disclosure of the basic fact of donor-
conception, which is not mandated in law. Clinics providing donor conception services are 
required in law to advise parents of the importance of telling and to provide advice on how to 
do so.98 The HFEA guidance frames the benefits of telling in terms of avoidance of ‘emotional 
damage’ and harm to family relations.99 But the HFEA has also expressed the policy view that 
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information about their donor origins “can help people complete a picture of their identity and 
it is natural to seek it.”100 
If one accepts the premise that personal bioinformation can be important to identity, then this 
evolution of UK law is welcome. But, as with the ECHR right to identity, in singling out the 
identity significance of knowledge of one’s genetic parentage it is similarly vulnerable to 
criticism that it reflects, and even promulgates, reductive genetic conceptions of family and 
identity. 
Where does this leave protection of identity interests? 
While it would be untrue to say that potential identity-related interests in some kinds of 
personal bioinformation are wholly absent from the existing legal and policy and practice 
landscape, the scope and articulation of these interests is problematic. In some instances the 
shortcoming amounts to a basic lack of clarity about what ‘identity’ denotes and how our 
(in)access to our bioinformation might impact on identity. But even where the underlying 
assumption does appear to be that the information in question contributes to self-
characterisation – as in the right to know one’s origins under Article 8 of the ECHR – the 
scope of the entitlement is so narrow as to suggest an implausible and contentious genetic 
exceptionalism and essentialism.101  
Of course, there are some legal routes by which individuals may obtain personal 
bioinformation which they might find useful for identity reasons, without the law needing to 
specify identity as grounds for access. For example, under data protection law, information 
subjects’ are entitled to access personal data about themselves, including their health 
records,102 and the ECHR Article 8 right to respect for privacy and family life includes a right 
to “practical and effective” access to one’s health records.103 There are also common law 
grounds based in negligence for providing patients with information pertinent to their 
treatment104 and these could in some circumstances extend to reporting individual research 
findings to participants where these carry health implications.105 These more general 
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provisions notwithstanding, it cannot be assumed that they will be sufficient to protect 
potential identity-related interests. First, they only apply to specific categories of information: 
‘personal data’ as defined in law, health records, or to research findings exhibiting clinical 
utility. The second is that none of these represent absolute entitlements. Each of them allows 
for exceptions and for the weighing of information subjects’ rights or interest against 
competing considerations. If identity-related interests are not explicitly recognised they cannot 
be part of any such weighing. 
Access need not be mandated in law for personal bioinformation to be made accessible on 
ethical or best practice grounds – for example, where a research protocol includes the provision 
of incidental findings to participants. However, as I shall outline in Chapter 9, the information 
subject’s interests that are most likely to be taken into account by such policies are those 
relating to her physical and psychological wellbeing and her autonomy. As I shall argue in that 
chapter, these interests may overlap with those relating to self-characterisation, but they are 
not coextensive. 
The conceptual and ethical gaps this thesis will fill   
The inadequacy of existing provisions exposes the gap that this research seeks to fill. I would 
concur with Marshall that it is indeed problematic if the law or policy were to instantiate or to 
entrench a narrow and prescriptive view of identity interests. However, unlike Marshall, I do 
not wish to hold that recognising and protecting the identity-significance of knowledge about 
genetic parentage (or any other aspect of one’s biological existence) necessarily commits one 
to an essentialist or exclusionary conception of identity. In order to defend this position it will 
be necessary for me to address the fundamental question of what the relationship between 
bioinformation and identity is. This in turn requires clarity about the conception of identity on 
which the account of this relationship is premised. As Heather Widdows observes: 
“Pictures of the self are vitally important. If the picture of the self is wrong so too 
are the legal ethical and social structures which are built upon it. What matters to 
human beings is that key goods are protected and that possibilities of flourishing 
and wellbeing are ensured.”106 
In the next chapter I shall establish the picture of identity on which my subsequent arguments 
are based. I shall survey some prominent ways in which the relationship between specific kinds 
of personal bioinformation and identity (understood in ways broadly commensurate with self-
characterisation) is characterised in the literature. I shall suggest that these on their own are 
unable to account for the potential impacts of a broad range of personal bioinformation on our 
                                                             





identities, or why these impacts matter. I propose that a conception of identity as constituted 
by our self-narratives provides a way of understanding how access to personal bioinformation 
can make a real difference to our identities in a way that affects our capacities to lead rich and 
fulfilling lives.  
Over the subsequent chapters I will develop and defend the argument that, because of its 
possible impacts on the contents and coherence of the narratives that constitute our identities, 
we will have ethically significant interests in respect of whether and how we are able to access 
a wide variety of information about our health, bodies and biological relationships. I shall 
argue that these interests are sufficiently strong to give rise to responsibilities amongst those 
who hold identity-significant personal bioinformation about us and to be taken into account 
by information disclosure policies and practices. As I will demonstrate, the character and 
strength of these interests and the scope of these responsibilities will vary depending on the 
type of bioinformation in question, as well as individual, contextual and relational factors. 
Access provisions must be responsive this diversity. For this reason, specifying precise policy 
or legal reforms across the many contexts in which issues of access to personal bioinformation 
arise lies beyond the scope of the present project. My aim in this thesis is to provide the 
conceptual basis and ethical framework on which any such reforms could be grounded. 
Without this foundation, attempts to offer adequate and coherent protection for identity 
interests in policy or law are jeopardised from the start.  
SECTION 4: OUTLINE OF THE THESIS BY CHAPTER   
Before closing this chapter I will briefly outline what each of the subsequent chapters will 
cover. 
PART I: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
In Part I of the thesis I set out the theory of narrative self-constitution and my own argument 
as to the role of personal bioinformation in this, to establish the conceptual and normative 
foundations for my practical recommendations.   
Chapter 2: The Theory of Narrative Self-Constitution  
Here I outline the philosophical theories of narrative identity on which my argument in this 
thesis is based. In doing so my aims are to establish what the key features of an identity-
constituting self-narrative are, and to lay the normative foundations for my argument by 
explaining what values are at stake in the development of such a narrative, and the factors on 
which their attainment depends. 
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Chapter 3: The Role of Personal Bioinformation in Self-Narratives 
I offer my original argument that personal bioinformation (as a broad category) has an 
important role to play in the construction of our self-narratives. This argument is based on the 
contention that we lead inescapably embodied existences. Given this and the normative 
features of identity-constituting narratives outlined in Chapter 2, I argue that personal 
bioinformation has a vital role to play in helping us to construct self-narratives that remain 
coherent within the context of embodied experiences and that support us in navigating these 
experiences.  
PART II: THE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
In Part II of the thesis I explore evidence, drawn from empirical literature, of people’s attitudes 
to three categories of personal bioinformation. My aims in doing so are threefold: to illustrate 
the theoretically-based argument of Chapter 3; to assess the plausibility of that argument in 
light of information subjects’ reported experiences; and to refine my claims  in line with the 
evidence. 
Chapter 4: Rationale and Methodology for the Illustrative Examples  
Here I set out my rationale for looking to the illustrative examples discussed in the three 
subsequent chapters and my methodology for approaching the empirical literature.   
Chapter 5: Illustrative Example I - Information about Donor Origins  
I review what the empirical literature indicates about donor-conceived individuals’ 
experiences of (not) having access to information about their donor conception and analyse 
what might be inferred from this evidence about the impacts of this information on their 
identities as narratively-conceived and the factors influencing these impacts. This is a category 
of personal bioinformation about which others have offered narrative explanations of identity-
value. This chapter does not, therefore, provide a wholly novel analysis, but explores what my 
particular narrative perspective brings to understanding the potential identity value of this 
information, and detriment of not knowing. 
 
Chapter 6: Illustrative Example II - Genetic Susceptibility Testing  
I review what the empirical literature indicates about individuals’ expectations of and 
responses to genetic susceptibility testing for two categories of serious, multifactorial disease: 





might be inferred from this evidence about the impacts of this information on the identities (as 
narratively-conceived) on those tested, and the factors influencing these impacts. Through this 
narrative analysis I seek to demonstrate that identity impacts extend beyond those most often 
proposed in the literature, and that they can be decoupled from the clinical utility of this 
category of bioinformation.  
Chapter 7: Example III - Diagnostic Psychiatric Neuroimaging  
I review what the empirical literature indicates about individuals’ expectations of diagnostic 
information about serious psychiatric illnesses generated through functional neuroimaging 
technologies (which are not yet in clinical use). I then analyse what might be inferred from 
these about the potential impacts of this information on patients’ identities as narratively-
conceived, and the factors influencing these impacts. I explore what a narrative analysis 
reveals about the potential identity roles and value of this information. In particular I examine 
the link between the epistemic limitations of neuroimaging-based diagnoses and identity 
detriment. 
PART III: BUILDING AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK  
In Part III of this thesis I take stock of what the illustrative examples bring to understanding 
the relationship between identity and personal bioinformation in order to specify the nature of 
our interests in accessing this information, and the grounds and extent of others’ 
responsibilities to meet these interests. On this basis I develop an ethical framework to guide 
information disclosure decisions.   
Chapter 8: Refining the Theory: Accounting for Identity Value, Detriment and Significance  
In this chapter I build on the illustrative chapters to make some refinements to my 
theoretically-based argument and move from discussion of the role of personal bioinformation 
(in general) in our identity narratives, to the questions of how and why particular kinds of 
instances of personal bioinformation might impact on our identities. To this end I use the 
evidence and analyses relating to the three illustrative examples to address three questions. 
The first asks what refinements the illustrative examples suggest need to be made to my 
normative argument developed in Chapter 3. The second unpacks what it means for personal 
bioinformation to play a valuable or a detrimental role in our identities in terms of its impacts 
on the character and coherence of our self-narratives. And the third considers what contributes 
to personal bioinformation playing any of these roles at all, that is, to its ‘identity-significance’. 
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These questions provide the foundations for the discussions of interests and responsibilities in 
the next chapter.  
Chapter 9: An Ethical Framework for Protecting Identity Interests in Practice 
I review what the discussions of the preceding chapters entail for the nature and strength of 
our interest in accessing personal bioinformation. I specify a suite of three bioinformation-
related identity interests – those in accessing some kinds of bioinformation, in being protected 
from others and, in receiving bioinformation in a way that supports identity development. 
Given the strength of these interests and the capacities of those holding bioinformation about 
us to respond to them, I propose a corresponding suite of pro tanto responsibilities accruing to 
those who hold bioinformation about us and practical recommendations for identity-
supportive disclosure. I conclude by drawing all these elements together in an ethical 
framework for managing information access in a way that responds to identity interests. 
Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks and Looking Forward  
In the concluding chapter I take stock of the arguments that I have offered and the original 
contributions that these have made to ethical debates about individuals’ interests in accessing 
their personal bioinformation. I review some key practical changes that are implied by these 
contributions and make some suggestions as to fruitful areas for further research that would 






CHAPTER 2: THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE SELF-
CONSTITUTION 
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the first of the four headline research questions listed at the start of the 
preceding chapter: how might the relationship between personal bioinformation and our 
identities be conceptualised? The full answer to that question will be provided by my original 
argument that I will present in Chapter 3. This chapter lays the foundations for that argument. 
It does so in two steps.  
My specific concern in this thesis is the relationship between personal bioinformation and 
identity in the context of information subjects’ own access to this information.  
My first step, then, will be briefly to survey some prominent accounts offered in the literature 
as to the relationship between our access to various kind of personal bioinformation and our 
identities, where identity is understood broadly in terms of self-characterisation. I will outline 
why none of these accounts on its own, or in combination, provides an adequate basis for 
explaining why a wide range of personal bioinformation might have sufficiently significant 
impacts on our identities to give rise to important interests in information access. I shall then 
propose that, if we understand our identities as being constituted by self-constructed narratives, 
to which personal bioinformation may contribute, this could indeed explain why access to this 
information matters in identity terms. However, I will argue further that in order fully to 
understand the role that personal bioinformation plays in our identity narratives, and the 
normative significance of that role, it is essential to understand what is entailed and implied 
by a theory of narrative self-constitution.  
My second step towards laying the foundation for my original argument in this chapter, 
therefore, will be to outline the key contours of the theory of narrative self-constitution as 
presented in the philosophical literature. In doing so I will highlight the features of, and gaps 
in, this established theory on which my own novel propositions regarding the role of 
bioinformation in our self-narratives will depend. My review of this literature comprises the 
bulk of this chapter and will serve to reveal the theoretical and normative foundations of the 




My particular research questions for this chapter are: 
i. In what ways do existing accounts of the relationship between personal 
bioinformation and identity fail adequately to explain why our access to a range 
of such information could have ethically significant consequences for how we 
develop and understand who we are? (Section 2) 
And, according to the narrative theory of identity on which this project is based: 
ii. What is the relationship between identity and self-narrative? (Section 4) 
iii. What are necessary conditions for an identity-constituting self-narrative? 
(Sections 5 and 7) and 
iv. What is at stake in our ability to construct and inhabit a self-narrative of this 
kind? (Section 6)  
The answers to these questions will inform my argument as to the ethical significance of the 
role of personal bioinformation in our identity narratives that I will develop in Chapter 3. That, 
in turn, will explain my subsequent characterisation of the nature of our interests in 
information access, and provide justification for my proposition that these interests warrant 
attention in information disclosure practices and policies. 
SECTION 2: EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BIOINFORMATION AND IDENTITY 
There is no shortage of discussion in the bioethical and social science literature of the ways 
that insights into aspect of our biology – for example, our health, bodies, genes, brains, genetic 
relationships or genealogy – can affect how we might describe or think of ourselves. This 
thesis cannot hope to provide a comprehensive review of all this work. Nor is it necessary to 
do so. Many of these discussions use ‘identity’ in a general and thin sense of ‘descriptor’. And 
many are descriptive, noting that bioinformation might alter our self-descriptions, without 
making claims about the value (or otherwise) of this. As such, this literature does not speak to 
the particular focus of the present project, that of locating and characterising a normative 
relationship between identity, understood as ‘who one is’, and personal bioinformation. Where 
this literature is relevant to my thesis I will refer to it in context in the coming chapters, rather 
than previewing it here.  
There are, however, some kinds of account that do inject (to a greater or lesser extent) a degree 
of normativity into their framing of the relationship between our access to some particular 





some prominent examples of these accounts here, grouping them under the following five 
headings so as to draw out the relevant features of that relationship in each:  
i) Bioinformation as the basis for specific social or group identifiers 
ii) Diagnostic and predictive health information as the basis for constituting practical 
roles 
iii) Bioinformation as a source of insights into who we ‘really are’ 
iv) Knowledge of genetic parentage as essential to identity development 
v) Knowledge of genetic parentage as contingently valuable to identity development  
For each, I will outline the nature of the claims made about the relationship between personal 
bioinformation in self-characterisation. I will consider the extent to which the relationship 
presented in each could provide a plausible and robust basis for arguing that access to a broad 
range of personal bioinformation could engage significant identity-related interests.  
i) Bioinformation and social identifiers  
The accounts grouped under this heading capture the role of bioinformation in providing new, 
or cementing existing, ways of classifying ourselves under a shared label, or describing 
ourselves in terms of our membership of a group. The emphasis differs between accounts. For 
example, Christine Hauskeller talks in terms of categorisation and the use of genetic 
information to affirm and to “fix prevailing classification patterns of origins, race, ethnicity, 
or disease” into what she calls “intra-species classifications”.107 Similarly, Carlos Novas and 
Nikolas Rose argue that predictive genetics has introduced the possibility of “biographical 
narration in genetic terms”,108 for example, through classifying oneself as being “genetically 
at risk”.109 Meanwhile, Alondra Nelson presents a relational picture, referring to the use of 
commercial genetic ancestry testing services to locate shared African ancestry in terms of 
“affiliative self-fashioning”.110 And Heather Widdows emphasises how genetic information, 
by virtue of being shared, can contribute to our understanding of ourselves as members of our 
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families or ethnic groups.111 Ian Hacking extends the frame beyond genetic information in 
arguing that other means of categorising people for the purposes of care, administration or 
research (for example, behaviourally-based diagnostic categories such as that for Attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)) may come to be more widely understood as 
designating “human kinds”, which individuals within these groups may then use to classify 
themselves,112  
ii) Health information and practical roles  
According to several accounts referred to under the previous heading, the means of self-
description offered by diagnostic or predictive health information do not function merely as 
passive labels, but provide the basis for an individual’s motives, conduct and “ways of being”, 
which in turn serve further to constitute their mode of identification.113 For example, Novas 
and Rose describe a ‘risk identity’ (as might be adopted after a positive test for susceptibility 
to genetic illness) as “a grid of perception which informs decisions on how to conduct one’s 
life” and as inextricably bound up with engagement with “life strategies”, such as researching 
the disease in question and pursuing therapeutic interventions.114 Elsewhere Rose uses the 
phrase “somatic identity” and “neurochemical selves” to capture ways in which – according 
to his account – genetic and neurological information may lead us to think of ourselves in new, 
biologically-defined and bodily-responsible ways.115 Intersecting with these accounts are those 
which describe bioinformation as providing a potential impetus or means to engage in what 
Sahra Gibbon and Carlos Novas term “biosocial identity-making”.116 That is to say, 
collaborative and group activities – such as patient activism or participation in health research 
– which have as their focus a particular sources of biomedical knowledge about oneself and 
which provide relationships and contexts within which a particular kind of self-
characterisation is fostered.  
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Could the kinds of accounts summarised under headings (i) and (ii) above provide sufficient 
bases for understanding why we might have significant identity-related interests in accessing 
a broad range of bioinformation about ourselves? I want to suggest that that they each provide 
important elements of the picture (as I will demonstrate in discussing the illustrative examples 
in Part II and in Chapter 8). However, they do not do all the necessary work. This is, in part, 
because many of these accounts pertain to specific categories of genetic or health-related 
bioinformation and are not necessarily generalisable to bioinformation more widely. It is also, 
in part, because the accounts are often ambivalent or sceptical about the value of defining 
aspects of ourselves using biological information. For example, Hauskeller holds that the value 
to the individual of genetically-reinforced (re)classifications is ambiguous, either because it 
has yet to be demonstrated, or because the classifications may be hurtful or unwelcome.117  
A more fundamental reason why these accounts cannot fully explain why access to personal 
bioinformation might have ethically significant consequences for our understanding of who 
we are, is that they concern unitary identifiers discussed in isolation from other aspects, or 
from the totality of someone’s self-characterisation. They do not speak to the matter of why it 
might matter for someone’s self-characterisation as a whole if it includes some kinds of 
descriptors, classifications or roles rather than others. For example, why does it matter if 
someone is able to characterise herself in terms of her ADHD diagnosis? One answer is that 
this could offer opportunities to access treatment or experience solidarity with other sufferers. 
My intention is not to question the value of these ends. But it is not clear why they are identity 
benefits as opposed to health or social ones. What is missing, for my purposes, is a global 
theory of identity that explains the role and value of these identifiers in identity terms – that is, 
why having access to personal bioinformation might make a difference to developing, 
understanding and inhabiting who one is.  
I will now turn, then, to consider three further kinds of account present in the literature which 
do purport to speak to the relationship between specific kinds of personal bioinformation and 
identity understood in a global sense. 
iii) Bioinformation as a source of insights into pre-existing identities 
It might be claimed that access to some kinds of bioinformation is important to our identities 
because it reveals pre-existing truths about ‘who we really are’. Essentialist assumptions – for 
example, about the power of our genes or our brains to determine a wide range of human traits 
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and disposition and, thus, for genetic or neurological information to provide insights into our 
identities – are largely the target of critique in the academic literature.118 Nevertheless, they 
may have some purchase in the popular imagination.119 And the suggestion, for example, that 
genetic information reveals aspects of our identities is ubiquitous in the marketing materials 
used by DTC genomic testing services.120 And, as noted in Chapter 1, the special protection 
afforded to genetic data in some legal contexts may reflect genetic essentialist assumptions. 121  
Genetic- or neuro-essentialist conceptions of the self cannot, I submit, provide a robust basis 
for understanding the potentially significant impact of personal bioinformation on identity. 
These conceptions do not admit even the possibility of defining ourselves, let alone defining 
ourselves in contrast to our biology. As such they close off options for us in terms of how we 
make sense of ourselves, and suggest there is only one route to knowing about who we ‘really’ 
are (often based on illegitimate assumptions about the bio-deterministic nature of our genes or 
brains). In seeking an account of identity as self-constructed, then, this avenue is both limiting 
and limited. If we are to explore our intuition that our identities are something that we 
construct, rather than something we discover, then this approach cannot be the basis on which 
to do so. 
iv) Knowledge of genetic parentage as essential to identity development 
More subtle than the argument that bioinformation directly reveals one’s true identity, are 
those which present a case that a specific kind of personal bioinformation is necessary for the 
developing a full and flourishing understanding of who one is. This kind of argument has been 
made in respect of knowledge of one’s genetic parents. David Velleman maintains that this 
knowledge is essential to forging relationships with one’s genetic family, and observing 
connections between one’s own and one’s family’s existence and embodied states, which in 
turn allows one to:  
“…identify objectively with the objective reality of the creature that I am, by 
seeing how that creature’s place in reality can possibly be mine.”122   
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He maintains that if this is necessary for the development of a sense of who one is, for finding 
“meaning in the events of one’s life” and for leading a flourishing existence.123 James 
Lindemann Nelson offers a similar argument, rooted in a narrative conception of identity.124 
He holds that we have an interest in “perceiving the connections between our lives and the 
lives of others” and that this not only adds “depth and richness” to our identity narratives, but 
is important to our abilities to make sense of our lives as a cohesive wholes.125  
As will become clear from what I will say in Chapter 3, my own proposal as to the relationship 
between personal bioinformation and identity has much in common with both Velleman’s and 
Nelson’s propositions. However, as they stand and in their own terms, these arguments do not 
provide a convincing justification for a claim that we have significant interests in accessing a 
wide range of bioinformation. This is, firstly, because they do not purport to speak to the 
identity significance of any kinds of information other than that about genetic parentage. 
Furthermore, their claims in respect of the necessary value of this information are themselves 
dubious given that the suggestion that everyone’s identity suffers from not knowing their 
genetic parents is open to readily available counterexamples (as will be illustrated in Chapter 
5). These accounts hold some promise in helping us to think about why personal 
bioinformation might be valuable to self-understanding, but they cannot do so to the full extent 
needed for the present inquiry. 
v) Knowledge of genetic parentage as contingently valuable to identity 
development 
Distinguishable from Velleman’s and Nelson’s positions, but still relating specifically to 
knowledge of one’s genetic parents, are suggestions that this knowledge could play a valuable 
role in the construction of a complete, “acceptable”,126 or “virtuous” 127 account of who one is 
because it provides accurate knowledge of the circumstances of one’s life and existence. The 
key distinction from the preceding claims is that in this cluster of arguments, this knowledge 
is not held to be essential to the construction of such an account. Its value is presented as being 
contingent upon the individuals’ personal and social circumstances. For example, Sarah 
                                                             
123 J.D. Velleman (2005), "Family History" Philosophical Papers, 34(3): 357-78, p.375. 
124 J.L. Nelson (1992), "Genetic Narratives: Biology, Stories, and the Definition of the Family" Health 
Matrix, 2: 71-83 
125 Ibid., p.81. 
126 G. Pennings (2001), "The Right to Privacy and Access to Information About One’s Genetic 
Origins " Medicine and Law, 20(1): 1-15, p.12. 
127 H. Lillehammer, 'Who Cares Where You Come From?', in Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction: 




Wilson maintains that genealogical information may be important if it allows donor-conceived 
individuals, or those separated from their parents in infancy, to fill interpretive gaps in their 
identity narratives by “alleviat[ing] uncertainty with respect to the past”.128 Hallvard 
Lillehammer, meanwhile, argues that knowledge of genetic parentage is valuable to an 
individual to the extent that this allows them to construct a “virtuous practical identity” which 
requires that “disclosure of further facts about themselves would not subvert their general 
sense of who they are and what they ought to be.”129 Similarly, Maggie Kirkman suggests that 
ignorance of donor origins may lead to the development of a “misleading” identity narrative.130  
This family of arguments is considerably more promising than any of the previous candidates. 
The sense in which identity is invoked is that of self-characterisation in a holistic sense, rather 
than that of a discrete identifier. The value of the information in question is premised on its 
instrumental rather than essential role in making sense of who one is in the context of one’s 
experiences. And as such, this at least leaves open the possibility that other kinds of 
bioinformation could occupy a similar role. I too wish to ground my argument as to our 
interests in accessing personal bioinformation in a narrative account of identity. And I will 
return in Chapter 3 to explain how my own argument relates to those summarised under this 
heading.  
However, I would suggest that, as they stand, the positions outlined above do not provide a 
rich enough picture of the relationship between information about genetic parentage and 
identity to explain in depth what is at stake in accessing this information. They do not yet 
permit us to understand whether and why ethically significant interests might be engaged. For 
that, what is needed is a more fully developed account of what it means for identity to be 
‘acceptable’ or ‘virtuous’; why it matters if our identities are misleading, contain uncertainties 
or are vulnerable to subversion; and an account of the precise nature of the roles that 
bioinformation may play in achieving or averting these ends and contexts in which and reasons 
why it might do so. Crucially, a more developed argument would also clarify the extent to 
which other kinds of bioinformation might fulfil a similar role to that assigned to genetic 
parentage. I suggest that these each of these features is required if an account of the relationship 
between personal bioinformation and identity is going to provide an adequate explanation of 
our interests in information access.   
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A narrative proposal 
I wish to propose that an account in which our identities are understood to be constituted by 
self-constructed narratives of who we are, is capable of providing just such a picture. As I shall 
argue over the coming chapters, if we appreciate the critical role that personal bioinformation 
may play in the development of a coherent self-constituting self-narrative, we may understand 
the importance of access to this information to the richness and character of our lives (see 
Chapter 3). A narrative-based account addresses identity understood as the whole of ‘who one 
is’. It permits us to understand how identity is something that can ‘go better or worse’, with 
non-trivial consequences for the richness and scope of our lives (see Sections 5-7 below). It is 
therefore able to account for the value and detriment of access, or lack of access, to personal 
bioinformation in way that goes beyond, and engages more profound concerns than, the 
acquisition of discrete identifiers. I shall suggest that a narrative-based account is capable of 
explaining how a range of different kinds of personal bioinformation may fill important 
identity roles (see Chapters 3 and 8), while also illuminating how different kinds of 
bioinformation may do so to different extents – without recourse to essentialism or arbitrary 
exceptionalism (see Chapter 8). Importantly, I shall also seek to demonstrate that the narrative 
roles of personal bioinformation is plausible in that it broadly corresponds with the ways 
people report responding to and using this information (see Chapters 5-7). On these bases, I 
will argue that a narrative-based account of identity development is capable of grounding the 
claim that access to a range of personal bioinformation can engage ethically significant 
interests (see Chapter 9).  
To provide the foundations for that argument, however, I need to go back to the detail of the 
philosophical accounts of narrative identity to provide the kind of more fully-developed 
account that, I have suggested, is lacking from the existing arguments relating to genetic 
parentage. This will entail unpacking what an identity narrative looks like (Section 4), what 
makes a narrative self-constituting (Sections 5 and 7), and why it matters that we have the 
means necessary to construct such a narrative (Section 6). These are the tasks for the remainder 
of this chapter. Crucially, however, the theories outlined below do not themselves argue for a 
role for personal bioinformation in constructing our identity narratives. That is an additional 
and original step taken in this thesis, which I will go on to defend in Chapter 3.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to provide a fresh or unassailable defence of narrative identity 
theory. The contribution I aim to make lies in applying this theory to an argument that we 
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potentially have ethically significant interests in relation to our access to personal 
bioinformation. It must be acknowledged that readers who remain unconvinced by a narrative 
conception might find it hard to accede to my arguments in later chapters. However, it is my 
hope that the empirical literature to be reviewed in Part II will lend further weight to their 
plausibility and defensibility. 
SECTION 3: SCOPE OF THE REVIEW OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY THEORY 
Narrative theories of identity are found in a number of disciplines, including philosophy131, 
philosophical bioethics,132 psychology133 and sociology.134 This chapter will focus upon the 
philosophical literature because it offers the kind of detailed, conceptual account of the nature 
of identity and how it is constituted, that is capable of providing normative foundations for the 
ethical argument I wish to make in subsequent chapters. However this literature is not 
abstracted from social or psychological contexts. The chief source on which I draw here is the 
influential account developed by Marya Schechtman across several publications, but most 
prominently in her 1996 monograph ‘The Constitution of Selves’.135 Schechtman’s account is 
primarily philosophical but incorporates psychological insights. One of her aims is to develop 
a theory that accommodates key aspects of the first person experience of the phenomenology 
of selfhood, such as concern for one’s own future.136  Meanwhile, Charles Taylor’s account, 
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for example, is inextricably embedded in his analysis of the impact of social context on how 
we conceive of ourselves.137 In addition to these authors, the following discussion draws 
(chiefly, though not exclusively) on the work of Françoise Baylis, David DeGrazia, Alasdair 
Macintyre and Catriona Mackenzie (and her co-authors).138 I focus upon these theorists 
because they are prominent in this field, but also because they represent a spread of emphases 
on matters such as the role of value, relationality and embodiment in identity, and thus help to 
fill-out a rounded account. These authors call upon narrativity to address a range of different 
ethical, metaphysical and social questions which inevitably brings different emphases.  
Restrictions of space here necessarily mean that many interesting avenues must remain 
unexplored. The aim of this chapter is to capture core commonalities, highlight relevant 
divergences, and address counterarguments, insofar as these are pertinent to answering the 
second research question (and its sub-parts) set out in Section 1. In particular, I wish to draw 
out what I shall term the ‘double normativity’ of narrative self-constitution theories. What I 
mean by this is, first, that valuable consequences maybe seen as following from the 
development of one’s identity (as explored in Section 6 below). And, secondly, that these 
consequences are contingent on one’s self-narrative having particular qualities (as outlined in 
Sections 5 and 7). I shall argue that this double normativity is essential to understanding the 
ethical significance of the role that personal bioinformation can play a role our self-narratives 
(see Chapter 3).     
SECTION 4: WHAT IS A SELF-NARRATIVE?  
Identity-constituting 
First it is necessary to establish the relationship between narrative and identity. According to 
the accounts reviewed here, our identities (in the characterisation sense) are not pre-existing, 
awaiting discovery. And one’s self-narrative does not merely reflect or describe who one is. 
We create our own identities through understanding ourselves as the protagonists in the 
ongoing stories of our lives. Our narratives constitute our identities (subject to conditions I 
shall go on to describe). The answer to the question of what makes me ‘me’ lies in the contents 
and interpretations of my autobiographical narrative. And characteristics are mine because 
(and to the degree to which) they are included in my narrative. Schechtman expresses the core 
contention of her theory as follows: 
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“On this view a person’s identity (in the sense at issue in the characterization 
question) is constituted by the content of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions 
and experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, hers.”139  
According to this view, narrative is the form that our self-understanding takes and the means 
by which we bind together the constituent parts of our lives.140 In doing so we ascribe meaning 
and significance to these parts according to the roles we see them as occupying in the 
overarching story of who we are. As Mackenzie describes it: 
“By appropriating our past, anticipating our future actions and experiences, and 
identifying or distancing ourselves from certain characteristics, emotions, desires 
and values, we develop a self-conception that brings about the integration of the 
self over time.”141 
As this suggests, the accounts reviewed here are not merely concerned with identity in terms 
of an inert description of what someone is like. Rather this is identity of a practical kind.142 
That is, it provides the basis for our agency, and is constituted by the ways we act and the 
motives we act from (see Chapter 1). These practical implications that key to the normative 
features of the narrative self-constitution theories that I describe below.  Before we can 
appreciate these, however, it is necessary to understand what a self-narrative is and looks like.  
What does a self-narrative look like? 
There is some ambiguity in the literature about the extent to which one’s self-narrative can be 
understood as a life story. However, it is emphatically not a straightforward comprehensive or 
chronological catalogue of everything that happens in someone’s life.143 I will outline here the 
key features of identity-constituting narratives that are of particular relevance to this project. 
These are their:  
i) First-person perspective; 
ii) Relational construction; 
iii) Varied contents; 
iv) Selective and interpretive nature; and  
v) Active and ongoing development. 
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i) First-person perspective 
According to the accounts reviewed here, our self-narratives are our own self-told stories of 
who we are, constructed from a subjective, internal perspective.144 These accounts hold that 
only this perspective adequately captures the phenomenology – the ‘what it is like’ – of 
selfhood.145 We are (in most cases) best positioned to capture the kinds of characteristics that 
make up our own stories (I say more about what a characteristic is below).146 And, crucially, 
narrating is an interpretive undertaking. The role and significance of the various constituents 
of our stories are interpreted in relation to each other and to the whole from the perspective of 
the subject who experiences them all.147 This does not mean that our self-narratives are, or 
could be, constructed through isolated introspection, but the emphasis on first-person narration 
represents resistance to suggestions that our own stories have no greater claim to authority in 
defining who we are than those of others,148 and to accounts that hollow-out selfhood by 
presenting identity as constituted largely by the public performance of roles.149  
ii) Relational construction 
It is a key aspect of narrative theories of self-constitution that we do not and cannot work out 
who we are in isolation and that our self-narratives are socially and culturally embedded. There 
are three senses in which this is the case: our relationships, social and relational roles 
contribute contents to our stories; social contexts and relationships provide the language and 
contexts that make self-narration possible; and the stories other people tell about us shape and 
constrain those we are able to tell about ourselves. Taking the first to be relatively self-
explanatory, I will briefly expand on the second and third senses.  
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With reference to the facilitative role of our social contexts, Macintyre’s observes that, “the 
story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my 
identity.”150 Taylor expresses a related idea in arguing that our communities supply us with a 
“common language” that gives us the means to reflect upon and articulate what it means to 
have an identity and, more specifically, what it is that we value and what kind of selves we 
are.151 Like any language, this derives its meaning in public arenas and needs to be practiced 
amongst others. In the terminology introduced in the previous chapter we might construe this 
as our communities providing the ‘interpretive frameworks’ within which we are able to 
construct our self-narratives.  
Individual interactions are also seen as playing crucial facilitative roles. Macintyre maintains 
that “[t]he asking for and giving of accounts itself plays an important part in constituting 
narratives.”152 This is echoed in Taylor’s argument that we learn how to reflect on who we are 
and want to be through living amongst, and in discussion with, others.153 He holds that our 
lives are “fundamentally dialogical”.154 Taylor assigns an important role to close and 
supportive relationships in which, he suggests, we come to understand what, for example, our 
values or beliefs are.155156  
In saying that we, “define [ourselves] always in dialogue with and sometimes in struggle 
against the identities our significant others want to recognise in us”157 Taylor alludes to the 
fact that others not only facilitate, but also constrain, our self-conceptions. The accounts others 
(not only significant ones) give of who we are can either challenge, or reflect, our own self-
conceptions and, thus, potentially undermine, or reinforce, the stories we tell about ourselves 
and our capacities to act accordingly.158 Schechtman notes that in order to live socially, “one 
needs is a self-concept that is basically in synch with the view of one held by others.”159 
                                                             
150 MacIntyre (1985), p.221. 
151 C. Taylor (1989), p.35. 
152 MacIntyre (1985), p.218.  
153 C. Taylor (1992).  
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Parallels may observed here with the literature on relational autonomy, in which it is argued that 
socialisation and personal relationships are necessary in order to develop the “competency” for being 
autonomous. See, for example, D.T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (NewYork: Columbia 
University Press, 1989); L. Barclay, 'Autonomy and the Social Self', in Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). I return to the relationship between self-constitution and 
autonomy further in Section 6. 
157 C. Taylor (1992), p.33. 
158 DeGrazia (2005); MacIntyre (1985).  





What such synchronicity might involve varies between narrative theorists. I return in Section 
5 to discuss Schechtman’s requirement that our narrative must be realistically reflect the world 
as others experience it. Françoise Baylis, meanwhile, argues the requirement is for 
“equilibrium” between how we see ourselves and how others see us.160 I would suggest this 
might concede too much, because (as indicated above) a defining feature of a self-constituting 
narrative is its first-person interpretive perspective. Furthermore, concessions to others’ 
perspectives seem like something we might want to resist if these are oppressive or harmful.161 
As I shall go on to describe in this and the next chapter, what seems most important is not 
equilibrium per se, but that our self-conceptions remain intelligible and inhabitable in the 
context not only of other’s perspectives, but also our own experiences. 
iii) Contents  
Schechtman enumerates the possible components of an identity narrative as including 
“…actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits…” and “other psychological 
features” – which she refers to collectively as “characteristics”. 162 The list includes things we 
might not ordinarily label as ‘characteristics’, but this terminology signals that these are to be 
understood as constituents of the stories that characterise us. Crucially, these potential 
contents only contribute to someone’s identity to the extent that they are included and 
interpreted as part of her self-narrative, not just because they occur in the course of her life. 
This notwithstanding, in Chapter 3 I will argue that the absence of explicit references to bodily 
characteristics, such as gender or health status, from this list represents a significant omission.     
iv) Selection and interpretation 
This brings us to perhaps the most distinctive feature of identity-constituting narratives – they 
are not comprehensive or “crude, literal reproductions” of everything that one does and 
experiences.163 Nor yet are they just reflections of ready-structured proto-narratives presented 
to us by the world – in Schechtman’s terminology they are not cut from “wholecloth”.164 
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Instead, a self-narrative is constructed from disparate, selected and inter-interpreted 
components.  
Schechtman maintains that, as authors of our narratives, we select their contents by 
“appropriating” or excluding contents.165 This need not be (and is perhaps only intermittently) 
a conscious endeavour. Our existing accounts of who we are provide the interpretive 
framework through which we encounter experiences and thus through which the relevance and 
importance of potential contents strike us. Identity development is reflexive – the creator and 
created are the same, existing in a cycle of self-constitution.166 One implication of all this is 
that not all our characteristics occupy equally prominent or enduring positions in our 
narratives; this relationship “admits of degree” and the extent to which we are identifiable with 
particular characteristics varies accordingly.167 I will return to consider objections to the ideas 
of active construction shortly. 
The constituent parts of a narrative themselves are not just collated, but changed by the 
interpretive framework of narrativity. Schechtman suggests that an apt metaphor here is not 
the accumulation of a library, but cooking.168 Like ingredients in a stew, the meaning and 
significance of narrative elements are shaped by being viewed in light of the overall narrative 
of which they are a part. As Schechtman says: 
“…creating an autobiographical narrative is not simply composing a story of 
one’s life – it is organizing and processing one’s experience in a way that 
presupposes an implicit understanding of oneself as an evolving protagonist. A 
large part of what that entails is that the remembered past and anticipated future 
exert an influence on the present – that they serve as its interpretive context, the 
lens through which it is experienced.”169 
Similarly, present experiences may also lead us to re-interpret our remembered past and also 
shape our expectations of the future.170 The interpretive and integrative nature of a self-
narratives may be seen as operating in two directions – one that draws together the synchronic 
experience of self at any one time and one that connects the persisting experience of self over 
a lifetime.  
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v) Active and ongoing  
As the above considerations suggest, an identity narrative is something that an individual does 
– that she creates, sustains and modifies through her interpretations, choices and actions – not 
just “static and passive features that she has”.171 Furthermore, our self-narratives are never 
constructed once-and-for-all. In Genevieve Lloyd’s terms, narrativity entails the “perpetual 
weaving of fresh threads”.172 Therefore, the role and integration of particular elements within 
our narratives is never more than conditional, responding to new experiences and priorities.173 
Our identities evolve and change accordingly. Charles Taylor emphasises this, saying that “our 
condition can never be exhausted for us by what we are, because we are always changing and 
becoming.”174 This process will, of course, eventually come to an end with our death or loss 
of cognitive capacities.  
Two objections  
The account outlined thus far describes what self-narratives look like, without (yet) making 
normative claims about what qualities they must exhibit in order to be self-constituting, or 
what outcomes depend on having such a narrative (I address these matters in subsequent 
sections). Two principal kinds of objection have been raised in respect of the picture outlined 
so far.175 There is insufficient space comprehensively to consider narrative theorists’ rejoinders 
to these, but I hope to indicate that they need not be fatal for the purposes of the present project. 
Not everyone’s experience  
Galen Strawson objects that it is simply empirically false to assert that everyone experiences 
their lives and thinks of themselves in the form of a continuing, thematically-linked narrative. 
He himself professes instead to have only “episodic” self-experiences,176 maintaining that: 
“…I have absolutely no sense of my sense of a narrative with a form, or indeed 
as a narrative without a form…Nor do I have any great or special interest in my 
past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future.”177 
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Jonathan Glover, meanwhile, raises a related but less thoroughgoing concern that “[m]ost of 
us do not spend our lives on endless landscape-gardening of the self.”178 Narrative theories 
might indeed appear to paint an unattractive and unrealistically rationalist, onerous and self-
absorbed picture of self-constitution. They might also seem to depend on one having the luxury 
of time for self-examination and self-interpretation, or living in a culture in which such 
activities are normal or valued. 
Narrative theorists, however respond that such objections imagine too high and literal a 
threshold for what counts as a self-narrative and narrative construction.179 The suggestion is 
not that self-narratives are like polished literary texts with well-defined plots.180 And their 
construction need be neither self-conscious nor explicit. Narrativity neither entails that we 
constantly mull over our pasts, nor that we explicitly think of our identities as narratives.181 
Identity development takes place through the business of living and acting, and in making 
connections between, and finding significance in, aspects of our lives. As Schechtman explains 
“[narrative] is the lens through which we filter our experiences and plan for actions, not a way 
we think about ourselves in reflective hours.”182 The connections we forge between the parts 
of our stories are rooted in as much in felt significance, practical concerns and perceptions of 
emotional resonance, as rational analysis.183 Furthermore, the conception reviewed in this 
chapter is distinct from the (caricature of) atomistic, narcissistic, self-actualising individualism 
of contemporary liberal western life.184 As indicated above, identity development is, crucially, 
a relational pursuit not one of isolated, individualistic navel-gazing.    
However, it is acknowledged that our self-narratives may well not be lucid and undisturbed at 
all times. Mackenzie observes that many of us will have experiences that are fragmented or 
hard to understand and the maintenance of an intelligible self-narrative might sometimes 
require effort. But, rather than being grounds for rejecting a narrative conception, these are 
indications that “the integration of selfhood across time is fragile”.185 So, even if Strawson’s 
wholesale scepticism is unwarranted, it is indeed the case that maintenance of a coherent self-
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narrative is not inevitable and perhaps, for some with limited cognitive capacities or very 
challenging lives, not even possible (as I will discuss further in Section 7).  
Fabrication 
Strawson’s second objection is that the selection and structuring of experiences into a narrative 
would not result in a faithful account of ‘who one really is’, but rather an artificial 
confection.186 I will briefly outline three parallel responses to this.  
First, it is not obvious how we could make sense of all the different aspects of our lives without 
prioritisation and interpretation.187 Excessive inclusivity or richness of detail would seem to 
militate against, rather than support, self-understanding.188 The second response is that, if we 
understand our narratives as constituting our identities, rather than describing them, then an 
individual simply does not have a more basic, or more ‘true’ pre-existing identity with respect 
to which self-narrative could found inauthentic.189 This does not preclude the possibility of 
self-deception or error about what characteristics are prominent in constituting who one is. But 
– turning to the third response – narrative theories incorporate checks upon unfettered 
invention, misappropriations and misinterpretations. An individual’s freedom to choose what 
goes into her narrative (and, therefore, create who she is) is constrained.  
Schechtman proposes two “constraints” upon what counts as an identity-constituting narrative. 
The first is that it must be amenable to “articulation”.190 The second is that it must “cohere 
with reality”.191 These constraints are broadly endorsed by other prominent proponents of a 
narrative conception of identity.192 These constraints also supply key steps in the argument I 
propose in subsequent chapters, so warrant further attention here. 
SECTION 5: CONSTRAINTS ON IDENTITY-CONSTITUTING NARRATIVES  
Articulation constraint 
Schechtman’s ‘articulation constraint’ requires that our self-narratives are intelligible and 
explicable to and by their subjects. This does not mean that we must literally, self-consciously 
or perpetually recount our self-narratives, but the connections between our experiences, 
actions, beliefs and values and their places in our narratives must at least be amenable to “local 
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articulation”.193 That is, we must be able to explain why we feel, believe and do as we do. We 
must be in a position to explain how these elements fit into “…an intelligible life story with a 
comprehensible and well-drawn subject as its protagonist.”194 
Articulation is not, however, presented as an all-or-nothing condition. An inability to make 
sense of some parts of one’s life would not necessarily compromise one’s capacity to have an 
identity altogether.195  Nevertheless, if, for example, someone frequently acts from 
unacknowledged motive, this might indeed mean that sufficient portions of her life lie outwith 
her control and are less than fully identifiable with who she is, and thus threaten the integrity 
of her identity.196 
The justification for the articulation constraint is grounded in the fact that being able to 
understand the role that the constituent characteristics of our narratives play in shaping and 
constituting the whole is key to our abilities to make sense of who we are, what we care about 
and the motives from which we act. It is thus key to our capacity to be responsible for 
ourselves, our conduct and our ongoing self-creation – in Schechtman’s terms, our capacity to 
live “the life of a person”.197 I shall return to discuss further what this means in Section 6.  
Reality constraint 
The second constraint that Schechtman imposes is that our self-narratives “cohere with the 
basic contours of reality”.198 The reality in question here is the world of facts as observed by 
others – facts about us as human organisms (rather than selves),199 other people, our 
environment, and relationships between these. Importantly this constraint does not entail a 
requirement for maximum inclusion of all such facts. Rather it highlights the threat that serious 
departures from these poses to maintaining and inhabiting an identity-constituting narrative. 
The reality constraint is justified by the need for us to have an identity that supports us in living 
in the world with others which, Schechtman argues, requires “[f]undamental agreement on the 
most basic features of reality.”200 She goes on to say that: 
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“The failure to be tuned into basic facts about the world one inhabits – and hence 
the failure to inhabit a world in common with one’s fellows – interferes with the 
capacities and activities that define the lives of persons.”201 
As with the articulation constraint, departures from reality that threaten identity can be 
distinguished from those that may reasonably be accommodated within a coherent self-
narrative. In the first category are gross and “recalcitrant” delusions about matters of fact or 
interpretations of facts, such as the belief that one is Napoleon, or reading everything as a sign 
that one is under surveillance.202 These may be seen rendering someone’s narrative so 
dysfunctional that it can no longer constitute an identity in a meaningful, practical sense, and 
make “taking one’s place in the world of persons virtually impossible” (see Section 6).203 
However, most human lives include innumerable mistakes of observation, memory, or 
interpretation. Schechtman holds that such errors do not compromise someone’s identity if 
they are of a kind that she would correct if they were drawn to her attention and if she is able 
(without too much difficulty) to revise her narrative accordingly.204 And interpretive 
idiosyncrasies – for example seeing life through an anxious or optimistic lens – are not held to 
threaten identity, but rather part of the individual and interpretive nature of the narrative 
endeavour.205 
These constraints will play a significant role in what I go on to say about the value of personal 
bioinformation in identity construction. However, I will suggest that the requirements for 
intelligibility and realism might extend in a direction that Schechtman herself neglects. 
Schechtman emphasises the need for our identities broadly to cohere with the world as 
experienced by others because we lead social lives. But, in Chapter 3 I will present my own 
argument, which builds upon but goes beyond, the accounts of identity outlined here. I will 
argue that, because we also lead inescapably embodied lives, there is also a need for our 
identities to be comprehensible in light of, and to cohere with, our own embodied experiences.   
SECTION 6: WHY HAVING COHERENT IDENTITY NARRATIVE MATTERS   
The conception of identity outlined in this chapter is more than a mere description of who 
someone is, it is a normative, practical one. That is to say, it is the foundation from which we 
interpret our experiences, evaluate, act and continue to constitute who we are. And the ability 
of a self-narrative to occupy these practical roles is contingent upon it having certain qualities. 
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According to the various accounts on which I draw in this chapter, it is variously argued that 
they must be: coherent, intelligible, realistic, amenable to articulation, explicable, unified, 
stable and integrated. For the remainder of this project, in the interests of brevity, I shall use 
‘coherence’ to refer to this suite of qualities. In doing so my intention is to exploit the dual 
connotations of ‘coherence’ – suggestive of both unification, and also of intelligibility. I return 
to unpack further what coherence entails in Section 7. In this section I will summarise the 
reasons indicated in the literature why it is that having a coherent self-narrative is held to 
matter for the richness and character of an individual’s own life. 
The valuable capacities  
The value to the individual of developing and maintaining a coherent self-narrative is held to 
lie in the kind of life that it supports. According to some accounts this value is described in 
terms of the life of a ‘person’.206 I shall not use the language of personhood here for three 
reasons.207 First I wish to avoid conflation with a different kind of debate in bioethics, where 
personhood is associated with third-person adjudication of questions about which kinds of 
lives, or whose choices, warrant respect. Secondly, in drawing together the nature of outcomes 
that are variously held to be contingent on the coherence of our self-narratives, I wish to cast 
my net wider than those narrative accounts which explicitly invoke personhood. Thirdly, the 
desirability of ‘being a person’ to an individual may be somewhat opaque. My intention is to 
illuminate why it matters to the individual herself that she has a coherent identity narrative. 
Here, then, I will unpack a suite of six (interconnected) valuable capacities that emerge from 
the literature as those which are contingent upon the coherence of our self-narratives.208 These 
are, our capacities for:   
i) self-understanding; 
ii) investment in our own pasts and futures; 
iii) strong evaluation;  
iv) autonomy; 
v) moral outlook and commitments and 
vi) self-creation. 
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I shall briefly describe each of these. 
i) Self-understanding  
Perhaps the most obvious function that our self-narratives serve, is allowing us to understand 
and reflect upon who we are. As Catriona Mackenzie and Mary Walker describe it, 
“Because self-narratives are selective and interpretive, they enable us to make 
psychological and evaluative sense of our selves, forging patterns of coherence 
and psychological intelligibility in response to the changing and fragmentary 
nature of our lived experience.”209 
They help us to locate our “central qualities” within the bewildering array accrued over a life-
course.210  A narrative framing permits one to think of our lives as a whole and to interpret our 
experiences in light of our pasts and in anticipation of our futures and can accommodate 
diversity and evolution within unity.211  
ii) Investment in our own pasts and futures  
The interpretive connections of narrativity provide the basis upon which I can understand how 
the ‘me’ in the past is continuous with the present ‘me’, despite having undergone (perhaps 
significant) changes. This sense of temporal connectedness is key to underpinning concern for 
our own past and future commitments or relationships and indeed to the fact that we are 
invested in long-term projects at all.212 Schechtman argues that our “self-interested concern” 
for what will happen in the future is explicable because it will be part of one’s story and have 
interpretive implications for other parts of this story.213 Within this picture there is room for 
my identification with different parts of one’s life to admit of degrees.214 But it is also 
conceivable that my characteristics might undergo such thoroughgoing changes that it is 
impossible to locate a thread that joins one part of my life to another, such that I might be 
justified in feeling that I was indeed a different individual.  
iii) Strong evaluation  
It is argued that our narratives provide us with the interpretive perspective from which we 
work out what we value and what a worthwhile life looks like – in Charles Taylor’s terms: 
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“To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand.”215 Taylor argues that our narratives 
support our capacity for, what he calls “strong evaluation”.216 They provide the foundation 
from which we can develop and articulate stable preferences, based in reflective judgements 
about what course of action, or ways of living, are worthwhile. Having, in Harry Frankfurt’s 
phrase, “second-order desires” – that is, not just to want, but to want to want something – 
requires knowing who we are and having a conception of ourselves as invested in the future 
direction of self-stories.217 The alternative is to be blown around by unreflective desires and 
ad hoc choices of a “simple weigher”.218 As this suggests, this capacity for evaluation is 
intimately tied to our autonomy and our identities as agents.  
iv) Autonomy 
Autonomy here is intended in the thick sense of a capacity of a person, rather than the property 
of an isolated choice.219 While the latter, thin, sense of autonomy could be exhibited by 
someone ‘simply weighing’ options in an ad hoc fashion, autonomy in the former sense may 
be seen as reliant on possession of an identity-constituting narrative for a number of reasons. 
On many accounts, at least one condition for being an autonomous agent is that one’s motives, 
desires, beliefs and values are ‘really one’s own’ because they are the product of critical 
reflection.220 Meanwhile, Robert Young describes autonomy as the “means to our working out 
our projects in the world”.221 Autonomous actions are those that are expressive of an individual 
“working as an integrated whole” in a way that permits multiplicity of roles and motives, but 
precludes compartmentalisation or deep conflict.222 On these grounds, the maintenance of a 
coherent self-narrative may be seen as the necessary foundation for autonomy insofar as it 
provides the basis for our strong evaluations, our investment in enduring projects, and the 
binding medium within which the mutual interpretation and accommodation of diverse 
motives is possible.223 A coherent self-narrative provides the foundation for us to be the 
authors of our own actions.224 This does not entail an individualistic conception of autonomy. 
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The narrative foundation on which our evaluations and priorities are based is one that is 
necessarily developed through our relationships with others.225    
v) Moral outlook and commitments   
The significance of knowing who one is, where one stands on matters of value and priority, 
and being in a position to make strong evaluations ought not to be seen as reducible solely to 
one’s capacity for autonomous agency. It may also be seen as the foundation for our moral 
outlook or vision and our conception of what constitutes a good life. As Iris Murdoch observes, 
our moral character is not constituted only by our will or our actions, but also by how we 
attend to the world and to other people.226 The idea that the construction of our self-narratives 
is intimately bound up with our articulation and pursuit of what we judge to be a good and 
worthwhile life is particularly associated with the accounts offered by MacIntyre and 
Taylor.227 Taylor holds that “[o]ur identity is what allows us to define what is important to us 
and what is not.”228 Furthermore, the integrity and continuity of our self-narratives may be 
seen as the necessary substrate that supports our investment in the kinds of long-term projects, 
commitments and relationships that help to give our lives depth and meaning.229 Though these 
aspects of a rich life might entail acting in particular ways, they are not wholly reducible to 
action.     
vi) Ongoing self-creation 
Being in possession of a coherent self-narrative is also key to our capacities to continue to 
create who we are, to consolidate the characteristics we value and to evolve.230 Our abilities to 
make strong evaluations, and to act on our autonomous choices may be seen not only as the 
products of our self-narratives, but also as the means by which we select the components of 
our self-narratives and shape their course into the future.231 This reflexivity is central to the 
narrative conception of self-constitution. DeGrazia characterises it thus: “…self-creation 
projects flow from narrative identity and, as they do so, continue to write and often edit the 
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narratives from which they flow.”232 On this view, the capacities listed above may be seen as 
both a means of narrative construction and an outcome of this. 
The ‘double normativity’ of identity-constituting narratives 
The purpose of this section has been to answer the fourth of the research questions posed at 
the start of this chapter: what is at stake in our ability to construct and inhabit an identity-
constituting self-narrative? The answer provided by the theories reviewed here is that what is 
at stake is the possibility of developing the six capacities outlined above (or in Schechtman’s 
terms, being able fully to live the life of a ‘person’). Schechtman stops short of saying that a 
life of someone who has authorship of her own actions and is invested in her own past and 
future is objectively better than that of someone who does not.233 However, she allows that, 
when our lives do have these features, retaining them does indeed matter to us. And she takes 
their value as basic, rather than something for which we need to (or could) seek further 
justification. In this thesis I will hold that knowing who one is and who one wants to be, and 
being in a position potentially to realise this through one’s actions, commitments, judgements 
and ongoing self-development, are things that we value and are key to leading rich, fulfilling 
and engaged human lives. I shall take this claim as relatively uncontroversial, particularly as 
this position is neutral as to the specific contents, pursuits or priorities of such a life. I would, 
however, readily concede that the six capacities are not sufficient for a flourishing existence, 
and that a life lived without them could be a content one, if not one that most of us would 
choose.  
At the start of Section 3, I suggested that narrative theories of self-constitution exhibit a 
‘double normativity’. The ‘outcome’ aspect of this double normativity is, then, that something 
valuable depends on the development and maintenance of our self-narratives: the ability to 
understand who we are and thereby to develop and sustain a cluster of capacities that contribute 
to the richness and fulfilment of our lives. The second aspect of the double normativity is that 
this outcome is contingent upon developing a particular kind of self-narrative – one that is 
intelligible, unified and realistic, in short, coherent. Narrative coherence is not inevitable. As 
outlined above, it is intimately tied up with the articulability and realism of someone’s account 
of who they are and how parts of this story connect to and colour others. It pertains to both 
internal integration and intelligibility with respect to the world. It is both synchronic and 
diachronic, binding together a “persisting subject” over time.234 This means that it is possible 
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to fail, to a greater or lesser extent, to develop or to maintain a self-narrative that is sufficiently 
coherent to support the valuable capacities. In the next section I shall turn to consider what is 
entailed by the requirement for narrative coherence.  
SECTION 7: COHERENCE AND SELF-CONSTITUTION 
The first matter I will address here is scepticism about whether narrative coherence is 
necessary to support the kind of identity-constituting narrative that is capable of underpinning 
the valuable capacities outlined above. I will then consider the assertions made in the literature 
about the degree of coherence that is deemed necessary and the kinds of factors that might 
impinge on our abilities to achieve it. This will start to expose the reasons why, as I shall argue 
in Chapter 3, personal bioinformation may play an important role in our construction of our 
self-narratives. 
The importance of narrative coherence  
Some commentators challenge the suggestion that narrativity, let alone narrative coherence, is 
necessary for a rich or fulfilling life.235 For example, Galen Strawson cites his facility for 
commitment and friendship despite the apparent episodic phenomenology of his life.236 It is 
hard to counter such an ad hominem claim. Again, one response to sceptics is that they are 
addressing a straw man by setting too high a threshold for what counts as coherent identity-
constituting and capacity-supporting narrative.237  
Another kind of response is to consider the importance of coherence from the opposite 
perspective – that of the challenges of living without a reasonably unified and intelligible 
foundation from which to interpret our experiences, to judge, decide, act, and to navigate our 
lives. At the extreme end of this, Mackenzie and Poltera offer the example of Elyn Saks’s 
memoir of living with schizophrenic psychosis as an example of the “real suffering” a 
disintegrated and disrupted narrative can cause. They describe Saks recounting how her illness 
removed any “vantage point” or “core” from which she was able to organise or interpret her 
experiences or locate herself amongst them.238  
More commonplace is the example invoked by Taylor of the ephemeral, but still distressing, 
experience of undergoing an “identity crisis” following the loss of a job or relationship, during 
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which one loses the parameters within which one is able to determine who one is or what one 
values.239 And Jonathan Glover captures the value of one’s identity narrative as a stable 
foundation for our agency in saying that: 
“Our inner story lets us get our bearings when we act. Without it, all decisions 
would be like steering at sea without a map or compass.”240 
The coherence of our self-narratives matters because they are the interpretive frameworks 
through which we make sense of and conduct our lives. Nevertheless, the theories considered 
here do not require absolute coherence for a self-narrative to be identity-constituting. 
How much coherence is required? 
Views differ about how much coherence is required for a self-narrative to be identity-
constituting. Schechtman asserts that a “high degree” is needed.241 But she acknowledges that 
“perfect intelligibility” is an unattainable ideal.242 Some, though, regard Schechtman’s 
requirement as too demanding.243 Mackenzie and Poltera point to the complex, multifaceted 
nature of our lives and their duration, which mean that, for example, tensions between our 
commitments, or alienation from some of our roles or motivations are almost inevitable. They 
suggest, therefore, that a narrative need only be “relatively integrated”.244 Furthermore, 
because we must respond to new experiences any coherence is only ever “dynamic and 
provisional”.245 Mackenzie argues that: 
“…part of what is involved in constituting oneself as a persisting subject is to 
create an identity that has a degree of permanence and coherence. This identity 
takes the form of character or a set of relatively stable and integrated traits, habits, 
dispositions, and emotional attitudes.”246 [emphasis added]  
Coherence entails neither bland homogeneity nor immutability. What matters is that a self-
narrative has a “meaningful” or “satisfying” unity, such that its constituent parts “hang 
together” in a way that make sense as parts of a whole (unfolding) story that is 
“psychologically intelligible” to us.247  
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The (in)coherence of our self-narratives may admit of degree and can be more or less 
pervasive. At one extreme someone might struggle to make sense of who she is at all, or what 
characteristics are attributable to her, for example, as a result of cognitive and affective 
disturbances associated with severe psychosis.248 More localised incoherence, for example 
where an individual is unable to reconcile particular desires with her account of who she is, 
may be more commonplace. The latter is not held fatally to threaten identity-constitution.249 
But it is suggested that there are limits to which the intelligibility of the whole can be 
quarantined from local dis-integrity. For example, Taylor holds that repudiating one’s entire 
childhood “is to accept a kind of mutilation as a person.”250  
According to the narrative theories of self-constitution reviewed here, a total inability to 
construct an intelligible self-narrative places the valuable capacities I have listed above beyond 
someone’s reach. However, arguments as to how much coherence and integration of one’s self-
narrative are needed to sustain these various corollary capacities vary between different 
accounts of narrative self-constitution. For example, Mackenzie and Poltera maintain that the 
conditions for preserving a sense of who one is may be less demanding than those for having 
a capacity for full autonomy.251 Meanwhile Schechtman suggests that one’s continued 
subjective sense of self may be more vulnerable to narrative disintegration than, for example, 
having a general sense of connection to one’s past actions.252 These distinctions 
notwithstanding, the broad implication of the theoretical accounts discussed here is that 
possession of an “internally troubled and divided” narrative threatens one’s capacities to have 
a clear sense of who one is, one’s value and priorities and sense of authorship of one’s own 
conduct and existence.253 Moreover, the way in which it does so is a matter of degree. My 
thesis will chiefly be concerned with the ways in which moderate and relatively common 
sources of disruption to narrative coherence could interrupt or diminish our capacities to make 
sense of, to inhabit and to enact who we are, rather than with sources of catastrophic narrative 
disintegration that would entail wholesale loss of identity.  
Factors affecting coherence 
This then leaves the question of what kinds of factors are held to influence (for better or worse) 
the coherence of our self-narratives. This question is crucial for the present project – I will 
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argue in the next chapter that access to personal bioinformation may be seen as playing a 
critical role in this. Here, though, I focus only on the influences indicated by the literature.  
These may broadly be broken down into: 
i) Personal agency; 
ii) Other people; 
iii) Events; 
iv) Body and health; and 
v) Moral teleology. 
The relevance of the first four of these factors to the role that I will propose that personal 
bioinformation may play in our identity narratives will become plan over the coming chapters 
i) Personal agency 
The development of an integrated identity is widely framed as “an achievement of agency” 
rather being inevitable.254 This does not mean that achieving coherence needs to be one’s 
explicit aim. But narrative construction is presented in the literature as the application of an 
organising, interpretive activity. And coherence is achieved or undermined to the extent that 
an individual is able to reconcile, for example, her personal values with her professional 
ones,255 or act in ways consistent with the normative descriptors or roles she applies to 
herself.256 Achieving or maintaining a coherent sense of self is something we do. But, as 
emphasised in Section 4, it is not something we necessarily do in a self-conscious or self-
absorbed way. In some circumstances, however, such as the restoration of coherence following 
the disruption of serious mental illness, it might require a considerable and “fraught” effort of 
will.257 But coherence is by no means wholly in our control, as the remaining four factors 
indicate. 
ii) Other people and social contexts 
It is only necessary briefly here to review the ways that other people can detract from or 
support the coherence of our self-narratives, as I have already discussed this in Section 4.  
Support comes in the form of the relationships within which we develop who we are and may 
see our own self-conceptions reflected, and the wider social contexts that provide the language 
and interpretive tools with which we work out what kind of individuals we are.258 Meanwhile 
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others may disrupt our self-conceptions by resisting our own self-characterisations.259 As 
Macintyre observes: 
“…what the agent is able to do or say intelligibly as an actor is deeply affected 
by the fact that we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of 
our own narratives.”260 
Inevitably, the actions of others also impact on our existing narratives by introducing new 
plotlines, opportunities or constraints.  
iii) Events  
Schechtman suggests that significant or unexpected events can disrupt formerly well-
integrated narratives by throwing new light and interpretations on what has gone before, or 
derailing their anticipated future trajectories.261 Coherence may be restorable. But Schechtman 
suggests that some particularly disorienting events could interfere with our capacities to 
articulate our narratives altogether.   
iv) Body and health  
Our mental health and cognitive and affective functioning are critical to our ability to construct 
and maintain a coherent self-narrative. Dementia or serious mental illness, by interfering with 
memory or the ability to organise experience into a comprehensible, temporal structure may 
lead to “fragmentation of the self”.262 And, as I shall go on to illustrate in subsequent chapters, 
it is likely that prominent amongst the events and experiences that can disrupt our self-
conceptions are those affecting our bodies or health. However, our bodies are not just a source 
of potential disruption. Mackenzie argues that our continuous (though evolving) awareness of 
ourselves as physical beings also provides a kind of substrate or anchor for the (particularly 
diachronic) integration of our identities and “one of the background conditions for the ongoing 
unity and intelligibility of our lives.”263 
I shall argue that these connections between body, health and biology, on one hand, and 
narrative coherence, on the other, is at the heart of the potential identity-value of personal 
bioinformation. For this reason, though, more detailed exposition must await Chapter 3.  
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v) Moral teleology 
Macintyre and Taylor argue that an identity-constituting narrative derives a unifying purpose 
from the “quest” for a morally good life.264 This moral teleology is absent from many other 
accounts, including Schechtman’s. I will not attempt to adjudicate this difference. My 
arguments that follow will not depend on there being a necessary connection between pursuit 
of morally virtuous life (or any single grand telos) and a coherent narrative.  
Beyond Coherence  
The discussion in this chapter has focused on what we might think of as the ‘structural 
conditions’ necessary for a self-constituting narrative – that is the interpretive relationships 
and ‘fit’ between the constituent parts of the narrative and reality and the relative coherence 
of the whole. Many narrative theories, including Schechtman’s, are largely silent on the 
qualities of the actions, values, beliefs or commitments that can make up a self-narrative.265 
Taylor is somewhat more directive, arguing that an identity built solely upon our own 
individualistic or ephemeral concerns, divorced from social commitments and contexts, is a 
limited and impoverished one.266 Nevertheless, Taylor does not prescribe the precise nature of 
characteristics that can contribute to an identity-constituting narrative.267  
The features of these theories of narrative self-constitution on which this thesis will depend 
are the requirement for achieving and maintaining a reasonable degree of narrative coherence 
and the implications this holds for a self-narrative to function as a practical narrative, 
grounding our sense of who we are, agency and navigation of lived experiences. The neutrality 
of many such theories as to the characteristics that can make up an identity-constituting story 
may be seen as contributing to their plausibility and range of applicability to many different 
kinds of lives and choices. Nevertheless, I would suggest that it must be recognised that from 
a first-person perspective it is not only the coherence of our identities that matters us. It also 
matters how I feel about the kind of person I am. It matters to me that I have particular kinds 
of desires and values, that I do particular things, occupy particular roles and have particular 
relationships. The contents of our narratives also matter. The relevance of this will become 
                                                             
264 MacIntyre (1985), p.219; C. Taylor (1989).  
265 They are silent to the extent the nature of the contents does not impinge on a narrative’s 
articulability or realism. 
266 C. Taylor (1992). 
267 Hilde Lindemann Nelson adopts a more socially-constructed and externalist conception of 
narrative identity than the one I have outlined here. Nevertheless, she argues that some means of 
narrative self-constitution may be oppressive and, in being so, interfere with someone’s capacity for 





clearer when I come to consider what it means for personal bioinformation to be significant 
and valuable to our identities in Chapter 8.  
SECTION 8: CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
I began this chapter by suggesting that existing accounts of the relationship between our access 
to various kind of personal bioinformation and our identities do not their own provide adequate 
bases for explaining why a wide range of personal bioinformation might have sufficiently 
significant impacts on our identities to give rise to important interests in information access. I 
have proposed that an account in which personal bioinformation is understood as potentially 
playing a crucial role in the construction of our identity narratives could provide just such an 
explanation. However, in order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to have a well-
developed appreciation of what is entailed by a theory of narrative identity. Outlining the 
relevant contours of such a theory has been the second key task of this chapter.  
The normativity of the theories outlined above will be key to understanding my case for the 
nature and weight of our interests in accessing personal bioinformation. This argument will be 
based on the premise that we all have a strong interest in developing and inhabiting coherent 
self-narratives that provide us with an understanding of who are, which of our characteristics 
make us who we are, what we value and how we are connected to our own pasts and futures. 
This is a narrative that brings an interpretive framework and binding logic to these various 
characteristics, such that they comprise a global identity that is unified (while admitting of 
complexity and change), that makes sense to us, and provides a foundation for our judgements, 
actions, relationships and commitments. The strength of the interest in narrative self-
constitution is not grounded in the valorisation of the vain or individualistic pursuit of self-
understanding or self-perfectionism. Rather its justification lies in the proposition that the 
development of a coherent self-narrative is a condition for the development of a suite of 
valuable capacities that are necessary for leading rich, fulfilling and engaged lives. This 
interest is, therefore, considerable. For this reason, I will argue, we have concomitant interests 
in the means to develop, maintain or restore narrative coherence. I will expand on this claim 











CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF PERSONAL 
BIOINFORMATION IN OUR SELF-NARRATIVES 
 
SECTION 1: AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER  
In this chapter I build on the philosophical account of narrative identity outlined in the previous 
chapter by presenting my own argument that personal bioinformation has a significant role to 
play in the development of our identity narratives. This argument will provide support for my 
central contention in this thesis: that our identity-related interests warrant serious ethical 
attention in policies and practices governing our access to this kind of information. 
As such, this chapter continues the work of addressing the first of my four headline questions 
set out in Chapter 1: how might the relationship between personal bioinformation and our 
identities be conceptualised? Specifically, it aims to make clear the source of the normativity 
in the relationship. The particular research questions that I will answer in this chapter are: 
i. Why is personal bioinformation relevant to our self-narratives? 
ii. In what ways could personal bioinformation benefit the development of our 
identities? 
I begin this chapter by setting the context for my argument by observing that many, though 
not all, existing philosophical theories of narrative self-constitution accord surprisingly little 
significance to the fact that we are we are materially embodied beings. I outline why this is an 
important omission. I then review the approaches of narrative theories that do accommodate 
embodiment, while noting these do not extend to recognising a particular role for personal 
bioinformation in narrative construction. (Section 2). I then present my own original argument 
that, given the inescapably embodied nature of our existence and experiences, personal 
bioinformation provides important tools for the construction of self-narratives that maintain 
their coherence in light of these experiences, and support us in navigating them. On this basis, 
I explain why the ‘double normativity’ of narrative identity theory supports my contention that 
access to personal bioinformation information engages ethically significant interests. (Section 
3). In proposing a role for personal bioinformation in the construction of our self-narratives I 
aim to contribute a fresh angle to the literature on narrative identity theory. In Section 4 I 
outline how my theory is distinguishable from four arguments in the literature with which it 
shares some similarities. In the final substantive section of this chapter I respond to two sets 
66 
 
of possible concerns that might be raised about the suitability of bioinformation as a tool of 
self-conception (Section 5).  
The arguments that follow in this chapter are intended to apply to personal bioinformation as 
a broad category, not necessarily to every type or token of it. The factors that help to shape 
and differentiate the significance and value of particular kinds and instances of personal 
bioinformation will be discussed in Chapter 8, drawing on the evidence from the illustrative 
examples in Part II. 
SECTION 2: EMBODIED IDENTITY  
Disembodied narratives 
Despite my proposal in the previous chapter that a narrative conception of identity has the 
appropriate qualities to ground an explanation of the role and value of personal bioinformation 
in self-characterisation, this theoretical foundation might seem a surprising choice. This is 
because many of the best-known theories of narrative self-constitution, including those of 
Marya Schechtman in ‘The Constitution of Selves’, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, 
have little or nothing to say about the relevance of our existence as biological beings to our 
identities. These canonical versions have been critiqued by some as being (excessively) 
rationalist and dualist in the ways they construe self-narrative.268 They appear to pay little 
attention to the ways that our bodies and embodied existence might contribute to and shape 
our experiences of ourselves and our lives and thus the accounts we give, or are able to give, 
of who we are. They paint a picture of self-constitution that takes place in the mind, while the 
body is relegated to the vehicle through which we happen to enact our stories of who we are. 
MacIntyre merely notes that birth and death bookend our narratives.269 Meanwhile 
Schechtman in her earlier work restricts the identity-related role of the human body to the 
means by which others may (re)identify us, thus permitting the kinds of social interactions that 
contribute to self-building.270 Not all theories of narrative identity, however, are similarly 
disembodied, as I will return to discuss later in this section. 
Given their dualism, it is hardly surprising that these prominent theories do not themselves 
argue for, or acknowledge, a role for personal bioinformation in informing self-constitution. 
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Nevertheless, I would suggest, they do not explicitly preclude such a role. For example, 
Schechtman lists the contents of self-narratives as being “…actions, experiences, beliefs, 
values, desires, character traits…”271 and “other psychological features”.272 This list in 
principle leaves open the possibility that some of these contents might sometimes be supplied 
by information about one’s body or biology.  
However, there is one reason these accounts might seem to preclude a role for personal 
bioinformation. This is because personal bioinformation pertains to bodily states, functions, 
or relationships which are only ‘ours’ or ‘about us’ in a passive, default sense. In an analogous 
observation, Harry Frankfurt says, “of course, every movement of a person’s body is an event 
in his history… But this is only a gross literal truth.”273According to the theories of narrative 
identity outlined in the previous chapter, our self-narratives are precisely not just made up of 
the ‘givens’ of our biological lives or the totality of all the facts about what inexorably goes 
on in and around us. Rather they are constructed and interpreted – we make them.274 Therefore, 
positing the identity-relevance of bioinformation might seem illegitimately to confuse 
information relevant to our identities – who we are as individual selves, persons and agents – 
on one hand, with information that is merely relevant to us as human organisms, on the other.  
Schechtman herself lodges a related objection when she argues that findings about the 
neurological correlates of choices or behaviour should not necessarily be seen as threatening 
our own narrative explanations of our motivations where they diverge from these.275 Her 
rejection is not dependent on such findings being poorly evidenced or otherwise dubious. 
Rather she holds that, because identity is constituted by narrative, these neuroscientific 
findings have no claim on being “prenarrative truth about the self”.276  
The argument to be developed in this chapter has no quarrel with Schechtman’s position. My 
position will not be premised on an assumption that personal bioinformation reveals existing 
facts about an individual’s identity, but rather that it supplies knowledge of her biology, body, 
or health, which she may then interpret as being relevant (or not), and choose to use (or not), 
in developing her self-narrative. So in positing, for example, that someone could have an 
identity-related interest in accessing findings from a neuroimaging study in which she has 
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participated pertaining to her own brain functions, my suggestion is not that these results 
somehow reveal ‘who she really is’ in the unmediated raw, but rather that they might provide 
material she could use in developing her interpretation of who she is. I shall argue here that 
bioinformation should be seen as relevant to identity in an instrumental rather than intrinsic 
sense.  
Inescapable embodiment 
What positive grounds, then, do I have for proposing that personal bioinformation could play 
a valuable part in our self-narratives? The answer, I will suggest, rests on the inescapably 
materially-embodied nature of our existence.  As such, I shall argue, knowledge of our health, 
bodies and biology provides both potential contents and crucial interpretive tools for the 
construction of our self-narratives. I will return to justify this claim in Section 3. But first, I 
shall outline what I mean by the ‘embodied nature of existence’.  
What I mean by this is that our experiences of ourselves and of the world, our abilities to act 
in the world, and the ways other people react to us are all shaped by the fact that we exist as 
material beings and material beings with particular physical attributes. We experience our lives 
from an embodied perspective and navigate them as embodied beings. Claims about the 
significance of embodiment may be found in diverse disciplines. Philosophers of mind and 
neurobiologists have argued that the fact that we exist as bodies inescapably shapes the ways 
in which we encounter, perceive and understand the world. For example, Quassim Cassam 
suggests that “the fantasy of the disembodied self is just that: a fantasy”.277 Consciousness 
itself, it is argued, can be seen as essentially embodied.278 Phenomenologists have argued that 
our experience of being embodied gives meaning and form both to the body itself and to the 
world. For example, Merleau-Ponty holds that – 
“The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living 
creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with 
certain projects and be continually committed to them.”279 
In recent years there has also been a ‘material turn’ in sociological theories of self – one that 
seeks to (re)assert and emphasise “the way material aspects of our embodiment condition our 
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lived subjectivity”.280 An emphasis upon the importance of the lived experience of the body to 
the self also makes up a significant strand in feminist theory.281 Judith Butler, for example, 
explores the interrelationship between materiality and performativity in the emergence of the 
categories of gender and sex,282 while Margrit Shildrick holds that “the being, or rather the 
becoming, of the self is always intricately interwoven with the fabric of the body”. 283  
Meanwhile, feminist theorists Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman observe that our bodies and 
biology exert both “active” and “recalcitrant” forces upon our lives that serve to shape, enable, 
and place limits upon what we are able to do and how we are able to define ourselves.284 
Because of the role of our bodies in shaping both the nature of our experiences and the 
directions our lives can take, I will argue that any adequate theory of identity must be one that 
reflects the phenomenology, the ‘what it is like’, of human existence and thus acknowledge 
the significance of embodiment to who we are and who we can be.   
Embodiment in narrative identity theory  
The dualism implied by the theories of narrative identity discussed above notwithstanding, 
other narrative theories have not ignored the material turn in accounts of the self. Several more 
recent narrative conceptions of identity recognise the extent to which our embodiment plays a 
central role in shaping our self-narratives.285 One of most developed accounts is offered by 
Catriona Mackenzie.286 Mackenzie is clear that her view is not that our identities are reducible 
to our bodily states or attributes. But, because our experiences of the world are necessarily 
those of embodied beings, our “bodily perspective” provides a crucial interpretive framework 
and counterpoint for the construction of our stories of who we are.287 She takes this to mean 
that our sense of continuous material embodiment supplies an important background condition 
for our sense of the unity of our self-narratives. But she also suggests that making sense of 
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who one is requires making sense of the biological realities of one’s life, such that, “developing 
an integrated and ongoing narrative of one’s embodied subjectivity is central to the activity of 
self-constitution.”288 
Françoise Baylis emphasises the importance not only of subjective embodied experience to 
our self-narratives, but also of the way that others recognise and respond to our physical selves. 
She argues that aspects of our bodies such as the colour of our skin or our sex “influence[s] 
who we are and how we can be in the world”, by shaping the stories others tell about us, and 
thus constraining those we are able to tell about ourselves.289 Meanwhile, Priscilla Brandon 
argues that our embodiment not only influences our self-narratives, but that these narratives 
can also affect how we carry ourselves or modify our bodies.290 Her position serves as valuable 
reminder that self-narratives are not epiphenomenal, but have consequences for how we 
conduct ourselves in the world. 
My own argument builds on these moves towards recognising the significance of embodiment 
within theories of narrative identity. However, the positions outlined in the previous 
paragraphs do not themselves include arguments for the value of personal bioinformation in 
narrative self-constitution. Indeed, these positions are chiefly concerned with how our existing, 
direct experiences of embodiment shape the stories we can and do tell about ourselves. In 
contrast, this thesis is concerned with our access to information that is not currently in our 
possession. How, then, might additional, as yet unknown, insights into our biological lives 
conveyed by this information be relevant or valuable to our self-conceptions? To understand 
this, I suggest, we need to recognise two things: first, the roles that personal bioinformation 
could play in helping us to make sense of, and navigate, embodied experience; and, secondly, 
the importance of constructing a self-narrative that is intelligible and coherent in the context 
of these experiences. I will unpack these steps in the following section.  
SECTION 3: BIOINFORMATION AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE IN AN EMBODIED 
LIFE  
Navigating embodied existence  
Our material embodiment is the unavoidable context within which self-constitution takes 
place. As such it is also a source of opportunities for, and boundaries upon, self-creation. As 
Ian Hacking observes, however strongly inclined we are to the idea that we invent who we are, 
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we must nevertheless recognise that in doing so we are, to some extent, constrained by our 
environment.291 This environment includes our own bodies and biology. As Hacking says:  
“We push our lives through a thicket in which the stern trunks of determinism are 
entangled in the twisting vines of chance.”292  
One need not subscribe to Hacking’s language of determinism for his metaphor to remain apt. 
In constituting ourselves we will inevitably bump up against the realities and constraints of 
our material selves. As noted above, our bodies may be seen as both “active” and “recalcitrant” 
in ways that enable and place limits on our capacities to act and define ourselves.293 
Embodiment impinges on who we are and can be because it has real, material consequences 
for us. This is readily apparent when thinking about the observable markers of potential social 
identifiers such as gender, ethnicity, disability or illness.294 Here our bodily attributes may 
affect the ways in which others’ respond to characterise us, thus potentially constraining the 
ways we can characterise ourselves.295 But it is equally the case where the materiality of our 
bodies enables or limits our interactions with and perceptions of our environment (both 
physical and social), its impact on us, and ours upon it. And this role may extend to the less 
visible aspects of our embodiment, such as our reproductive, cognitive, and affective 
capacities, the functioning of our autonomic systems, and our biological relationships to 
others. And, crucially for my present argument, the role of our health, bodies and biology in 
shaping the kinds of accounts we are able to give of who we are, and our abilities to inhabit 
these accounts, may extend to aspects of our biological lives about which we ourselves might 
not (yet) be directly aware, such as the latent risk of an inherited disease or one’s genetic 
parentage.  
I wish to suggest that personal bioinformation is important to our identities precisely because 
our bodies both frame our subjective experiences and play an active part in shaping ‘how our 
lives go’. My core proposition is that personal bioinformation can play an invaluable role by 
helping us to negotiate some (though not all) of our ‘recalcitrant’ materiality, by alerting us to 
the whereabouts of some of the ‘stern trunks’ and ‘twisting vines’, and by helping us to explain 
or anticipate their impacts, and embrace or navigate around them. The value of personal 
bioinformation to our self-narratives, I suggest, lies in its capacity to provide context, 
explanations, or predictions in respect of our more direct encounters with our bodies, their 
                                                             
291 Hacking (2004). 
292 Ibid., p.282. 
293 Alaimo and Hekman (2008) pp.3-4. 
294 Shilling (2012), p.xii. 
295 Baylis (2012). 
72 
 
capabilities, limitations and connections to the bodies of others. It also lies in its potential to 
make intelligible or accessible to us aspects of our material existence that are ambiguous, 
uncertain or only partially apprehended. Though Mackenzie does not herself suggest that 
personal bioinformation is important to our self-narratives, the role for this information that I 
am proposing here echoes her statement that: 
“Making sense of who we are, and making sense of our lived embodiment, 
involves constructing an identity that is shaped by, and responsive to, biological 
realities”296  
My suggestion in this thesis is that personal bioinformation has a critical role to play in this 
sense-making. My claim here is not simply that this information is will introduce narrative 
contents and plot-lines involving our health, bodies and biological relationships – although 
this seems very likely. According to the relationship between identity and personal 
bioinformation that I am proposing, bioinformation does not only (potentially) supply the raw 
descriptive building blocks of a self-narrative – for example, “I am the individual with 
biological attribute x”. More particularly, my contention is that information about one’s 
biological existences has the potential to provide valuable interpretive narrative tools for 
making sense of and constructing one’s wider account of who one is in light of one’s embodied 
experiences. According to the account outlined in the previous chapter, a self-narrative is itself 
an interpretive framework. My suggestion is that personal bioinformation is both the object to 
which this framework is applied, and amongst the tools that shape it. That is, it can provide 
the means of making sense of, connecting or prioritising aspects of the individual’s embodied 
experiences and thus their role in the story of who she is.  
In Part II of this thesis I will provide illustrative examples – based on analysis of information 
subjects’ experiences reported in the empirical literature – of the potential constitutive and 
interpretive narrative roles that specific kinds of personal bioinformation might play. The 
focus of the present chapter is to establish the broad basis on my conceptual and normative 
argument in relation to personal bioinformation as an inclusive category. 
Contributing to a coherent self-narrative  
What I have said so far explains why personal bioinformation might be useful, but it might 
still be queried why having the opportunity to access and to use personal bioinformation in the 
construction of one’s self-narrative engages ethically significant interests. That is, why might 
                                                             





access to this information have sufficiently great an impact on what is important in our lives 
to warrant the attention and intervention of those who hold this information?  
The answer, I wish to argue, is located in, what I have termed, the ‘double normativity’ of 
theories of narrative self-constitution (as outlined the previous chapter). That is, a self-
narrative is more than just someone’s life story, it is a constructed account that is constitutive 
of her identity. This means that maintaining and inhabiting an identity-constituting self-
narrative has important consequences in terms of securing valuable aspects of human 
existence. However, being in a position to realise these valuable consequences depends on a 
self-narrative exhibiting coherence, which depends in turn on it meeting the twin conditions 
of being both intelligible to the individual herself and also reasonably consistent with the world 
as experienced by others. These are the conditions that Schechtman terms the “articulation” 
and “reality” constraints.297    
According to the picture I outlined in the previous sub-section, personal bioinformation can 
support the development of self-narratives that exhibit these two important, intertwined, 
aspects of coherence. Firstly, personal bioinformation can play a role in helping an individual 
to meet (or preventing her falling foul of) the articulation constraint by informing her 
understanding, selection, prioritisation and mutual interpretation of those health-related and 
embodied experiences, physical and behavioural traits and biological relationships that 
provide some of the contents of her self-narrative. In doing so it supports the internal 
intelligibility of her story. Meanwhile, it can also support her in constructing a story that 
broadly accords with other people’s perceptions, understanding and experience of states of 
affairs pertaining to her health, body and biology – thus helping her identity to meet the reality 
constraint. 
However, I want to argue that Schechtman’s version of, and rationale for, the reality constraint 
does not go far enough. According to Schechtman, the reality constraint requires that our 
narratives are reasonably consistent with the world as experienced by others, because we 
cannot function effectively in social contexts if our self-characterisations seriously conflict 
with how others see us.298 However, I would argue that it is just as important that our self-
conceptions are reasonably consistent with our own experiences of our embodied, biological 
lives – both those aspects we have already encountered and those that are likely to assail us. 
This is because the coherence and life-navigating capacities of our self-narratives are not only 
                                                             




potentially jeopardised by their discordance with how others perceive the world, but also by 
their discordance with our own experiences of our embodiment. I wish to argue that avoiding 
such jeopardy is critical to making sense of who we are and to functioning in the context of 
embodied existence. I suggest that personal bioinformation not only helps us to make sense of 
our identities when faced by the vagaries and onslaught of embodied existence. It also permits 
us to construct self-narratives that support us in navigating and acting in the world as embodied 
beings. Our identities are not only those of rational, social beings, but also of embodied ones.  
This brings me back to the ‘outcome’ aspect of the ‘double normativity’ of narrative identity 
theory. Supporting the fulfilment of the reality and articulation constraints is no trivial matter. 
To the extent that these are routes to developing a reasonably intelligible and coherent self-
narrative, they are conditions for realising what I have termed ‘the valued capacities’ – the 
capacities for knowing who I am and what I value, and thereby being a position (all other 
things being equal) to be the author of my own judgements, actions and self-creation, to feel a 
connection to my own history and unfolding future, and thus to sustaining enduring 
commitments and projects.299 Personal bioinformation may play a vital part in my capacity to 
develop, maintain or restore an identity-constituting narrative at all, and thus being able to 
exercise the practical aspects of this identity in ways that contribute to richness and character 
of my life.  
So part of my contention in this chapter is that it is important to recognise that, because we 
lead inescapably embodied lives, personal bioinformation is likely to contribute to and inform 
many of the (to use Schechtman’s term) ‘characteristics’ that comprise the contents of our 
identity-constituting narratives. But, it is precisely because this is so, that my more 
fundamental, normative claim bites. I have argued here that it is not merely satisfying or 
interesting if our self-narratives include plotlines that involve features of our biology. The 
incorporation of these is key to meeting the conditions of a robust, coherent, identity-
constituting narrative in the context of embodied existence. And this, in turn, is key to 
developing the capacities that contribute to a fulfilling and self-realising life. It is on this basis 
that I wish to argue that access to personal bioinformation engages ethically significant 
interests, interests that I will characterise in more detail in Chapter 9. 
The preceding paragraphs outline the core of my conceptual and normative argument that 
personal bioinformation can potentially provide a valuable tool in the construction of our 
narrative identities. It is important to be clear about the nature of the claim I am making here. 
                                                             





I am not seeking to argue that every particular kind or instance of personal bioinformation will 
be valuable in the ways described above. As I shall go on to illustrate in Part II of this thesis, 
some of this information may be of little or no value, or even detrimental to our identities. 
Rather, what I am offering is a way of conceptualising why personal bioinformation as a broad 
class can make vital contributions to our developing identities, and why our access to it may, 
therefore, engage ethically considerable interests. I will return in Chapter 8, informed by the 
empirical literature reviewed in the intervening chapters, to discuss the factors that might 
contribute to or detract from the value of particular instances of bioinformation under this 
conception. 
SECTION 4: DISTINGUISHING MY ARGUMENT  
In order to unpack further what is and what is not implied by my argument, and to make clear 
my contribution to analysis in this field, it will be useful to differentiate my claims from those 
of four arguments in the bioethical literature with which it shares some features. The first three 
of these pertain specifically to the role of knowledge of genetic parentage in identity 
development and have already been introduced in Chapter 2.  These are: 
i) The necessity of genealogical knowledge to understanding one’s embodied existence; 
ii) The potential value of genealogical knowledge to a complete biography; and 
iii) The potential value of genealogical knowledge and avoiding subversion of one’s 
identity. 
I will also differentiate my position from a fourth argument, which holds that: 
iv) The only (bio)information that is necessary for narrative coherence is that revealing 
our ‘real’ motives. 
As indicated by what I have said in the preceding chapters, a rich seam of theoretically-based 
normative arguments for the value of personal bioinformation to identity may be found in 
debates about the importance of knowing about one’s genetic parentage. Some of these share 
key features of the position I have outlined in the first half of this chapter, but none of them is 







i) Genealogical knowledge and understanding one’s embodied existence 
The first argument from which I wish to distinguish my own is proposed by David 
Velleman.300 As noted in Chapter 2, Velleman argues that knowledge of one’s genetic 
parentage helps us make sense of our embodied “predicament” and “distinctive features” and 
to build identities which accord with our biological existence, rather than being alienated from 
it.301 He also argues that the ability to incorporate knowledge and understanding of our 
biological selves into our identities is linked to our capacities to lead full and fulfilling lives. 
In these respects Velleman’s rationale for the value of one specific kind of bioinformation 
looks very close to my own. 
My position differs from Velleman’s, however, in that he does not invoke the concept or 
constraints of narrativity in building his argument. This in itself might not perhaps be so 
material were it not for the inclusivity and flexibility that this conception affords my own 
account and which is absent from his. The most important distinction, then, is that Velleman 
argues that acquaintance with one’s genetic family is essential to making sense of our bodily 
reality and in developing a self-conception that supports human flourishing. This claim is 
premised on what he takes to be our universal, specific and sui generis identity-related needs 
to recognise shared traits and to know about our origins. He does not intimate that any other 
kind of information about our biological existence could fulfil comparably significant, parallel 
roles pertaining to other aspects of our lives. In contrast I do not seek to argue that any 
particular kind of personal bioinformation is essential to identity development, or that our 
“genetic endowment” is uniquely relevant to our identities.302 Rather my assertion is that 
personal bioinformation is instrumentally important to us only and insofar as it contributes to 
the coherence of our self-narratives in light of our particular experiences of embodiment. And, 
this is role could be fulfilled (or not) by many different kinds of information about our health, 
bodies or biological relationships (as I shall illustrate in Part II and analyse further in Chapter 
8).    
ii) Genealogical knowledge and biographical completeness  
Given what I have just said, my position looks somewhat closer to that adopted by Sarah 
Wilson, who holds that identifying and biographical information about one’s genetic parents 
could play a contingent, instrumental role in some individuals’ self-narratives by filling in 
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biographical gaps.303 In doing so Wilson acknowledges that not everyone will find this 
knowledge important to their story of who they are. There are two chief differences between 
Wilson’s account and my own, however. First, she attributes the narrative value of information 
to one very narrow retrospective explanatory role – that of “alleviation of uncertainty with 
respect to the past”.304 Although this is indeed one of the narrative roles which I am suggesting 
that personal bioinformation might play, here my proposition is that the range of interpretive 
and contextualising functions that personal bioinformation could provide extends far wider 
than this, and be performed by a much wider range of bioinformation than solely that about 
genealogy (as I will illustrate in Part II). The second difference is that Wilson does not explain 
why it matters if we have uncertainty about our past. It may seem intuitive that self-narratives, 
like the plots of novels, are better for not having gaps in them, but Wilson herself does not 
explain why this might apply to our own self-narratives or what might be at stake in their 
coherence.  
An explanation of precisely this kind is offered by James Lindemann Nelson.305 Nelson holds 
that knowledge of our genealogy provides: 
“…the earlier chapters of [our story] which are part of the ongoing narrative, and 
without which we cannot read well what is going on in the part occurring now.”306  
He argues that filling in these earlier chapters is important because our identity narratives 
provide the “the structures of meaning through which we try to make sense of our lives.”307 
Nelson’s position closely resembles my own in this respect. I too wish to hold that the 
coherence of our self-narratives is important because they provide the interpretive framework 
for our lives and that understanding of our biological existence is important to constructing 
the kinds of frameworks that support us in making sense of our embodied experiences. 
However, as with Velleman, the key difference between Nelson’s position and my own is that 
I neither wish to argue that knowledge of genetic parentage invariably fulfils this kind of sense-
making role for everyone, nor that it is uniquely important in this respect. And, as with Wilson, 
I do not wish to limit the value of bioinformation to its retrospective explanatory power.  
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iii) Genealogical knowledge and identity subversion  
Thirdly, I wish to acknowledge similarities between the argument I have proposed here and 
that offered by Hallvard Lillehammer in respect, again, of knowledge of one’s genetic 
parentage.308 As outlined in Chapter 2, Lillehammer proposes that is this information is 
valuable to the extent that this allows one to construct a “virtuous practical identity” which, he 
holds, is a condition for leading a flourishing life.309 In framing this argument, Lillehammer 
leaves open the possibility that any information about oneself could contribute in the same 
way (though he does not specify other bioinformation). Lillehammer accounts for the harm of 
lacking genealogical information, not in its essential role in identity development, but in the 
possibility that this could leave one’s identity vulnerable to ‘subversion’ from receipt of further 
information that would undermines beliefs on which one’s existing self-conception is 
premised. This accords closely with my own position (to be fleshed-out further over the 
coming chapters) that the value of bioinformation lies to a considerable degree in enhancing 
the resilience and coherence of our identities in light of embodied experience. Lillehammer’s 
position, however, is something of a black box with respect to the ways in which self-
knowledge, a virtuous identity, and flourishing life are connected. The argument based in 
narrative identity that I am proposing here offers one way of filling-out such an account.  
In Chapter 5 I will consider what the empirical literature suggests about the role of information 
about genetic parentage – specifically gamete donor origins – in the individuals’ construction 
of their identities.  In that chapter I shall illustrate how Lillehammer’s position and my own 
intersect in more detail in discussing the potential narrative jeopardy incurred by failing to tell 
donor-conceived individuals of their donor origins. 
iv) Knowledge of one’s motives and narrative coherence  
I turn now to distinguish my position from quite a different kind of argument, while also 
indicating that such an argument is based on a misunderstanding of how personal 
bioinformation could contribute to narrative coherence.   
This is an argument presented by Lisa Bortolotti in response to a strand of reasoning in the 
debate about the ‘right not to know’ genetic information, a strand that holds that it is not 
possible to justify such a right on autonomy grounds because knowledge of genetic 
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dispositions or health risks are necessary to our capacities to be self-determining.310 In 
rejecting this contention, Bortolotti appeals to Schechtman’s account of a coherent and 
realistic identity narrative as the foundation for our capacity to live autonomous lives. 
Bortolotti holds that there is only one kind of information that would be essential to our 
capacities to be self-determining. That is information that would ensure one’s self-narrative 
remained aligned with one’s real reasons and motives of action, and thus met Schechtman’s 
reality constraint. Therefore, the only kind of information (genetic or otherwise) is ever 
necessary for achieving a coherent, autonomy-supporting, self-narrative is that would provide 
an individual with “knowledge of [her] own mind” by revealing her “behavioural 
dispositions”, “biases in deliberation” and “attitudes and dispositions” – for example, as 
revealed by psychological tests or neurological data.311 In contrast, Bortolotti holds that genetic 
information, for example, about a serious disease risk, would merely affect the plot of 
someone’s story, but not her capacity to build a an identity-constituting story at all. 
My responses to Bortolotti’s position are not only that her category of potentially identity-
valuable bioinformation is too narrow, but that it rests on a misunderstanding about how it is 
that we come to understand our motives, priorities and values. And, as such, I wish to 
distinguish it from my own position. I do not seek to claim that bioinformation is important to 
the coherence of our self-narratives because it reveals our ‘real’ motives or facts about who 
we really are qua selves or agents. Such a claim is not coherent under a narrative account. 
Under a narrative view of self-constitution Bortolotti’s contention that “knowledge of the self 
matters to accurate and coherent narratives” is circular.312 Of course we can be mistaken or 
self-deceiving about our motives and attitudes. And this does matter for our narratives’ 
coherence.313 But these motives and attitudes are not discrete psychological or neurological 
events, separate or separable from the stories of who we are.314 They are constituted and given 
their meaning by these very stories. 315 Locating ‘extra-narrative’ motives in neurological or 
psychological facts is misplaced.  
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My argument is that many different kinds of information are potentially important to 
constructing an identity-constituting self-narrative and to securing the intelligibility and 
compatibility of our motives. Personal bioinformation can support us in making sense of our 
motives and priorities (and many other aspects of who we are) to the extent that it helps us to 
shape the narratives from which our motives derive their significance and meaning, and to 
secure the extent to which our narratives make sense to us in light of our embodied 
experiences. And this could very well include information about our genetic dispositions or 
health risks (as I will illustrate in Chapter 6). 
The conceptual and ethical argument that I have presented in this chapter shares some 
commonalities with aspects of arguments about the value of particular kinds of bioinformation 
that are present in the literature, but it is not identical with any of them. I shall return in Chapter 
9 to consider in more detail how identity-based interests grounded in the argument I have 
offered here are distinguishable from a range of other interests - including those in developing 
and exercising our autonomy – that are commonly invoked in policy contexts and ethical 
debates about information subjects’ access to bioinformation. 
SECTION 5: ADDRESSING POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS  
Before I conclude this chapter I wish to address some concerns or objections that might be 
invited by the position I have outlined above.  These, I suggest, fall into two categories:  
i) The first includes concerns that my argument is based on a bio-essentialist premise that 
we are, or ought to be, defined by our biology. 
ii) The second cluster of concerns questions the suitability of personal bioinformation to fulfil 
the epistemological role I have proposed for it.  
I shall take these in turn. 
i) Concerns about bio-essentialism  
The first possible set of objections are those based on the concern that arguments which hold 
that bioinformation is valuable to self-constitution necessarily embrace a limited and limiting 
conception of identity as defined by biology, one that reduces who we are to only our biology, 
or assumes that knowledge of particular aspects of our biology is essential to understanding 





Conceptions of personal identity as self-created are often contrasted with those in which it is 
seen as pre-defined.316 Accounts that propose a significant role for knowledge of one’s biology 
are often taken to fall in the latter camp, the presumption being that claims for the identity-
value of bioinformation must be based in the assumed role of the information in uncovering 
or bringing to fruition a pre-existing essence.317 As such, accounts that accord significance to 
particular kinds of bioinformation are sometimes treated as objectionable for denigrating the 
choices of those who characterise themselves in ways that diverge from their biology, or taken 
to imply that those who lack this information are in some sense incomplete or defective.318   
Bio-reductionist or essentialist conceptions of identity are seen as objectionable and limiting 
for many reasons. For example, feminist resistance to the suggestion that our identities are 
defined by our bodies may be understood as a reaction against implications that women’s 
identities are more in the thrall of their biology than those of men and therefore less rational 
and less self-made. 319 There are similarly good reasons to resist identity being reduced to our 
skin colour or our physical (dis)abilities. Not only might we object to others defining us 
according to our biology or physicality, we ourselves might also feel alienated from, rather 
than identification with, aspects of our bodies such as our biological sex, our reproductive 
(in)capacities, or our ill-health.  
In this section my aim is to show that in arguing for the value of personal bioinformation I am 
committing myself to neither a bio-reductionist nor bio-essentialist conception of identity.  
Here I will set out two responses to these concerns by indicating that according to my account: 
a) Personal bioinformation is not the only information potentially valuable to a coherent 
identity; and 
b) It is possible to develop a coherent identity while rejecting or omitting aspects of one’s 
biological existence.   
a) Personal bioinformation is not uniquely valuable  
First, my argument does not entail the position that personal bioinformation is sufficient for 
the construction of a coherent, embodied self-narrative. As Hallvard Lillehammer observes:  
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“There are many things that could make more of a difference to how I think of 
myself than facts that determine how I was constituted as a biological entity.”320 
I have no quarrel with this assertion. Our narratives will inevitably and appropriately also be 
woven from strands that have nothing to do with our biology. My aim in this project is to 
contribute to existing bioethical and policy debates about which interests are relevant to ethical 
practices relating to the disclosure of bioinformation in clinical, research, commercial and 
regulatory settings, by making a case for the significance of identity-related interests. It is not 
to suggest that bioinformation is the only or most important contributor to our self-
conceptions. 
b) Excluding and omitting bioinformation  
To reiterate the distinction that I drew at the start of this chapter: the present account frames 
bioinformation as a source of knowledge about aspects of our biological lives, not about our 
identities. This notwithstanding, it might still be a source of concern that my argument ties the 
attainment of narrative coherence and intelligibility to broad concordance between someone’s 
self-narrative and biological states of affairs. This might seem to be a capitulation to a 
requirement that we define ourselves directly accordance our biological attributes. And this 
could appear to present problems in two kinds of cases: first, where someone wishes to exclude 
an aspect of biological existence from her self-definition; and secondly, where someone is 
simply unaware of aspects of her biology. Neither of these scenarios seems at all unlikely. It 
would, therefore, be problematic if my argument entailed the position that such circumstances 
are an inevitable barrier to someone having the kind of self-conception that was capable of 
supporting the capacities that make for a rich and fulfilling life. However, as I shall outline 
here, I do not believe it does entail this. 
First, my argument is compatible with someone refusing to be defined by aspects of her 
material self – for example, by choosing not to make her risk of hereditary breast cancer part 
of how she understands herself, relates to others or conducts her life. Provided the self-
narrative she constructs on this basis is both internally intelligible and retains its coherence 
when confronted by states of affairs in the world, including her own changing health, then the 
exclusion of this information need not threaten the coherence of her identity. Indeed, the 
editing and prioritisation of contents is inherent to the concept of narrativity.321 One of the 
conceptual strengths of a narrative-based account of the relationship between identity and 
personal bioinformation is that it allows us to understand that information need not contribute 
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solely by providing self-descriptors or blunt building blocks of identity. Instead it may play an 
interpretive role. And this could involve relegating aspects of one’s health to the status of brute 
facts of one’s biology, according them no place in one’s self-characterisation.322 Repudiation 
of personal bioinformation need not jeopardise narrative coherence, although I will return in 
Chapter 8 to consider circumstances in which it might do so. 
Turning to the second possibility, it is inevitable that all of us will have self-narratives that 
have been constructed in ignorance of much of our biology. This in itself need not be a threat 
to their coherence. Indeed, I would suggest, that any attempt at factual completism is more 
likely to militate against this. Making sense of who one is is an inherently interpretive 
undertaking, and it seems likely that the more detail one attempts to build in, the harder it is to 
tell a coherent story of who one really is and which features are most prominent in shaping 
one’s priorities and values. However, there is an important distinction to be made here between 
a mere lack of information and the incorporation of false beliefs. Lillehammer draws attention 
to this in observing that: 
“It is one thing to develop a virtuous practical identity in conditions where facts 
about one’s genealogical origins play little or no role while being aware that there 
are significant gaps in one’s knowledge of those facts. It is quite another to 
develop such an identity in the false belief that one’s knowledge of these origins 
is accurate or complete.”323 
Lillehammer’s implication is that the former is innocuous, whereas the latter represent the kind 
of harm to identity that interferes with its capacity to provide a platform for a flourishing life. 
I wish to suggest that, according to my narrative-based argument, the latter could be harmful 
for two reasons. First, it could render one’s self-narrative vulnerable to being undermined 
when one stubs one’s toe against one’s existence as a biological being. And, secondly, such 
misconceptions make our self-narratives unreliable foundations from which to navigate and 
make sense of our experiences of embodiment because they are premised on false assumptions. 
So ignorance of personal bioinformation is not in itself a problem, but it could be insofar as it 
fosters self-characterisations that are at odds with ours and others’ experiences. I will return 
to illustrate these claims in Chapters 5 and 7. 
Though these defences have necessarily been brief, I would suggest that nothing that I have 
said so far inevitably precludes the possibility of being able to construct a coherent and 
intelligible self-narrative, while defining myself in ways that omit or depart from facts about 
my health, body or biology. However, as I shall return to discuss in the chapters that follow, 
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misplaced faith in the veracity or reliability of the bioinformation to which we do have access 
may pose a threat. 
ii) Concerns about the epistemic limitations of bioinformation  
I will now turn to the second set of possible concerns. These pertain to my claims above, that 
bioinformation is valuable to our identities because it expands the interpretive toolboxes of 
self-construction, by helping us to explain, anticipate, contextualise or otherwise make sense 
of our experiences of embodied, biological existence. The concerns I will respond to here are 
those that are sceptical about the suitability of personal bioinformation – specifically that 
generated by the biomedical sciences – to fulfil the interpretive role I have proposed for it.  
That role depend on this information extending our knowledge and understanding of our 
material existence beyond the limits of what we are able to perceive with our own senses. 
These concerns might be grounded in any of the following three positions: 
a) Biomedical information does not tell us about biological reality. 
b) Biomedical information does not capture the phenomenology of embodied existence. 
c) Biomedical information does not provide any new insights. 
I shall respond to these in turn. 
a) Bioinformation does not tell us about biological reality  
What I have said so far has taken as its unspoken assumption that personal bioinformation, 
much of which is likely to be derived from the biomedical sciences, can make a valuable 
contribution to our identities because it delivers reliable knowledge about the world – 
specifically about states of affairs relating to our health, bodies and biology. However, 
antirealist perspectives call into question the assumption that science is “the paradigmatic 
knowledge-producing enterprise”.324 There are various antirealist positions. These need not 
entail denying the existence of a material world altogether. But they do (for diverse reasons) 
deny that science can, or does, provide knowledge of the world as it really is.325 If biomedical 
science does not provide knowledge about biological states of affairs in the world, then it is 
not obvious that the information it supplies could help us to construct narratives that are any 
more intelligible in light of, or any better for negotiating, these states of affairs.  
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I will not engage with the realist/antirealist debate here. It is sufficient to note that my argument 
does not depend on a “naïve realism” in which “[t]he picture which science gives us of the 
world is a true one, faithful in its details”.326 Indeed, this would be unwise, given the relative 
youth of some of the information-producing disciplines – such as genomic and neurological 
medicine – with which this project is concerned. And my argument need not deny that some 
personal bioinformation will incorporate constructed categories such as ‘being depressed’.327 
Neither of these concessions preclude the potential interpretive utility of personal 
bioinformation. It is sufficient for my purposes that biomedical sciences can provide the kind 
of “empirically adequate” theories that generate personal bioinformation that accords broadly 
with the world as it is experienced.328 It is enough that personal bioinformation can provides 
reasonably reliable “instrumental knowledge” about how observable phenomena are likely to 
behave, in which, in Bas van Fraassen’s phrase, our actual and potential experiences can “find 
a home”.329 This position is consistent with recognising that developments in biomedicine 
could bring new ways of thinking about our embodied existence and interpreting phenomena. 
For example, as Margaret Lock observes: 
“…molecularized genetics has brought about a fundamental transformation in the 
ways that the body is conceptualized and that this change has implications not 
only for what constitutes a normal body and the labeling and management of 
disease but also for insights into self and identity.”330 
It must be acknowledged, however, that not all bioinformation – for example, about our health 
risks, diagnoses, genetic relationships or traits – will confer equally useful or reliable means 
for interpreting embodied existence. Some of it may be unsound or misleading because of 
immature methodologies or invalid inferences.331 And some of it, while analytically sound, 
does not trade in certainties, but complex probabilistic risk assessments.332 And while some 
bioinformation might well exhibit ‘empirically adequacy’, this still demands the question – 
adequate for what? Findings that are sufficiently explanatory to meet the aims of population-
level research, for example, might not be sufficient to meet the needs of individual participants 
who wish to have more definitive knowledge about their own particular health risks. The 
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question of when particular personal bioinformation provides a ‘good enough’ chart of the 
submerged trunks of someone’s embodied existence, such that it provides a useful tool for 
narrative construction seems likely to be something that will admit of degrees. I will return in 
Chapter 8 to discuss the potential identity detriment of false and unreliable personal 
bioinformation.  
b) Missing phenomenology 
A different kind of concern about personal bioinformation being able to fulfil the coherence-
conferring role in our self-narratives that I am proposing, is that biomedical information is 
unlikely to  capture the phenomenology of bodily state of affairs or ill-health to which they 
pertain.333 It might plausibly be claimed that this is what someone cares about when hoping to 
make sense of her experiences as part of constructing and inhabiting her identity. It could be 
objected that I have conflated Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the biological body and 
the body as lived, and that bioinformation it is incapable of providing the kinds of useful 
interpretive context for embodied experience that I have suggested.334   
My response to this is that the account of identity-value offered in the previous sections does 
not rely on the claim that bioinformation provides the complete story of someone’s 
experiences of embodiment, with all the personal, experiential nuances this entails. For 
example, findings about neurological correlates of symptoms of depression, taken in isolation, 
might indeed not to equip someone with everything she needs to understand or navigate her 
experience of mental illness. However, this does not mean that these findings could not be of 
use in helping her to make sense of what her symptoms mean for who she is.335 Loughlin et al. 
draw a useful distinction, arguing that: 
“there is a difference between saying that looking at the world in a certain way 
can help you understand aspects of the truth about your predicament, and saying 
that looking at the world in a particular way, understood through the lens of 
scientism, provides the only truth,”336  
The former of these positions is close to the view I wish to defend. However, it seems likely 
that whether biomedical findings are in fact useful interpretive tools for navigating the 
phenomenology of embodied existence will, to a considerable extent, depend on support the 
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subject is given to understand the epistemic qualities and limitations of that information. I 
return to this matter in Chapter 9. 
c) No new insights 
The third epistemological objection is that my account subscribes to a misconception that 
bioinformation is “revelatory” and renders the functioning and future states of our bodies more 
“legible”, when in fact it may be nothing of the sort.337 For example, Bronwyn Parry has 
suggested that “in most instances” the results of genomic testing are no more potent and 
revelatory than the vernacular knowledge that was available to us long before genetic 
medicine, through everyday observation of patterns of inheritance within families.338 There 
are several responses I wish to make to this. First, my intention is not to imply that information 
derived from genetic or other biomedical sciences will necessarily offer greater insights than 
that provided by our unaided senses. Much of our narrative content will indeed come from 
direct experiences. Furthermore, as noted above, ‘bioinformation’ as a class is clearly not of 
uniform quality or epistemic value. Parry’s scepticism may well be warranted with respect to 
some claims made, for example, by commercial genetic testing services in respect of tests for 
common complex disorders, in which genetic factors play only a small and poorly understood 
role.339 And some inferences drawn from genetic analysis to, for example, our ancestral origins 
may well be spurious.340 However, it seems clear that in other instances biomedicine can 
provide us with knowledge of our health, bodies and biology that we would not otherwise have 
had, and in a form that is useful to us. Moreover, the narrative role that I have posited does not 
depend on bioinformation heralding radically new news. As I shall illustrate in Part II of this 
project, its value may sometimes lie precisely in providing context for, or new ways of 
interpreting, our existing beliefs about, for example, one’s disease-risk or diagnostic status. 
SECTION 6: CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I have outlined the argument that any account of narrative self-constitution that 
reflects the realities of our lives must be one that reflects the inescapably embodied nature of 
our existence. From this starting point I have proposed my own argument that personal 
bioinformation (as a broad category) can play a vital role in helping us to construct self-
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narratives are responsive to the vagaries, limitations and opportunities of embodied existence. 
This information supports us in constructing self-narratives that not only make sense when 
confronted by our embodied experiences, but also provide the foundations from which we are 
able to interpret and navigate our embodied lives. In doing so, personal bioinformation helps 
us to develop, maintain or restore the kind of narrative coherence and intelligibility that is 
necessary if our identities are to ground our capacities to have a strong sense of who we are, 
and thus to have a solid foundation from which to make judgements and choices and to be the 
authors of our own actions and ongoing self-creation. As noted in the previous chapter, I take 
these capacities to be central to leading a rich, fulfilling and engaged human life. On these 
grounds, I submit, we may understand why access to personal bioinformation could engage 
ethically significant interests that warrant attention by those who hold this information when 
making decisions about whether to disclose it. I will specify the nature of these interests in 
Chapter 9, having refined my account in light of the illustrative examples yet to come. 
The argument presented in this chapter is not intended to assert that every kind or instance of 
bioinformation is valuable to our self-conceptions, but to explain why bioinformation as a 
class has an important role to play. I have sought in this chapter to address concerns that such 
an argument endorses a bio-essentialist conception of identity. My position is that this 
information is valuable not because it reveals who we already are, but because it can offer 
ways of understanding of our embodied states that can provide potentially useful tools for 
interpreting and developing who we are.  As this indicates, not all personal bioinformation will 
be of equal (or indeed any) value to this end and no particular kinds of bioinformation are 
intrinsically identity-relevant. Particular personal bioinformation will be instrumentally 
valuable only insofar as it serves the ends of helping an individual to construct a self-narrative 
that is coherent in the context of embodied experience. I have suggested that the capacity of 
bioinformation to fulfil this role does not depend on it providing us with comprehensive or 
unassailable facts about the objective reality of our health, bodies and biology, or of every 
aspect of the phenomenology of lived experiences, but rather on its supplying reliable 
knowledge that helps to navigate and make sense of these. The possibility remains that some 
bioinformation will just not be very good at fulfilling this role. Some might even be detrimental 
to our efforts to construct coherent embodied self-characterisations. I will return to unpack 
these possibilities over the coming chapters. 
If this account of the relationship between personal bioinformation and identity is to provide 
a sound foundation for ethical decision-making and policies about providing access to personal 





with and uses of this information. To this end, my next step in this project is to turn to the 
empirical literature for examples that, while not in any way proving the theory-based argument 
I have outlined here, nevertheless indicate that this argument is not wildly at odds with 
people’s experiences. My intention is that exploring individual information subjects’ reported 
attitudes and reactions to access, or lack of access, to diverse kinds of personal bioinformation 
will serve to illustrate, and also to refine, the assertions I have made. I shall describe my 



























CHAPTER 4: RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
This short chapter provides the introduction to Part II of this three part thesis. In this middle 
section of the project I turn to look at findings from empirical literature that may tell us 
something about information subjects’ attitudes and reactions to three different categories of 
bioinformation. My purpose in doing so is to address the second of the four high-level research 
questions set out in Chapter 1: what grounds are there for holding that the conception of 
the relationship between personal bioinformation and identity proposed in Chapter 3 is 
robust and plausible in light of people’s actual experiences?  
My intention is that my analysis of people’s reported experiences of encountering diverse 
kinds of personal bioinformation in diverse circumstances will lend plausibility to and 
illustrate my central claim that personal bioinformation can play important roles in an 
individual’s development of her narrative identity in the context of embodied existence (as 
argued the preceding chapter). My further intention is that the empirical findings will allow 
the further refinement of this claim, such that it provides a robust and realistic foundation for 
my characterisation of information subjects’ interests in accessing personal bioinformation 
and the corresponding responsibilities of those who may be in a position to disclose it. 
These intentions will be pursued over the coming chapters. The purposes of the present chapter 
are to: 
i. Explain the relationship between the evidence considered in the illustrative 
chapters and my theoretical and normative argument (Sections 2 and 4) 
ii. Set out my approach to sourcing and analysing relevant empirical findings 
(Section 3) 
SECTION 2: THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN THIS THESIS  
The use of the empirical literature in this project seeks to respond to one of the concerns 
motivating the so-called ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics.341 That is, if the ethical arguments and 
conclusions of this discipline are to be relevant and practical they ought to engage with social 
scientific findings, so that they are connected with, and are responsive to, the realities of 
                                                             
341 P. Borry et al. (2005), "The Birth of the Empirical Turn in Bioethics" Bioethics, 19(1): 49-71. 
94 
 
people’s experiences and practices.342 If the present project is to make a meaningful 
contribution to practical, normative questions about the governance of access to information, 
its claims must at very least be consistent with people’s experiences and what matters to them.  
The contention that I am subjecting to scrutiny over the coming three chapters is that outlined 
in Chapter 3, that personal bioinformation can play important roles in the development, 
maintenance or restoration of a coherent self-narrative in the context of embodied existence. 
This claim is not a purely empirical one. It incorporates a particular conception of how our 
identities are constituted and the conditions and value implied by this. Nevertheless, it is a 
position that could be undermined by empirical observations – for example, were it to be found 
that no one ever reports feeling differently about how they characterise themselves having 
received information about their health, bodies or biological relationships. Similarly, it gains 
credence if there is readily available evidence, across a range of different types of 
bioinformation, that people value these kinds information in seeking to understand and 
develop who they are. It is also the kind of claim that is amenable to caveats or conditions, if 
evidence indicates that it holds in some circumstances but not others. A key purpose of 
exploring the three illustrative examples, therefore, is to demonstrate that – and the extent to 
which – my theoretically-based claim as to the narrative role of personal bioinformation is 
congruent with people’s lived experiences of encountering or being denied this kind of 
information.  
For each of the illustrative examples in the following three chapters I will ask the following 
three questions:  
i. What evidence is there that access (or in-access) to personal bioinformation can have 
an effect on individuals’ accounts of who they are? 
ii. What might this indicate about the extent and nature of the narrative roles played by 
this information? 
iii. What factors affect the nature and extent of these impacts and roles? 
My intentions in asking these questions are threefold. First, if there is indeed evidence – which 
can be shown to be neither trivial, wildly anomalous, nor vanishingly rare – that access to 
personal bioinformation does sometimes play an important role in information subjects’ 
development of their self-conceptions, then this adds strength and plausibility to the 
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theoretically-based argument as to the potential identity value of information. Secondly, 
examples from the empirical literature will illustrate this argument, raising it beyond 
theoretical abstraction and making it more concrete. In doing so these examples may also 
reveal diversity and common-ground amongst different individuals’ experiences and the 
diverse impacts of different kinds of bioinformation. This will help to achieve my third aim of 
refining my theoretically-based argument. Thus far I have offered this argument with respect 
to the narrative role of personal bioinformation in general, taken as a broad class. The 
illustrative examples will allow me to refine this argument, by exposing any diversity of 
reactions to different categories of bioinformation encountered in different circumstances. 
Ultimately, then, my goal is to develop a more nuanced picture of what might account for the 
identity-significance and value of particular kinds of instances of personal bioinformation. 
This is a task I shall undertake in Chapter 8. 
I wish to be clear here about which aspects of my argument the empirically-based examples 
in the following chapters are not intended to speak to directly. The evidence I will draw upon 
is not intended to offer support for the veracity of the narrative theory of identity-constitution 
itself. I do not seek to defend this theory by empirical means in this thesis, rather to take it as 
a premise which the reader may of course reject. At the other end of my argument is my 
practical conclusion – that identity-based interests ought to be taken into account in governing 
information subjects’ access to personal bioinformation. Again, my aim in looking to the 
empirical literature is not to locate evidence of express support for this recommendation 
amongst information subjects or potential disclosers. As outlined above, the evidence I shall 
consider is intended to help build the normative argument that provides my rationale for this 
conclusion as the outcome and practical contribution of this thesis.  
SECTION 3: APPROACHING THE EVIDENCE  
The specific evidence in which I am interested in this thesis is that which reports the 
expectations, attitudes and reactions of individuals to receiving, or being denied, personal 
bioinformation about themselves. And I am interested in these responses insofar as they might 
tell us something about the roles of this information in information subjects’ identity narratives  
I have adopted a theory-led approach to my selection both of the kinds of studies and findings 
to which I look for this evidence, and also to the categories of bioinformation to which these 
studies pertain. I have done this in order to focus my attention on findings of most relevance 
to addressing my headline research question (as cited above), while also looking at findings 
relating to a sufficiently varied kinds of bioinformation to permit me to generalise from my 
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analysis and to reduce the risk that the conclusions I draw are peculiar only to a narrow sub-
set of bioinformation.  
As such, my approach to identifying the empirical literature and findings on which I will draw 
is analogous to that of ‘purposive sampling’ in social science research.343 Purposive sampling 
is a strategic and selective approach to acquiring data, driven by the research questions at hand, 
meaning that: 
“…the researcher establishes criteria concerning the kinds of cases needed to 
address the research questions, identifies appropriate cases, and then samples 
from those cases that have been identified.”344 
Theoretical conclusions are then drawn from the analysis of the evidence generated by the 
selected cases. I do not wish to overstate the formality of the sampling method I have used 
here: first, because purposive sampling applies, typically, to the collection of primary data in 
qualitative research, and is not so readily applicable to the selection of the kinds of tertiary 
data (data already analysed by others) from existing literature; and, secondly, because the 
relationships between my theoretical starting point and the selection, interpretation and 
application of empirical evidence is perhaps more circular than the inductive rationale of 
purposive sampling normally permits (as I address further below). However, my approach – 
insofar as it is intended to refine my initial theoretical position – does share something with 
the more iterative and theory-refining ‘theoretical sampling’ version of purposive sampling.345 
Selecting the kinds of bioinformation  
The first kind of ‘sampling’ judgement I have made is to select three categories of 
bioinformation on which to focus. These are: 
 Information that an individual was conceived using donor gametes (Chapter 5) 
 Results from genetic susceptibility testing for serious, multifactorial conditions 
(Chapter 6) 
 Diagnoses of psychiatric disorders based on functional neuroimaging findings 
(Chapter 7) 
My approach in Part II of this thesis is to examine evidence of the degree of potential 
significance to identity, and factors affecting this, of each of these categories on its own terms. 
But the wider aim is to gain insights that apply to personal bioinformation as a general 
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category. My intention is that using three diverse examples will support some generalisable 
conclusions, while permitting a depth of attention to each. I will explain the rationale for 
choosing each example in more detail in the three chapters that follow but, in brief, my reasons 
for selecting these examples are as follows. First, my aim is to move beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’ in existing ethical and policy-focused debates about access to bioinformation and 
identity. Therefore, this set includes one category of information about which debates about 
the importance of access are widespread (donor conception)346, and two where these are less 
common. Secondly, these examples allow me to challenge assumptions that identity 
significance might just be reducible to the significance of health-decisions, the brain and 
genes, as none of these is a universal feature of all three. This spread of examples also concerns 
information that arises in different settings, is not currently equally accessible to its subjects, 
and exhibits varying degrees of reliability in terms of providing knowledge of subjects’ 
embodied states. This variety is useful in identifying features-in-common that could indicate 
the potential identity-significance of other kinds of bioinformation which share these, and 
differences that might indicate factors that amplify or detract from bioinformation’s identity-
significance (see Chapter 8). 
Identifying suitable studies and findings  
My second ‘sampling’ choice concerns which kinds of studies and findings to include in my 
research.  
The evidence on which I draw is from published social science research. This includes both 
qualitative and quantitative studies of various sizes and methodologies, for example 
encompassing both large policy-focused studies and small, highly theorised ethnographic 
projects. I have also looked at systematic reviews and meta-analyses.347 The unifying feature 
is that these sources report empirical research that describes the actual or potential impacts on 
individuals of (not) receiving the three kinds of personal bioinformation listed above. 
The purposive nature of my approach means I have actively sought to identify findings that 
speak to the potential impacts of (not) receiving bioinformation on individuals’ self-narratives. 
However, doing so has necessitated looking beyond research that sets out specifically to 
explore identity impacts, let alone impacts on narrative identity, for three reasons. One is that 
there are relatively few studies that do the former. Even fewer do the latter. Secondly, 
participants sometimes raise identity-relevant matters even if this is not the study’s focus. 
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Thirdly, researchers’ and participants’ conceptions of identity are often narrower, or different 
from, that which I am using in this project – for example that might use identity to mean a 
discrete social identifier. This means that my approach to selection of relevant studies and 
findings is inherently inferential, and takes in a range of personal and practical impacts that 
might not be explicitly reported as identity impacts. These inferences are informed by a 
narrative conception of identity (as described in Chapter 2) and my claims about the role of 
personal bioinformation in this (Chapter 3).  
For the most part the research I focus upon records the self-reported views and reactions of 
information subjects/recipients collected through surveys, interviews or observational studies. 
However, for some categories of bioinformation this still results in a very small pool of 
research. Furthermore, where individuals are unaware they lack information, this presents a 
clear obstacle to gathering their views. For these reasons, I also widened my net, where 
necessary, to include studies that report the views of other parties, such as clinicians or parents, 
insofar as these provide useful insights into (potential) information recipients’ reactions. To 
the extent that I have successively widened the frame of evidence I have examined, in the ways 
described in this section, my method resembles ‘sequential purposive’ sampling.348  
Analysing the evidence  
Having selected the relevant empirical literature, I have analysed it to address my research 
questions. In each of the three chapters my analysis has three parts.  
I first set out and categorise the empirical findings that are relevant to addressing my research 
questions. This categorisation is not a formal thematic analysis, but is informed by the research 
participants’ own ways of characterising and explaining their experiences, as well as the 
interpretations applied by the social scientists conducting the empirical research.  
My second step is to draw inferences as to what these findings might tell one about the possible 
roles that the bioinformation in question play, or could play, in recipients’ identity narratives. 
This approach I take is an inferential and interpretive one – where this involves 
“…constructing or documenting a version of what you think the data mean or represent”.349 
My interpretation is informed, once again, by the conception of embodied and narratively 
constituted identity that I have set up in the preceding chapters. My own theoretical lens does 
not operate in isolation here. Depending on the study, the researchers themselves will to a 
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greater or lesser extent have contributed their own conceptual analyses to their findings – 
sometimes focusing upon impacts on recipients’ identities. I also draw upon (or differentiate 
my position from) arguments made in the wider theoretical literature about the potential 
identity significance of the category of bioinformation in question. In each case I clearly signal 
where the empirical findings stop, and where my own, or others’, interpretative analyses of 
these begin. As this process implies, my approach to assessing the potential identity-
significance of the bioinformation does not take a purely internalist perspective. That is, it 
does not just take identity impacts as those that (potential) recipients of these categories of 
information report. For example, I also infer them from other kinds of responses or reflect on 
how different circumstances might change participants’ attitudes.  
My third step is to consider what inferences maybe drawn from the empirical literature about 
the kinds of factors, either those intrinsic to the category of bioinformation, or those dependent 
on the contexts in which it is generated or communicated, that might be seen as influencing 
the nature or extent of the impact it has on recipients’ self-conceptions.  
Methodological caveats 
This approach to the selection of sources and their analysis might raise three particular 
concerns about the robustness of any conclusion drawn from them. 
The first concern is that, by extending my scope beyond evidence of attitudes and reactions in 
which identity is explicitly invoked, I allow such a wide conception of potential identity 
impacts that my inquiry becomes trivially self-affirming. This is indeed a risk. However, I 
would argue that it is necessary to throw the net wide precisely because this opens up a richer, 
more dynamic, multi-stranded and normative conception of identity (and thus the contributions 
of bioinformation to it), going beyond the narrow understanding of identity as social identifier 
or genealogy. This broadening of focus is inherent to the aims of this project. Nevertheless, it 
does mean proceeding with care. A narrative conception is not licence to include every fleeting 
impression or emotion under the label ‘identity impact’. On the contrary, what the idea of 
narrativity brings is the condition that to count as having identity-significance, something must 
make an interpretive, substantive or structural difference (albeit not necessarily a permanent 
one) to someone’s account of who she is and the characteristics of which it comprises. This 
requires that relevant impacts must have a degree of stickiness and weight, that the roles they 
play in someone’s life are not trivial or ephemeral. These considerations provide a vital filter 
in selecting and analysing the relevant evidence.  
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The second concern is that my approach is question-begging, because it uses the conceptual 
lens of narrative identity to select and analyse evidence, which is then intended to lend support 
to my hypothesis that personal bioinformation can play an important role in identity narratives. 
I concede that there is circularity here, but would suggest that this reflects the reflexive and 
mutually-informing nature of the relationship in this inquiry, between the real-life examples 
and the underlying theory. Given this reflexivity, it is not possible to treat the empirical 
findings as theory-independent proof of bioinformation’s identity-significance. To do so 
would indeed be problematic. But the empirical findings cited in the following chapters are 
not being used to prove that personal bioinformation plays important roles in individuals’ 
construction of their identity narratives. Nor is it used to quantify the proportion of people who 
do invest particular bioinformation with identity-significance, much less make claims to 
unanimity of such views. Instead, these illustrative examples are offered in order to 
demonstrate that this theoretically-based claim is at least congruent with the evidence of 
people’s lived experiences – that these support, or at least do not undermine, its cogency and 
plausibility.  
The third concern relates to the fact that my approach to the literature is not comprehensive. 
What follows is indeed not a systematic or exhaustive review of all the empirical literature that 
report the impact of three categories of information on its subjects/recipients. For the reasons 
outlined in the previous paragraph, fulfilling my aims of illustrating and lending plausibility 
to my hypothesis does not require a systematic account of all possible perspectives. These 
aims can be fulfilled by looking at a sufficient number of widely cited, peer-reviewed sources 
which allow me to obtain a rich selection of attitudes and responses, draw out common themes, 
and to gather examples of responses that not only support my claims, but also of those that 
challenge it. 
The empirical literature on which I draw is exclusively English-language, and chiefly reports 
studies conducted in Western Europe, North America and Australasia. The attitudes reported 
may not, therefore, be more widely representative or support my proposition outwith the 
particular cultural contexts in which the research was conducted. 
SECTION 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EVIDENCE AND NORMATIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
A different kind of concern might be that I am seeking to use empirical information to support 
a claim as to the value of personal bioinformation to identity, which, as noted above, is not 
itself solely factual, but includes normative assumptions. The challenges inherent to 





longstanding.350 There is not space to pursue that debate here. However, they are challenges 
commonly wrestled with in the field of empirical bioethics. As noted above, my reasons for 
including evidence from the empirical literature in this project shares the desire of empirical 
bioethics to anchor normative conclusions in evidence of how the world is. And empirical 
bioethics has made various attempts to categorise how the relationship between ethical 
propositions and social scientific data might be negotiated in this field.351 Even though my 
project is not itself one of empirical bioethics,352 it is nevertheless possible to draw on one such 
taxonomy broadly to characterise the relationships between empirical findings and bioethical 
arguments in this thesis. 
Using the taxonomy devised by Bert Molewijk et al, the relationship between the evidence 
and the ethical argument of this project may be seen as lying somewhere between what these 
authors characterise as a “theorist” approach and a “critical applied ethicist” approach.353 
Exemplifying the ‘theorist’ approach, the locus of ethical authority in this project lies in the 
theoretical premise of the research. It is my underlying account of embodied narrative identity, 
rather than attitudes revealed by empirical research, that carries the weight of the normative 
argument. Meanwhile, in line with the ‘critical applied ethicist’ approach, this project has the 
practical goal of applying the ethical argument to making recommendations about the policies 
and practices governing disclosure of personal bioinformation to individual information 
subjects. Finally, in common with both these approaches, this thesis seeks to apply empirical 
evidence to checking the cogency and nuance of the more factually-based elements of the 
central normative argument and making such refinements to its claims as are necessary.  
In the next three chapters I will explore what the social science literature indicates about the 
roles that three categories of personal bioinformation may play in information subjects’ self-
conceptions. As I have outlined above, the findings reported in this literature cannot prove the 
importance of this information to our identities or to the richness and character of our lives. 
And they cannot prove that we consequently have ethically significant interests in accessing 
                                                             
350 See, for example, Hume’s critique of the derivation of moral principles from matters of fact – D. 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Analytical Index by La Selby–Bigge. Text revised and notes by 
PH Nidditch. (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1978).  
351 R. Davies et al. (2015), "A Systematic Review of Empirical Bioethics Methodologies" BMC 
Medical Ehics, 16(1): 1. 
352 Two main features distinguish my methodology from empirical bioethics in the strictest sense. 
First my project has no integral empirical methodology, but relies on others’ findings and 
interpretations of these. Secondly, as described above, my use of these sources is theory-driven and 
inferential. 
353 B. Molewijk et al. (2004), "Scientific Contribution. Empirical Data and Moral Theory. A Plea for 
Integrated Empirical Ethics" Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 7(1): 55-69. 
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this information. My intention, however, is that they will illustrate these claims and provide 
grist to their plausibility. Furthermore, exploration of specific examples will supply texture 
and detail that may permit the development of a more refined account of how different kinds 
of bioinformation might affect individual’s self-conceptions in different circumstances. This 
will allow me to move forward on a sound footing to practical questions of when and how 
individuals’ interests in identity development might be engaged by access to personal 
bioinformation. In Part III of this thesis I will bring together the findings from the three 
examples to consider what generalisable lessons might be drawn from these in terms of the 
identity-significance and value of particular kinds and instances of bioinformation and what 







CHAPTER 5: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE I - INFORMATION 
ABOUT DONOR ORIGINS 
 
SECTION 1: TOPIC AND AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER  
This chapter is the first of the three illustrative examples I draw upon in this project, with the 
aims of assessing the plausibility of, illustrating, and refining my theory-based argument as to 
the importance of personal bioinformation to developing a coherent self-narrative (as made in 
Chapter 3). This example focuses upon information about donor origins (also referred to as 
donor conception) – that is, information conveying to an individual that she was conceived 
using donor gametes or a donor embryo. Under the definition of ‘personal bioinformation’ 
provided in the Chapter 1, this category of information is ‘biological’ because of its 
‘interpretative pedigree’, rather than its source.354 That is, it is biological because it understood 
to about the beginning of an individual’s embodied existence and her genetic relationships to 
others – not because it is necessarily derived from analysis of biological material (its source is 
more likely to be parental knowledge or administrative records).355 
Reasons for choosing this example 
There are three reasons that I have chosen this category of bioinformation as my first case 
study. First this is, as noted in preceding chapters, an area in which claims about the identity-
significance of a particular kind of bioinformation appear to be most prevalent in academic, 
legal and public discourse, so the basis for such claims warrants interrogation.356 Secondly, 
there is a reasonably large body of empirical literature regarding donor-conceived individuals’ 
experiences of (not) knowing about their donor origins.357 And, finally, this is a category where 
health-related implications of the information are not the chief theme, so it usefully 
complements my two other illustrative examples which are concerned with health.358  
                                                             
354 See Chapter 1. 
355 This chapter will only address donor-conceived individuals’ attitudes to information about their 
gamete donors insofar as it sheds light on our understanding of the impacts of information about 
conception. 
356 See Chapters 1 and 2. 
357 See Section 3 below. 
358 Some of the inferences drawn in this chapter might also apply to information about genetic 
parentage beyond the present example – for example in circumstances of adoption, surrogacy, 
mitochondrial donation, or unknown paternity. My intention here is not to make claims for the sui 
generis significance of information about donor conception, but to use this as an illustrative example 




This chapter directly addresses the second of the four headline research questions set out in 
Chapter 1: what grounds are there for holding that the conception of the relationship between 
personal bioinformation and identity developed in Chapter 3 is robust and plausible in light 
of people’s actual experiences? In order to answer this, my specific research questions for this 
chapter will be: 
i. What do findings reported in the empirical literature indicate about the impacts 
upon donor-conceived individuals of discovering and knowing about their donor 
origins? (Section 4) 
ii. What might be inferred from this about the roles that information about donor 
origins could play in donor-conceived individuals’ self-narratives? (Section 5) 
iii. What kinds of factors appear to influence whether it plays these roles? (Section 
6) 
Answering these questions will provide insights into the potential identity-significance of 
information about donor origins. My broader objective is to gain insights into what factors 
shape the identity roles, significance and value of many different kinds or instance of personal 
bioinformation (see Chapter 8). This in turn will contribute to asking my third and fourth 
headline research questions outlined in Chapter 1: what are the nature and scope of our 
identity-related interests in accessing personal bioinformation?; and what ethical 
responsibilities for disclosure accrue to those who hold personal bioinformation about us? I 
will address these further questions in Chapter 9. 
Before looking at the evidence it will be instructive first to review the current legal and 
practical status of donor-conceived individuals’ access to information about their donor 
conception (Section 2) and to outline my approach to sourcing and analysing findings from 
the empirical literature (Section 3). 
SECTION 2: CURRENT ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION ABOUT DONOR ORIGINS  
Regulatory position  
Although ‘open-identity donation’ (where identifying information about gamete donor is to 
some extent available to offspring) is now required in law in a number of jurisdictions, 
including the UK,359 very few states have taken statutory steps to encourage disclosure of the 
                                                             
359 I have outlined the UK regulatory position with respect to donor-conceived individuals’ access to 





underlying fact of donor conception.360 One exception is the Australian state of Victoria, where 
donor conception is recorded on birth certificates.361 In the UK, once an individual turns 
eighteen (if born after 1991) they are entitled to apply to the regulator, the HFEA, to find out 
if they are donor-conceived (presumably if they have unconfirmed suspicions).362 However, 
proactive disclosure of donor conception is not mandated in UK law. 
Tabitha Freeman observes that:  
“…there is an emerging consensus in professional and policy discourse in the 
UK, the USA, Australia and some other Western countries that parental 
disclosure in early childhood of the fact of donor conception, if not the identity 
of the donor, is in the best interests of the child.”363  
This is reflected in the regulatory position in the UK. Licensed clinics offering donor-assisted 
conception are required in law to advise prospective parents of “the importance of informing 
any resulting child at an early age” of their donor-conception and to provide guidance and 
information and direction to services that could support them in doing so.364 Nevertheless, it 
is ultimately left to parents to decide whether to tell. This may reflect unwillingness to impose 
coercive legal measures in private areas of family life,365 or caution about the invariable 
benefits of openness.366  
Knowing that one is donor-conceived is clearly a condition for exercising legal entitlements 
to access information about one’s donor. However, in this chapter my intention is to 
interrogate the potential identity-value of knowledge of donor origins in its own right, not 
merely as a step to donor information.  
 
 
                                                             
360 E. Blyth and L. Frith (2009), "Donor-Conceived People's Access to Genetic and Biographical 
History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor Identity" 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 23(2): 174-91 
361 Ibid.  
362 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended) s.31. 
363 T. Freeman, 'Introduction', in Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction: Families, Origins and 
Identities, ed. T. Freeman, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.14. 
364 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended) s.13 (6c); Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, 'Code of Practice' (2015), 
365 A proposal for annotated birth certificates was rejected in the UK during the drafting phases of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008., see, Department of Health 'Government Response to 
the Report from the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill (8 October 
2007)' . 
366 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013) 
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Parental disclosure  
Until relatively recently the norm was for parents not to tell their children about donor 
conception.367 In the early days of fertility treatment, secrecy was assumed to protect children’s 
wellbeing and family relationships.368 Attitudes about the benefits of openness are changing, 
in what may be seen as part of a wider social trend toward according significance to genetic 
inheritance.369 Nevertheless, it is currently the case that the majority of donor-conceived 
people do not know their donor origins.370 
Indications from the UK are that heterosexual parents are increasingly telling their donor-
conceived children about their origins (same-sex and single parents have historically been 
more open).371 However, not all parents share the view that disclosure is in children’s interests, 
and telling can be personally challenging.372 Intentions to tell do not always lead to 
disclosure.373 The majority of parents in heterosexual couples still do not disclose.374 For 
example, one recent study found that by the time children in the participating families were 
seven (the age by which most parents who intend to tell do so)375 only 29% (n=10) who had 
used sperm donors and 41% (n=13) who had used egg donors had started the process of 
disclosure.376 It is not yet clear whether the introduction of open-identity donation is likely to 
encourage or discourage parental openness.377 Of course disclosure of donor origins does not 
                                                             
367 J.B. Appleby et al., 'Is Disclosure in the Best Interests of Children Conceived by Donation?', in 
Reproductive Donation: Practice, Policy and Bioethics, ed. M. Richards, et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
368 T. Freeman and S. Golombok (2012), "Donor Insemination: A Follow-up Study of Disclosure 
Decisions, Family Relationships and Child Adjustment at Adolescence" Reproductive biomedicine 
online, 25(2): 193-203. 
369 Freeman (2014); M. Richards, 'A British History of Collaborative Reproduction and the Rise of the 
Genetic Connection', in Relatedness in Assisted Reproduction: Families, Origins, and Identities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
370 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013). 
371 Ibid.; D. Beeson et al. (2011), "Offspring Searching for Their Sperm Donors: How Family Type 
Shapes the Process" Human Reproduction, 26(9): 2415-24. 
372 J. Readings et al. (2011), "Secrecy, Disclosure and Everything in-Between: Decisions of Parents of 
Children Conceived by Donor Insemination, Egg Donation and Surrogacy" Reproductive biomedicine 
online, 22(5): 485-95. 
373 Ibid. 
374 S. Zadeh (2016), "Disclosure of Donor Conception in the Era of Non-Anonymity: Safeguarding 
and Promoting the Interests of Donor-Conceived Individuals?" Human Reproduction, 31(11): 2416-
20. 
375 L. Blake et al. (2010), "‘Daddy Ran out of Tadpoles’: How Parents Tell Their Children That They 
Are Donor Conceived, and What Their 7-Year-Olds Understand" Human Reproduction, 25(10): 2527-
34. 
376 L. Blake et al. (2014), "Parent Psychological Adjustment, Donor Conception and Disclosure: A 
Follow-up over 10 Years" Human Reproduction, 29(11): 2487-96. 
377 T. Freeman et al., 'Identifiable Donors and Siblings: Implications for the Future', in Reproductive 






only occur in planned ways or early in a child’s life. Events such as divorce or the death of 
one parent may precipitate later revelations.378 And offspring may find out from other relatives, 
family friends, by accident, or reach their own inferences.379 As discussed later in this chapter, 
unplanned and later disclosures may affect the impacts of the information. 
As indicated in Chapter 1, recognition of donor-conceived individuals’ identity-related 
interests were part of the rationale for the change in the law ending anonymous gamete 
donation in the UK. I shall return at the end of Chapter 9 to reflect on what, if any, difference 
thinking about these interests in terms of narrative identity might make to practices and 
policies in respect of provision of information about donor origins.  
SECTION 3: SOURCES AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
As I have indicated in the preceding chapters, there is no shortage of assertions in legal, policy 
and academic (both theoretical and empirical) sources that knowledge of donor origins can be 
important to donor-conceived individuals’ identities.380 To take just three examples, Guido 
Pennings argues that: 
“…information about one's genetic lineage is needed in order to be able to 
construct an acceptable life story, i.e., a story of who one is.”381 
Vardit Ravitsky maintains that: 
“The development of personal identity requires understanding “where you came 
from”…”382 
And the HFEA has stated that information about “genetic origins” -  
“…can help people complete a picture of their identity and it is natural to seek 
it.”383  
However, assertions such as these cannot (or at least not on their own) provide the kind of 
evidential support that I am seeking in this chapter. Not only are such claims not uniformly 
evidence-based, but it is not always safe to assume that they invoke identity in a sense 
sufficiently similar to the conception at the heart of this project. Furthermore, though abundant, 
                                                             
378 K. Daniels et al. (2011), "Factors Associated with Parents’ Decisions to Tell Their Adult Offspring 
About the Offspring's Donor Conception" Human Reproduction, 26(10): 2783-90; Kirkman (2003).  
379 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013). 
380 See, Chapters 1 and 3.  
381 Pennings (2001), p.12.  
382 V. Ravitsky (2010), "Knowing Where You Come From: The Rights of Donor-Conceived 
Individuals and the Meaning of Genetic Relatedness" Minn. JL Sci. & Tech., 11(2): 665-84, p.674. 
383 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 'HFEA Paper 485: Opening the Register Policy: A 
Principled Approach' (21 January 2009) [10.1]. 
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such arguments are not without detractors. Some authors query the universality of an identity-
related interest in knowing,384 while others challenge the objective basis or ethical significance 
of such an interest.385  
I have outlined my broad methodological approach to analysing the empirical evidence for all 
three illustrative examples in Chapter 4.  Here I will set out my specific approach in this 
chapter. 
Empirical literature   
There is a relatively large body of empirical research looking at the experiences, attitudes and 
wellbeing of donor-conception families. To navigate this field, I have taken as stating point 
the sources that informed the detailed evidence-review conducted by the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics for their 2013 report, ‘Donor Conception: ethical aspects of information sharing’,386 
supplementing these with more recent studies and reviews where appropriate. Here I draw 
upon 21 publications reporting primary research gathered through a range of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The largest of these reports qualitative and quantitative findings from 
741 participants.387 Many are smaller; the smallest involving 16 participants.388 Some studies 
were longitudinal and others, snapshots. They chiefly involve participants from the UK, 
Australia, New Zealand, North America and Western Europe. A sizeable proportion of these 
studies are co-authored by members of the Centre for Family Research at the University of 
Cambridge, a leading centre for empirical work in this field.389 I have also drawn upon several 
evidence reviews. It is necessary to raise two caveats in respect of applying the findings of this 
literature to my research questions listed in Section 1. 
Limitations of research findings 
The first caveat is that that participants in studies looking at donor-conceived individuals’ 
reactions to information about their origins research may not be representative of all donor-
conceived individuals. The difficulties of studying those who do not know they are donor-
                                                             
384 See, for example, Lillehammer (2014). 
385 See, for example, de Melo‐Martín (2014); S. Haslanger (2009), "Family, Ancestry and Self: What 
Is the Moral Significance of Biological Ties"; K. Leighton (2014), "The Right to Know Genetic 
Origins: A Harmful Value" Hastings Center Report, 44(4): 5-6. 
386 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013). 
387 Beeson et al. (2011).  
388 A.J. Turner and A. Coyle (2000), "What Does It Mean to Be a Donor Offspring? The Identity 
Experiences of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implications for Counselling and 
Therapy" Human Reproduction, 15(9): 2041-51. 
389 University of Cambridge Centre for Family Research website ‘New Families Research Group’, 





conceived means that participants are often drawn from networks that facilitate contact 
between donor-relatives, amongst whom pro-information attitudes may be more prevalent.390 
Individuals conceived with donor eggs or embryos are less well-represented than those 
conceived using donor sperm.391 Given the relatively recent introduction of open-identity 
donation, there are also limited findings from those who know who their donors are.392 And 
few of the larger studies are longitudinal or conducted with adults, limiting the insights into 
the longer-term impacts of this information.393 
The second caveat relates to the specific challenges of illustrating impacts on identity-
narratives. Few studies investigate identity-related effects directly;394 though, they are 
sometimes indirectly inferred from findings relating to the psychological wellbeing and quality 
of relationships within donor-conception families.395 Even where identity effects are explicitly 
mentioned, these are more commonly invoked either in a broad, undefined sense, or in the 
more technical terms of developmental psychology.396 One exception to this is research 
conducted by Maggie Kirkman, in which she applies a narrative conception of identity to her 
own findings – albeit not the philosophical one on which this thesis is based.397 Kirkman’s 
analysis informs my own in Section 5.  
These limitations will be taken into account in my analysis of the empirical evidence below.  
Analytical approach  
In Section 4 I will summarise findings from published empirical studies insofar as these report 
the experiences, attitudes and expectations of donor-conceived individuals in relation to 
having, receiving or lacking information about their donor origins. This is conducted with a 
view to gaining insights into the impact of this information (or its absence) on the way donor-
conceived individuals see themselves, their relationships and their lives in a way that might 
allow me to draw inferences about its possible narrative roles. 
                                                             
390 T. Freeman (2015), "Gamete Donation, Information Sharing and the Best Interests of the Child: An 
Overview of the Psychosocial Evidence" Monash Bioethics Review, 33(1): 45-63. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Ibid. 
393 E. Blyth et al. (2012), "Donor-Conceived People's Views and Experiences of Their Genetic 
Origins: A Critical Analysis of the Research Evidence" Journal of law and medicine, 19(4): 769-89. 
394 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013). 
395 Freeman and Golombok (2012). 
396 See for example, J. Slutsky et al. (2016), "Integrating Donor Conception into Identity 
Development: Adolescents in Fatherless Families" Fertility and sterility, 106(1): 202-08; Turner and 
Coyle (2000). 
397 Kirkman (2003); M. Kirkman (2004), "Genetic Connection and Relationships in Narratives of 
Donor-Assisted Conception" Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society, 2(1). 
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Having gathered and summarised the relevant findings, I shall then turn (in Section 5) to 
analyse this more specifically through the conceptual framework of the current project – 
according to which I have hypothesised that personal bioinformation may not only contribute 
contents and plotlines to our self-narratives, but also the interpretive context that helps us 
construct coherent self-narratives, which make sense and support us in navigating our 
embodied lives and experiences.  
In Section 6 I will consider what the empirical literature indicates, first, about which features 
of information about donor origins contribute to its identity-relevance and, secondly, what 
factors appear to account for diversity amongst the ways in which individuals respond to it. 
As outlined in the previous chapters, there is already a theoretical literature that frames 
individuals’ interests in knowing about their genetic origins in terms of narrative identity.398 
And as noted above, there are a small number of empirical studies in which the findings are 
analysed with reference to effects on identity.399 My intention in this chapter is to go beyond 
the conclusions reached in either of these literatures by bringing together my own 
theoretically-based conception of the role of personal bioinformation in identity development 
with the findings reported in the empirical literature to provide a distinctive and evidence-
informed normative account of the role that information about donor origins might play in 
someone’s self-conception. As such, my narrow aims are to provide a robust response to those 
who question any identity value in information about donor origins,400 and to meet the need, 
noted by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, for an adequate articulation of what “harm to 
identity” means in ethical terms in this context.401 My wider aim is further to develop the 
picture of how and why access to personal bioinformation may engage ethically significant 
identity-based interests. 
SECTION 4: THE EVIDENCE 
In this section I will present what I take to be the key pertinent findings from the literature I 
have surveyed. In order to highlight what these findings indicate about the possible impacts 
on donor-conceived individuals of having or lacking information about donor origins I will 
divide these findings into the reported effects of three ‘epistemic states’, those of: 
 Not knowing about donor origins; 
 Discovering donor origins; and 
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 Living with the knowledge of donor origins. 
Impacts of not knowing  
There are clear inherent difficulties facing researchers seeking to ascertain the effects of not 
knowing on those who do not know they are donor-conceived. On possible source of insights 
are large-scale observational studies comparing psychosocial measures of wellbeing and 
familial relationships in disclosing and non-disclosing families.402 These studies have not 
investigated identity impacts directly. But they have found no significant differences in 
children’s wellbeing between those who know and those who do not.403 Although mother-
child relationships have been observed to be somewhat more positive in disclosing families 
while children are young,404 the direction or nature of any causal link is not known.405 These 
studies do not currently extend into adulthood, so do not speak to any longer-term 
consequences of not knowing. 
Another source of insights are the retrospective reflections of donor-conceived individuals, 
who learnt of their origins in adolescence or adulthood, upon their experiences prior to this. A 
number of sources report donor-conceived individuals as having felt anomalous within their 
family with respect to their appearance or character traits.406 For example, one participant 
describes that – 
“I’d always known that something wasn’t quite right that there was something 
different about me but I just didn’t know what,”407 
 
                                                             
402 S. Golombok et al. (1996), "Children: The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families: 
Family Functioning and Child Development" Human Reproduction, 11(10): 2324-31; S. Golombok et 
al. (2002), "The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families: The Transition to Adolescence" 
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and Talking (Donor Conception Network, 2006); Turner and Coyle (2000). 
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And another that: 
“I sensed that my social father wasn’t my biological father and I began asking 
questions.”408 
While another says that learning that she was donor-conceived: 
“…explained so many unanswered questions I had [and] resolved a fog of 
confusion”.409  
Some donor-conceived individuals describe the sense of disconnection they felt prior to 
learning about their conceptions as “blighting” their lives or damaging their self-esteem.410 It 
is, however, not possible to disentangle such views from the colourings of hindsight, 
adolescent disaffection, or distress at how they found out. 411  
It has been posited that concealing donor conception within a family can itself cause tensions, 
or affect parental behaviour in ways that are palpable to offspring.412 One donor-conceived 
individual reports that the withholding of information in her family: 
“…created a ‘shroud of secrecy’ and a ‘sense of shame’ but something I could 
sense, but of what I had no real knowledge”.413 
One self-evident consequence of non-disclosure in childhood is that it leaves open the 
possibility of late or accidental discovery which, as I shall now go on to discuss, is often a 
negative experience.414   
Experiences of discovery  
Reactions to discovery of donor origins vary markedly by the age at which this occurs.415 
Although some parents fear that disclosure will confuse very young children or cause 
psychological problems, the most common reactions amongst those who are told before 
reaching school-age are indifference, pleasure or curiosity.416 And for many the experience is 
one of ‘always having known’.417 In contrast, it has been observed that those who learn of their 
donor conception when they were adolescents or adults are more likely to react with shock, 
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confusion, numbness or anger.418 One individual, told when she was eighteen, describes 
finding out as:  
“…one of the most shocking and upsetting moments of my life.”419  
Participants in several studies report anger and a sense of betrayal that they had been lied to, 
or that their “entire life [has been] based on a lie”.420 Several participants in another small 
study, told during their teens or adult years, expressed the wish that they had been told 
earlier.421 
There are also some explicit references to identity. One individual told in her thirties describes 
becoming very depressed because she felt “I wasn’t the person I thought I was” and having to 
“redevelop her sense of identity”.422 One younger individual says that, “I knew I was still 
loved. But I think I felt like “who am I?” Another reports feeling angry because, “…I felt that 
I did not know myself”.423  
Not all experiences of disclosure in adolescence or adulthood are negative. Some report 
curiosity or joy upon learning of their donor conception.424 Some are excited to gain a new 
living ‘parent’425 or to receive an explanation for lifelong feelings of ‘non-belonging’.426 
Others, meanwhile, report a mixture of positive and negative reactions. For example, in more 
than one study participants report that despite feeling shocked or disoriented, they also felt 
“liberated” or “relieved”.427 Again, identity impacts are sometimes explicitly invoked. Several 
participants in one study talk of having to “reappraise” their identities, but frame this as a 
positive opportunity.428 
Experiences of living with the knowledge 
This sub-section looks at individuals’ reactions to or experiences of living with knowledge of 
donor-conception beyond initial discovery (although indications are that the manner of 
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discovery may colour their ongoing feelings about the information). In order to illustrate the 
different facets of the effects that this information might have, I will divide the evidence here 
into the following four categories:  
i) Effects on psychological wellbeing;  
ii) Impacts on relationships;  
iii) Responses explicitly invoking identity; and  
iv) Express preferences for knowing.  
i) Effects on psychological wellbeing  
As noted above, large-scale studies comparing the psychosocial wellbeing of children and 
young adolescents in disclosing and non-disclosing families have found no differences in their 
psychological adjustment, leading researchers to conclude that knowing about donor 
conception “does not create significant difficulties” amongst these age groups.429  Early 
disclosure often seems to be associated with an unproblematic longer-term accommodation of 
the knowledge. For example one research participant felt that being told early “allowed [their 
donor origins] to be a ‘normal’ kind of thing”.430 A parent providing evidence to the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics reported their child (told when she was four) remained “comfortable” 
and “unfazed” by the knowledge.431 However, it is noted that people’s attitudes can change 
throughout their lives.432  
The longer-term reactions of those that learn of their donor origins in adolescence or adulthood 
may be less sanguine. One large study observes that, even after any initial shock or confusion 
had subsided, anger often persists.433 However, it has been suggested that this may be 
attributable to the perception that they were lied to, or the circumstances disclosure, rather than 
knowledge of donor conception per se.434 
ii) Impacts on relationships  
Impacts on family relationships have been observed to be similarly diverse. As noted above, 
early disclosure has been observed to be associated with more positive mother-child 
relationships while children a young.435 However, large longitudinal, comparative studies have 
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also observed the emergence of lower father-child warmth and more mother-daughter conflict 
during early adolescence.436 The authors comment that this coincides with a development stage 
of “questioning one’s identity”.437 They stress, however, that the problems observed do not 
count as dysfunctional and are not necessarily attributable to disclosure.438 Other studies have 
observed that openness about donor conception can enhance family relationships. For 
example, one participant reports that it has made their family closer because it provided a 
“special bond”.439 And some parents report that being open with their children has cemented 
trust.440   
It is widely reported that later disclosure appears to be particularly associated with enduring 
anger amongst donor-conceived offspring, directed at parents who they regard as having lied, 
dismissed their earlier suspicions, or prioritised their (the parents’) own interests over those of 
their children.441 Trust between parents and offspring may be a casualty of later disclosure.442 
And some describe their relationships with their parents as permanently damaged.443  
Knowledge of donor origins also introduces the possibility of reconfigured or new personal 
relationships. Several studies report participants as feeling a sense of loss and grief at having 
to relinquish what they had assumed to be their family or genetic heritage.444 However, other 
reactions are more positive. For example, in more than one study participants report relief 
upon learning that they are not genetically related to a parent towards whom they feel 
antipathy.445 Some donor-conceived individuals are also excited by the prospect of donors as 
imagined ‘fantasy parents’ or of meeting and building relationships with donors or donors 
siblings.446 For example, one participant reports that:  
“I also felt excited, because it meant I might have a living “father” (my social 
father died when I was quite young), and half-siblings as well.”447 
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However, for regulatory, practical and personal reasons, hopes of identifying or contacting 
donors or donor siblings may not always be realisable or have positive outcomes.448  
iii) Explicit identity impacts 
Based on its own review of empirical studies and direct engagement with donor-conceived 
offspring and support networks, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics observes that: 
“…some donor-conceived people have expressed very strongly the view that 
knowledge of their biological origins, in the sense both of the truth about the 
circumstances of their conception and of the knowledge of their donor, is 
essential to both their sense of self and to their social identity: their understanding 
of ‘who they are’ and of where they fit in the world.”449 
For some, donor conception appears to occupy a central part of how they define themselves. 
For example, one research participant who had ‘always known’ about her origins reports that:  
“My conception is who I am, it is who I will always be, it will never change… 
My hair is black my parents divorced when I was three. I am an only child, and I 
was conceived through DI [donor insemination].”450 
But, for others, donor conception plays no part in their self-characterisation. For example, a 
participant on one study reports that:  
 “I am no different than any other person. How we are born does not make us who 
we are. I do not define myself by that trait.”451 
A more ambiguous position is reflected by the response that – 
“It doesn’t bother me at all. I live life like I would’ve if I wasn’t a ‘donor sperm’ 
person.”452 
Some report that their donor conception is something that marks them out in positive ways, or 
makes them feel “special”.453 However, positive reactions are not universal. Some parents 
report a fear that their children will suffer stigma if their donor conception is widely known.454 
One large study found several participants felt ashamed, with some (statistically non-
significant) correlation between this and later discovery.455 The label of ‘donor-conceived’ is 
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sometimes experienced as a negative or marginalising characteristic. For example, one young 
person reports:  
“I felt like a commodity that has been commissioned…I genuinely felt that I am 
different to other people.”456 
The threat of stigma is thought to be greater in communities in which, for example, infertility 
is seen as shameful.457  However, it has been suggested that feared experiences of otherness or 
discrimination often fail to materialise.458 And Kirkman observes that the negative reactions 
of participants in her study to discovering their origins was usually not related to negative 
feelings about being donor-conceived.459  
Knowledge of donor conception is also reported as having impacts – both constructive and 
detrimental – on donor-conceived individuals’ capacities to make sense of who they are. As 
described above, some participants feel that learning of their donor conception brings fresh 
intelligibility to their traits or experiences of their place within their families.460  In contrast, 
however, one small study reports that many participants responded that learning of their donor 
conception left them feeling as if their identity was ‘incomplete’.461 Similarly, Kirkman (who 
brings a narrative-identity-based analysis to her data) has suggested that, following later 
disclosure, some (even if they do not feel negatively about being donor-conceived) have 
trouble reconstructing a satisfying narrative of who they are – one that either comfortably 
accommodates or excludes ‘being donor-conceived’.462  
iv) Preferring to know 
Despite the varied range of reactions to information about donor origins, two studies indicate 
a strikingly widespread preference for knowing, even amongst those for whom the experience 
has not been wholly positive. For example, in one large study in which the participants reported 
a range of good and bad experiences of learning they were donor-conceived, only one percent 
(of a total of 164)) said that they wished that they had not found out.463 It must be noted, 
however, that this study recruited participants from a network facilitating donor and sibling 
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contact, so those disposed to welcome information may well be overrepresented. In another 
study (a qualitative one with 12 offspring participants) the author reports that:  
“Without exception participants who are adult offspring of donor-assisted 
conception argued the necessity of developing an identity that accurately 
reflected their conception”464 
For example, one of these participants says that despite having to “redevelop” her sense of 
identity upon learning about her conception, she is glad to have done so because “truth is 
always better”, and it helped to explain some of her prior experiences.465  
The findings summarised in the sub-sections above already go some considerable way to 
indicating what the potential impacts of information about donor origins on a donor-conceived 
individual’s identity might look like. Indeed, although the views cited above indicate that by 
no means all donor-conceived individuals experience this category of personal bioinformation 
as making straightforwardly welcome or important contributions to their identities, my more 
modest intention – to demonstrate that at least some do – might seem to be adequately fulfilled 
by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ observation (quoted above) that some individuals feel 
strongly that knowledge of their genetic origins is essential to their sense of self.466 However, 
the present project is not simply interested in identity impacts conceived in just any sense, but 
specifically in the potential for this category of bioinformation to play roles in the construction 
of a coherent self-narrative that underpins both one’s sense of who one really is and one’s 
interpretive outlook on the world. So, although it will entail some repetition, in this section it 
is my aim to interpret the findings above through the lens of a narrative conception of identity. 
In this, my analysis is informed by empirical researchers who explicitly invoke identity 
narratives in their interpretations of their own findings, as well as theory-led commentaries 
that posit a narrative role for knowledge of genetic parentage.  
SECTION 5: INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS IN TERMS OF IMPACTS ON NARRATIVE 
IDENTITY 
I wish to propose that the evidence summarised above suggests the following six, sometimes 
interconnected, ways that information about donor conception can play a role – not always a 
positive one – in donor-conceived individuals’ self-narratives:  
i) Self-labelling; 
ii) Reconfiguration of relationships; 
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iii) Biographical beginnings; 
iv) Explaining experiences; 
v) Disrupting existing narratives; and 
vi) Jeopardising narrative coherence. 
i)  Self-labelling  
Self-ascription of the label of being ‘a donor-conceived individual’ does not emerge as one of 
the more widely invoked consequences of individuals learning that they are donor-conceived. 
While a few report that this is how – for better or worse – they think of themselves, others 
repudiate any such label. One important angle that a narrative conception of identity opens up, 
however, is a picture self-characterisation that extends beyond the acquisition of self-labels, 
to characterisations that are constituted by what someone does. Behind many of the findings 
cited above lie descriptions or implications of the pursuit of donor information, and active 
engagement with support networks and donor and donor-sibling voluntary contact registries 
by some donor-conceived individuals.467 And, although it is necessarily speculative without 
first person testimony speaking to such a conclusion, I would tentatively suggest that such 
activities could constitute portions of these individuals’ self-narratives in a way that is 
inextricably bound up with the means of their conception.  
ii) Relational roles and relationships 
As noted in Chapter 3, James Lindemann Nelson suggests that the narrative value of 
understanding how our lives connect with those of others may be seen as lying in the “depth 
and richness” which these connections bring “to the continuing story in which we 
participate”468 This is reflected in the views of those research participants who report marked 
curiosity or excitement at learning of genetic relatives – both donors and siblings – beyond 
their social families. There are indications that information about donor origins invites not 
only new ways for donor-conceived individuals to think of themselves in terms of their 
relational roles, but also new relational contexts and wider family narratives within which they 
may (re)interpret their accounts of who they are.  
The findings discussed above indicate that the addition of new relationships and relational 
roles to one’s story is not inevitably at the expense of existing ones. However, this is 
sometimes the case, either as a matter of choice – where the individual uses the information as 
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grounds to write an existing parent out of their story – or more involuntarily and perhaps 
unwelcome – where the new information precipitates a breakdown in trust or closeness 
between the individual and other family members, or because the individual feels severed from 
her previously assumed genetic connection to others. As Kirkman observes, these disturbances 
may have a doubly detrimental effect upon an individuals’ self-narratives: upsetting both the 
former shape and contents of their account of who they are and the nature of the very familial 
relationships which had hitherto provided the crucible within which they had hitherto worked 
out who they were.469 
iii) Biographical beginnings 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics suggests that one role that information about donor origins 
can play is in filling aspects of the beginnings of an individuals’ biography.470 The evidence 
considered above does indeed suggest that one aspect of the importance of this information to 
its recipients lies in its capacity to supply the starting point for their accounts of themselves 
and help them to locate their own biological existences within the contexts of choices made 
by their parents and gamete donors. Kirkman argues that: 
“Family stories of birth and conception, stories of “how our family came to be,” 
are fundamental to the idea of narrative identity.”471 
This is illustrated in another source by the view of the donor-conceived individual who says:   
“… who wants to start a book on Chapter 2? I want Chapter 1, the Introduction 
and the Prologue as well!”472 
Part of the value of the filling-in of these early chapters appears to lie in the capacity of this 
information to provide context and explanation of other experiences – as described under the 
next sub-heading. 
iv) Explaining experiences  
The role that this information can play in contributing to the coherence of individuals’ accounts 
of who they are, are vividly illustrated by the examples of individuals who report how learning 
about their donor origins helped to explain disparities between their own appearance or 
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character traits and those of family members, or features of prior family dynamics, or “resolved 
a fog of confusion”.473 To some extent these testimonies support Sarah Wilson’s suggestion 
that knowledge of donor origins is valuable because it helps “…with the alleviation of 
uncertainty with respect to the past”.474 Wilson’s characterisation seems plausible. But it 
perhaps misses the mark where it is not so much a felt historical gap that is a problem, but 
enduring dissonances. The examples above appear consistent with my broader narrative-based 
contention that it is important that our self-narratives accord broadly with, and thus help us to 
live in and navigate, the world as experienced by others (especially those close to us amongst 
whom we work out who we are) and with our own experiences of embodied existence, and 
that personal bioinformation can be an vital means of securing this concordance.  
v) Disrupting existing narratives  
It is clear that not all experiences of receiving information about donor origins are wholly 
positive. Following Kirkman, I would submit that this distress may be sometimes be 
understood within a framework of narrative identity, as being associated with disruption to an 
individual’s existing self-narrative or, what Eric Blyth calls, “disjunctions in their 
biographies”.475 Disclosure might mean, for example, that an individual is forced, abruptly and 
involuntarily, to relinquish her self-conception as the “biological product of both her 
parents”,476 or as someone who has an open, honest relationship with her family. This 
explanation of distress in terms of identity disruption is further supported by the considerable 
body of evidence that indicates that disclosure is much less likely to cause distress when it 
occurs in early childhood.477 Kirkman and Freeman both posit that, when someone is told 
early, and donor conception is part of her “family narrative”, her own identity narrative may 
be better able to develop consistently with this.478 
However, the implications of the idea of narrative disruption for any conclusions I wish to 
draw about the potential identity-value or detriment of this information, warrant interrogation. 
The empirical literature indicates that, for some, the disruptive impacts of late disclosure may 
have deep and enduring impacts, with individuals reporting that they have since found it 
impossible to reconstruct a satisfying account of who they are. However, this is not invariably 
the case. Despite initial shock, some individuals report welcoming the opportunity to 
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reappraise their identities and their relationships to others. This is in line with the account of 
narrative identity offered in the preceding chapters, according to which self-narratives are not 
inert things, which once made can only be preserved or broken. Rather they are ever-evolving 
in response to new experiences and interpretations. And short-term disruption might 
sometimes serve longer-terms narrative coherence when it is associated with someone’s 
reinterpretation of her experiences equipped with fuller information about her origins and 
relationships.  
vi) Jeopardising narrative coherence 
Given the findings from comparative studies of children’s and adolescents’ psychological 
wellbeing and family relationships, which indicate little evidence of ill-effects amongst donor-
conceived individuals who grow up not knowing that they are donor-conceived, one might be 
inclined to draw the conclusion that there are no grounds for inferring detrimental identity 
impacts from not knowing that one is donor-conceived. However, a narrative conception of 
identity – by emphasising both the longitudinal nature of identity and the importance of 
interpretation and coherence across its temporal span – suggests another possibility. It is 
conceivable the harm implicit in constructing a self-narrative without information about donor 
origins may well be latent (in a temporal rather than psychoanalytical sense) – lying in the 
construction of, what Kirkman terms, a “misleading identity”.479 
It might reasonably be objected here that there are infinite possible facts about our lives and 
circumstances of which we are unaware without our being misled as to who we are.480 In this 
respect, though, I would suggest that ignorance of one’s donor origins differs from lacking 
knowledge of many other kinds of personal bioinformation. This is not based upon 
assumptions about its intrinsic identity-significance. Rather it is attributable to the fact that 
not-knowing and false belief are likely to coincide in this context, because where it is the norm 
for one’s social parents also to be one’s genetic parentage – in the absence of information to 
the contrary – most people would assume this is true of their own family.481 In the case of 
donor-conceived individuals this assumption would be (wholly or partly) false. Of course, it 
is possible that one’s beliefs about one’s parentage might play no significant role at all in one’s 
self-narrative. In which case this assumption may have no notable identity-related 
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consequences. However, where it does comprise part of one’s self-conception, then in 
Kirkman’s words: 
“the story of where I came from and who I am, constructed, developed, and 
amended on the assumption of consistent social and genetic parentage, [is] based 
on a false premise.”482 
I would suggest that there is a significant difference between choosing to ignore, exclude, or 
contradict aspects of one’s biological existence in the construction of one’s self-narrative, on 
one hand, and building such a narrative around an (unrecognised) false belief, on the other. 
This is because, where such a belief comprises part of the interpretive framework of and for 
her self-narrative, the internal integrity of this narrative, its intelligibility with respect to lived, 
embodied, relational experiences, and its capacity to support coherent navigation of these 
experience (in her judgements, commitments and actions) are in all placed in jeopardy. The 
individual in these circumstances is placed in a situation in which, as succinctly captured by 
Harvald Lillehammer –“disclosure of further facts about themselves” could “subvert their 
general sense of who they are and what they ought to be.”483  
So, not-knowing could be impact-free. But my suggestion here is that it potentially leaves an 
individual’s self-conception vulnerable either to incremental dissonance or to the more 
thoroughgoing disruption. And the routes by which this could happen are neither far-fetched 
nor unpredictable, as illustrated by the research findings considered above. I would suggest 
that indications of such subversions may be observed in some individuals’ struggles (of more, 
or less, enduring or critical kinds) to make sense of who they are, either in the face of their 
everyday experiences of anomalies in familial interactions or traits, or following disclosure. 
As I have noted above, narrative disruption, where short-lived, need not necessary imply 
lasting harm to identity. But insofar as – as posited in Chapter 2 – narrative coherence is 
necessary to support our capacities for self-understanding and leading autonomous, evaluative, 
engaged lives, we may understand it is not a trivial matter when it is placed in predictable 
jeopardy.484 
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This and the previous subsection indicate an important consideration in seeking to infer 
potentially valuable or detrimental effects of personal bioinformation on identity – that 
psychological harm and identity detriment are not necessarily synonymous or coextensive. 
This much has been noted by Freeman, who has herself conducted extensive empirical 
research with donor conceived individuals. She cautions that:   
 “An absence of evidence of psychological ‘harm’ should not be equated with an 
absence of evidence of psychological ‘wrong’. Conversely, a negative outcome 
cannot necessarily be equated with a ‘wrong’”485 
I wish to suggest that an analysis of the impacts on identity of receiving or being denied 
information about donor origins provides one way of understanding the possible disjunction 
between readily observable imminent harm, on one hand, and identity detriment, on the other. 
Distress and disorientation upon learning of donor origins (provided these are short-term) 
could be compatible with a constructive reassessment of one’s self-narrative and the 
restoration of a more coherent or resilient sense of who one is. Meanwhile, conversely, it is 
possible to understand how someone’s identity may be harmed if the coherence of their self-
narrative is placed in a position of probable and non-trivial jeopardy, even if this is not manifest 
in contemporary psychological distress. This indicates the need for care in approaching the 
empirical literature in considering the identity significance of any particular category of 
personal bioinformation. While the evidence it supplies contributes valuable texture and detail 
to our understanding of this significance, it may not supply the whole picture.  
This brings to a close my analysis of what the empirical literature indicates about the potential 
impacts of information about donor origins on the identities of donor-conceived individuals, 
where their identities are conceived in terms of evolving, embodied self-narratives. I would 
suggest that, although it is not possible to conclude that this category of personal 
bioinformation is of universal significance, let alone value, to individual’s identities, the 
findings reported above indicate that for some – perhaps many – donor-conceived individuals 
it does play an important role in their understanding who they are. This then raises the 
questions of what the empirical literature indicates about the kinds of factors contribute to how 
recipients respond to this category of bioinformation and the nature and extent of the role it 
plays in their self-conceptions. These questions will be the focus of the next, and final, section. 
Addressing them will be useful both in generalising beyond the conclusions of this chapter to 
other categories of personal bioinformation (see Chapter 8), and in assessing the significance 
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of individual and contextual factors in recognising and responding to identity-related interests 
in accessing this information (see Chapter 9). 
SECTION 6: FACTORS POTENTIALLY INFLUENCING IDENTITY IMPACTS 
The aim of this final section before my concluding remarks is to return to the empirical 
literature for indications of the kinds of factors that might influence the nature and extent of 
the impact that information about donor conception has on a recipient’s self-conception.  
This aim breaks down into two questions: 
 What does the empirical evidence indicate about which features of information about 
donor origins might contribute to its playing a role in donor-conceived individuals’ 
self-conceptions? 
 What factors appear to account for diversity amongst individuals’ responses to this 
information? 
Accounting for the possible narrative significance of this information 
The first possibility that warrants consideration here is the pertinence of the genetic nature of 
this information to individuals’ perceptions of its relevance to their accounts of who they are. 
I submit that the empirical literature indicates that this may have some role to play, but this is 
not necessarily straightforward.   
Even if the hypothesis at the heart of this project does not depend on a bio-essentialist 
conception of identity, it is undeniably the case that some of the reasons given by some donor-
conceived individuals for investing significance in information about their conception are 
rooted in genetically essentialist and determinist assumptions. That is, they appear to view 
their donors’ attributes as straightforwardly ‘about them’, as if appearance, personality traits, 
and even cultural heritage, are uncomplicatedly genetically inherited and define who they 
are.486  
However, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics observes that: 
“… when people talk about their ‘genetic origin’, this should not be narrowly 
understood as concern about their genetic inheritance, or that they understand 
their identity as genetically determined. It should be understood, rather, much 
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more broadly in terms of their own story, including their biography, background 
and family connections.”487 
This draws an important and subtle distinction by highlighting that the identity-significance of 
this information may track genetic connections without being reducible to them.488 And I 
would suggest that this is borne out by some, if not all, of the kinds of potential identity roles 
outlined above. For example, some donor-conceived individuals welcome the insights that 
knowledge of their donor origins brings to making sense of discrepancies between their own 
traits and those of their family members.489 This does not necessarily mean that they take these 
traits as wholly defining who they are, but rather they value being able to account for how 
these traits comprise part of a story, with a particular kind of beginning and in which they 
stand in particular kinds of relationships to their family members. 
I wish to suggest a further critical factor in the perceptions of the importance of information 
about donor origins is that it is seen as true. This is signalled by the virtually unanimous 
position in two of the studies cited above, that participants would rather know about their 
donor origins than not. The implication is that this information is valuable to their identities, 
not because it is necessarily welcome, but because it is true. No doubt, what some individuals 
might mean by truth is that this information reveals their ‘true’ identity or ‘real’ parentage. 
But, as noted in the previous paragraph, where this information is valued for explanatory and 
biographical reasons truth need not signal dubious essentialist assumptions and need not be 
hedged with quotation marks. What it refers to are truth about the circumstances of someone’s 
conception, and where it is contrasted with the falsehood of misplaced beliefs about 
relatedness. 
A further influential factor is social context. A number of researchers investigating the impacts 
of knowledge of donor origins on donor-conceived individuals observe that the perceived 
significance of this knowledge to their individual’s identities cannot be understood in 
abstraction from the meaning assigned to genetic and family relationships in societies in which 
these individuals live.490 Indeed, it has been suggested by some researchers that policies that 
encourage openness about donor origins may themselves further feed to perceptions of this 
                                                             
487 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013), p.14.  
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information’s importance.491 I will return to consider the role of social construction in 
ascriptions of identity significance of personal bioinformation in Chapter 8.  
Accounting for diversity in identity impacts 
A different question – intersecting somewhat with that just posed – is what kinds of factors 
appear to account for differences amongst donor-conceived individuals’ reactions to and 
ascriptions of identity significance to knowledge of their donor origins. I wish to suggest that 
the literature provides indications of the relevance of the following six factors: 
i) Age of discovery; 
ii) Manner of discovery; 
iii) Life-stage; 
iv) Family relationships;  
v) Sperm or egg donor; and 
vi) Availability of donor information. 
i) Age of discovery 
It is widely thought that one of the most significant factors in determining the nature of 
someone’s reaction to learning they are donor-conceived is the age at which this happens.492 
The majority of published research indicates that the older someone is, the more difficult the 
experience tends to be.493 The HFEA and Donor Conception Network recommend telling 
before a child is five.494 The explicit reasons given tend to not to be the value of the knowledge 
per se, but rather avoiding distress from late disclosure.495 
ii) Manner of discovery 
How someone finds out is also thought to be a factor.496 Guidance for parents published by 
bodies such as the Donor Conception Network suggests, planned disclosure in early childhood 
                                                             
491 Freeman (2015). 
492 Ilioi and Golombok (2015). 
493 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2013). One study that found no straightforward correlation between 
age and experience of discovery was P.P. Mahlstedt et al. (2010), "The Views of Adult Offspring of 
Sperm Donation: Essential Feedback for the Development of Ethical Guidelines within the Practice of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States" Fertility and sterility, 93(7): 2236-46. 
494 Donor Conception Network website 'Telling Your Child', www.dcnetwork.org/telling-your-child 
(accessed 9 June 2017); Human Fertlisation and Embryology Authority website, 'Talk to Your Child 
About Their Origins', www.hfea.gov.uk/116.html#DCN (accessed 9 June 2017). 
495 Ibid. A recent review of the evidence reported that the link between age of disclosure and 
children’s wellbeing was inconclusive G. Pennings (2017), "Disclosure of Donor Conception, Age of 
Disclosure and the Well-Being of Donor Offspring" Human Reproduction, 32(5): 969-73. 
496 Ilioi and Golombok (2015); Freeman (2015). 
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allows parents to introduce the topic incrementally, and children to assimilate it gradually.497 
In contrast, several of the studies discussed above indicate that abrupt, late disclosure 
precipitated by family crises, such as divorce or bereavement, are often experienced in 
particularly negative ways.498  
iii) Life-stage  
Individuals’ feelings about their donor conception and what they wish to know about their 
donors may change throughout their lives. It is noted that adolescence is a critical time for 
identity exploration.499 One study reports that adolescents are likely to be especially curious 
about what traits they share with their donors, while adults are more likely to want health 
information.500 Life-changes, such parenthood, have been noted as a potential spur to 
individuals wanting to know more about their own origins.501 
iv) Family relationships 
Family relationships appear to play a key part in how donor-conceived individuals regard and 
assimilate information about their origins. One aspect of this relates to the structure of their 
social families. Several studies have found that offspring in families without social fathers are 
more curious about their donor-conception.502 But it is not clear if this is about ‘filling a gap’ 
(relational or biographical), or because those with fathers feel inhibited about expressing an 
interest.503    
A key factor in positive reactions to finding out about donor origins, and the impacts of this 
knowledge upon identity in particular, is thought to be the presence of emotional and 
interpretive support within the family. One study has suggested that openness in a family may 
assist adolescents in assimilating knowledge of their origins.504 And two studies emphasise the 
importance of parental relationships in the making sense of the information in identity terms. 
Kirkman observes that all the participants in her study indicated that their parents were 
important collaborators in helping them to make sense of what their donor conception means 
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for their identities.505 And another study has found that adolescents’ sense of secure attachment 
with respect to their parents is associated with greater curiosity about their origins, and 
confidence to explore of whether to integrate it (or not) within, their own “growing sense of 
identity”.506  
v) Sperm or egg donor 
It has been noted that offspring of sperm donation are more likely to invest their donor origins 
with personal significance than those conceived using donor eggs, and to show greater interest 
in contacting their donors.507 It has been hypothesised that this could be due to asymmetry in 
prevalent cultural perceptions that fatherhood is conferred at conception, while motherhood is 
constituted by gestation and care.508 However, the relative paucity of research with those 
conceived from donor eggs means that further insights are not available. I shall return in 
Chapter 8 to discuss the wider contribution of socially-constructed aspects of identity-
significance. 
vi) Availability of donor information 
In order to keep the discussion of this chapter within a reasonable scope I have avoided 
widening it to include questions about the potential narrative roles of information about donors 
or donor siblings. But there is one important respect in which individuals’ reactions to 
information about their origins and their attitudes to information about their donor relatives 
may be closely entangled. Several researchers suggest that access to information about, or 
contact with, their donors may be an important factor in determining the extent to which some 
donor-conceived individuals are able to reconcile knowledge of their donor conception with 
their identities.509 Kirkman, for example, has suggested that a lack of donor information may 
leave individuals “unable to make sense of themselves”.510 However, this is not to imply that 
individuals only ever value information about their conception as a means to knowing about 
their donors. The findings cited above are from research conducted for the most part in 
jurisdictions where access to identifying donor information is not (yet) available to donor-
                                                             
505 Kirkman (2003). 
506 Slutsky et al. (2016). 
507 Freeman (2014).  
508 T. Freeman et al., 'Making Connections: Contact between Sperm Donor Relations', in Relatedness 
in Assisted Reproduction: Families, Origins and Identities, ed. T. Freeman, et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Richards (2014). 
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conceived individuals, thus signalling that where this information is deemed significant, it 
must be for its own sake.   
Highlighting the six factors above signals that the potential identity impacts of information 
about donor origins is not determined by the nature of this information alone. Whether, and to 
what extent, it has beneficial, detrimental or no effects on an individual’s self-conception is 
likely to depend not only on her own circumstances and characteristics, but also on the manner 
and context in which she receives and interprets the information. This is a crucial finding for 
this project because it signals that meeting identity-related interests will require more than the 
identification of categories of identity-significant bioinformation. It will mean attending also 
to the specific circumstances of (possible) disclosure.  In Chapter 8 I shall return to consider 
(in combination with indications drawn from the remaining two case studies) the range of 
factors that might shape the identity significance and value of personal bioinformation in any 
particular case. 
SECTION 7: CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
On the basis of evidence from the empirical literature, it is not possible to conclude that 
knowledge of donor origins makes universally welcome or valuable contributions to the 
identities of all donor-conceived individuals. However, this is not necessary for my research 
aims. What I need is to be able to demonstrate is that the evidence of people’s experiences is 
at least consistent with my contention that that this information can play a significant role in 
some individuals’ conceptions of who they are and that it is plausible to interpret this in terms 
of the contribution the information makes to the construction of a coherent and sustainable 
self-narrative. It is also necessary that this evidence is not wholly trivial or wildly anomalous. 
I would suggest that these aims are fulfilled by the evidence reviewed in this chapter. 
Moreover, the interpretation of the evidence I have offered here indicates that in order for 
information about donor origins to be important to someone’s identity it is neither necessary 
to hold that knowledge of genetic origins is intrinsically important to everyone’s identity, nor 
that ‘being donor conceived’ needs to be a defining aspect of that individual’s self-
characterisation. Rather, as I have sought to demonstrate, this information may be important 
to the extent that it plays a contributory and instrumental role in her self-understanding. Indeed, 
although there are indications that this information might modify the ‘contents’ of a recipient’s 
account of who she is – for example, her self-descriptors or relational roles – perhaps even 
more important is the role the information can play in filling-out and rendering more 





The example of information about donor origins explored in this chapter brings to light three 
key lessons that are potentially transferrable to considering the significance to identity of other 
categories of personal bioinformation. First, that it is important to attend not only to the 
immediate impacts of disclosure of information about donor origins, but also its longer-term 
consequences. A disrupted self-narrative may only represent harm to identity where the 
individual lacks the personal, relational or informational means to reconstruct a (more) 
coherent account of who she is. Secondly, it is not so much the absence of knowledge of donor 
origins that may jeopardise the resilience and coherence of someone’s self-narrative, but rather 
the construction of this narrative around a false belief about an aspect of one’s embodied 
existence. And, thirdly, it is not possible to talk of the inevitable or uniform identity-impacts 
of knowledge of donor origins, only its potential impacts, which may be shaped by the 
particular context and manner of its disclosure and the circumstances of the individual 
concerned. All three of these lessons will be critical when I come to consider the considerations 











CHAPTER 6: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE II - GENETIC 
SUSCEPTIBILITY TESTING 
 
SECTION 1: TOPIC AND AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER 
This chapter provides the second of my three illustrative examples. Its purpose, as with that 
discussed in the previous chapter, is to explore people’s attitudes and reactions to a particular 
category of personal bioinformation – as reported in the empirical social science literature – 
in order to lend plausibility to, to illustrate, and to refine my theoretical argument about the 
role that this information might play in its subjects’ identity narratives.  
The category of personal bioinformation to be examined here is findings from genetic 
susceptibility testing for serious complex, or multifactorial, disorders with a known genetic 
component. These are disorders that are not caused by a single gene, but by interactions 
between multiple genetic and environmental factors.511 Testing involves the analysis of an 
individual’s blood or tissue samples to detect “the presence or absence of, or alteration in, a 
particular gene, chromosome or gene product”.512 Based on this (and, often, other data such as 
family history) an individual’s susceptibility to the disorder is calculated, typically taking the 
form of a probabilistic percentage lifetime risk.513 Accordingly, susceptibility testing can be 
understood as: 
“…a type of genetic testing that provides less predictive value than testing for 
typically Mendelian conditions, but that may nonetheless be of interest and use 
to at-risk individuals.”514 
I shall take it that such test results fall under the definition of ‘personal bioinformation’ both 
because of their source – they are derived (in part) from analysis of an individual’s tissues – 
and their ‘interpretive pedigree’ – they are understood as telling someone about her possible 
future health (albeit in probabilistic terms). I take it that such results are no less personal for 
also potentially revealing genetic relatives’ susceptibility, or for being calculated not solely 
                                                             
511 "Multifactorial Disease," in Encyclopedia of Public Health, ed. W. Kirch (New York: Springer, 
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134 
 
from an individual’s own genotype, but also on the basis of risk profiles developed from 
epidemiological data. 
The chief example to be discussed in this chapter are attitudes to results for genetic tests for:  
Susceptibility to late-onset Alzheimer’s disease based on genotyping for variants of the 
Apolipoprotein E (APOE) gene (henceforth, ‘APOE testing’)515  
The Ɛ4 allele (variant) of the APOE gene is thought to be a “robust risk factor” for increased 
risk of late-onset Alzheimer’s disease.516 However, late-onset Alzheimer’s is a multifactorial 
disease, and the relative contributions of genetics and other factors are only partially 
understood.517 So, although testing reliably detects variants of the APOE gene,518 a positive 
test result for one or two copies of the Ɛ4 allele indicates an increased relative risk, rather than 
that the individual will inevitably develop the disease.519 One copy of the Ɛ4 allele is thought 
to increase risk to about three times that of the general population, while two copies increases 
the risk to somewhere between eight and 30 times greater than the population risk.520 A 
negative test does not signal no risk, as Alzheimer’s can occur in the absence of the Ɛ4 allele.521  
Late onset Alzheimer’s disease is a condition for which no effective preventative measures or 
treatments are yet available. These factors mean, at present, APOE testing is held to lack 
clinical utility.522  
For the purposes of comparison, I will also consider attitudes to results from tests for:   
Susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer based on genotyping for mutations to the 
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genes (henceforth, ‘BRCA testing’) 
                                                             
515 In this chapter, unless specified otherwise, ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ and ‘Alzheimer’s’ will be used to 
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516 E.R. Atkins and P.K. Panegyres (2011), "The Clinical Utility of Gene Testing for Alzheimer's 
Disease" Neurology International, 3(1): 1-3.  
517 Ibid.; J.S. Roberts et al. (2011), "Using Alzheimer's Disease as a Model for Genetic Risk 
Disclosure: Implications for Personal Genomics" Clinical Genetics, 80(5): 407-14. 
518 Roberts et al. (2011). 
519 Atkins and Panegyres (2011). 
520 L.A. Farrer et al. (1997), "Effects of Age, Sex, and Ethnicity on the Association between 
Apolipoprotein E Genotype and Alzheimer Disease: A Meta-Analysis" Jama, 278(16): 1349-56. 
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Neurodegen. Dis. Manage, 2(2): 141-44. 





The mutations on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are responsible for a greatly elevated lifetime 
risk of developing hereditary forms of breast and ovarian cancer in female carriers.523 In men 
they increase the risks of breast and prostate cancer.524 A positive result (confirming carrier 
status) indicates increased susceptibility to these cancers, but not their inevitability. For 
example, a previously unaffected woman who tests positive for the BRCA1 mutation has a 60 
to 90 percent lifetime risk of developing breast cancer and a 40 to 60 percent lifetime risk of 
developing ovarian cancer.525 A negative test result does not signal no risk, only 5-10 percent 
of breast cancers cases are caused by BRCA mutations.526 Possible preventative strategies 
following a high risk estimate include prophylactic mastectomy or hysterectomy, or access to 
screening regimes.527 For these reasons BRCA testing is judged to have clinical utility.528  
Reasons for choosing these examples 
There are two key reasons I have chosen APOE testing for susceptibility to late-onset 
Alzheimer’s disease as the chief example for this chapter. First a large, longitudinal study – 
the ‘Risk Evaluation and Education in Alzheimer’s Disease’ (REVEAL) Study – specifically 
set out to examine the personal impacts of receiving the results of this category of test, and 
this provides a valuable resource on which to draw here (as I shall describe further below).529 
Secondly, it is precisely the lack of clinical utility of this test that allows me to investigate the 
degree to which the identity-value of personal bioinformation is entangled with clinical utility 
and, where the latter is absent, whether there might nevertheless be justification for disclosure 
of information about disease susceptibility on grounds of its potential identity value. However, 
in order to unpick these questions, it will be helpful to contrast the findings relating to APOE 
testing with those pertaining to a test which is held to have clinical utility. This is why I will 
also look at reactions to BRCA test results. My less in-depth treatment of the BRCA literature 
will reflect the fact that it serves chiefly as a comparator. It is through my analysis of the less 
well-traversed APOE-related literature that I hope to contribute useful insights into 
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understanding the nature and scope of the potential identity impacts of genetic susceptibility 
testing.  
Research questions 
As with the previous chapter, this chapter addresses the second of the four headline research 
questions set out in Chapter 1: what grounds are there for holding that the conception of the 
relationship between personal bioinformation and identity developed in Chapter 3 is robust 
and plausible in light of people’s actual experiences? In order to answer this, my specific 
research questions for this chapter will be: 
i. What do findings reported in the empirical literature indicate about recipient’s 
attitudes and reactions to receiving results from genetic susceptibility testing? 
(Sections 4 and 5) 
ii. What might be inferred from these findings about the roles that genetic 
susceptibility test results could play in individuals’ self-narratives? (Section 6)  
iii. What kinds of factors appear to influence whether it plays these roles? (Section 
7) 
Again, answering these questions will both provide insights into the potential identity-
significance of this specific category of personal bioinformation, while also informing my 
wider analysis of what factors shape the identity roles, significance and value of personal 
bioinformation more broadly (see Chapter 8). This in turn will contribute to asking my third 
and fourth headline research questions outlined in Chapter 1: what are the nature and scope 
of our identity-related interests in accessing personal bioinformation? and what ethical 
responsibilities for disclosure accrue to those who hold personal bioinformation about us? I 
will address these further questions in Chapter 9. 
Before looking to the empirical evidence it will be instructive first to understand the existing 
circumstances in which the results of APOE and BRCA testing can be accessed (Section 2). I 
will then outline my approach to the empirical literature (Section 3). 
SECTION 2: CURRENT ACCESSIBILITY OF GENETIC SUSCEPTIBILITY INFORMATION 
In this section I will briefly outline the current regulatory and practical circumstances 
regarding individuals’ access to findings from susceptibility testing. This will help to establish 







Testing in healthcare 
Whether a validated genetic test for susceptibility to a particular disorder is offered in clinical 
practice will be subject to conditions including costs and licencing.530 It is also likely to depend 
on assessment of the clinical utility of the test and the ratio of benefit to harm. For example, 
the UK National Screening Committee’s criteria for appraising the appropriateness of offering 
a screening programme requires that the benefits of screening outweigh the risks which means, 
inter alia, that “there should be an effective treatment or intervention for patients identified”.531 
In the UK, in accordance with National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
guidelines, BRCA testing is only offered to the group for whom it is judged to have greatest 
clinical utility – adults with both a family history of breast or ovarian cancer and a genetic 
relative who has received a positive BRCA test.532 In contrast, the current advice of clinicians 
and Alzheimer’s advocacy groups is to recommend against provision of APOE testing.533 
Because this test lacks clinical utility, it has been assumed that the potential distress associated 
with testing outweighs any benefits.534 The identity-related impacts of testing are not given as 
grounds for decisions about whether to provide genetic testing, but are likely to play a part in 
genetic counselling when testing is offered.535 
Access by other routes  
APOE testing for late-onset Alzheimer’s disease is commercially available in the UK through 
some DTC services, such as ‘23andMe’.536 This service formerly also offered BRCA testing.537 
In 2013 the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took action against ‘23andMe’, 538 
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requiring them to discontinue marketing personal genome testing for serious disease risks, 
including those for cancer and Alzheimer’s disease.539 The FDA judged that in these areas 
there was a risk of “unreasonable harm” from “incorrect test results or unsupported clinical 
interpretations”.540 23andMe ceased marketing predictive medical tests in the US, but has 
recently regained FDA approval to provide testing for late-onset Alzheimer’s disease and nine 
other conditions, not including BRCA testing.541  
It is conceivable that, if individually-relevant susceptibility information is generated by a 
research study, these findings could be reported to participants. Whether this occurs is likely 
to depend on the clinical utility of the results, and the protocol and the consent conditions of 
the particular study.542  
A further source of indications of one’s own susceptibility to disorders with a genetic 
component may be the risk status of close blood relatives. Clinicians and genetic counsellors 
are likely to advise those who test positive for some conditions of the value of discussing the 
result with their close relatives, though they cannot compel them to do so.543 European data 
protection law recognises that for some purposes genetic data should be seen as the personal 
data of more than one person.544 And the idea that genetic information does not belong to just 
one person, but is shared or part of a “joint account”, is commonplace in the academic 
literature.545 Nevertheless, at present, individuals are not entitled in law to know a relative’s 
genetic risk status where the relative does not wish to divulge it. The English High Court found 
that doctors who refused to go against the claimant’s father’s wishes by informing the claimant 
of her father’s Huntington’s disease diagnosis (and thus her own possible risk) had been 
neither negligent, nor unlawfully breached the her right to respect for private and family life 
                                                             
539 U.S. Food and Drug Administration ‘Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal 
Investigations, Warning Letter to 23&Me, Document Number: Gen1300666’ (22 November 2013),  
www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2013/ucm376296.htm (accessed 9 June 2017). 
540 Ibid. 
541 US Food and Drug Adminitration Press Release 'FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-
Consumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions' (6 April 2017) 
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm551185.htm (accessed 17 June 
2017). 
542 V. Ravitsky and B.S. Wilfond (2006), "Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research 
Participants" American Journal of Bioethics, 6(6): 8-17. See Chapter 1 above. 
543 K. Forrest et al. (2003), "To Tell or Not to Tell: Barriers and Facilitators in Family Communication 
About Genetic Risk" Clinical Genetics, 64(4): 317-26. 
544 European Commission, 'Article 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data: Working Document on Genetic Data (12178/03/En)' (17 March 
2004); Taylor (2012) 
545 M. Parker and A.M. Lucassen (2004), "Genetic Information: A Joint Account?" BMJ: British 





under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998.546 An appeal against this judgment has been 
allowed.547  
It is my intention that this thesis (as a whole – not solely the discussion of the present 
illustrative example) will provide grounds for asserting that individuals’ identity-related 
interests in accessing personal bioinformation ought to be relevant considerations in the kinds 
of policies and practices outlined above. I will return in Chapter 9 to consider what my 
conclusions imply for access to genetic information about disease susceptibility. 
SECTION 3: SOURCES AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
I will outline here the literature upon which I draw in this chapter and my approach to analysing 
it.  
Empirical literature  
My chief source of evidence regarding attitudes to APOE testing are publications reporting the 
findings from the US-based REVEAL Study.548 This ongoing longitudinal study is a series of 
randomised clinical trials involving asymptomatic adults with first degree relatives with late-
onset Alzheimer’s disease.549 The aim of REVEAL has been, inter alia, to investigate the 
psychological and behavioural effects of receiving genetically-based risk estimates of 
developing late-onset Alzheimer’s, calculated using their APOE carrier status and other 
data.550 The findings discussed here are from the first two phases, conducted in the early 2000s, 
involving a total of 442 participants.551 Participants were provided not only with their risk 
estimate, but also with counselling and educational materials regarding the predictive 
capacities and limitations of these risk estimates and the absence of effective interventions for 
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this disease.552 Participants’ attitudes to their test results were gathered both before and after 
testing through both qualitative and quantitative methods.553 
The REVEAL study provides valuable material for the present project for a two reasons. First, 
it is a large, widely-cited study which had amongst its aims the exploration participants’ 
personal and emotional reactions to test results beyond their clinical application.554 Secondly, 
by comparing participants’ attitudes to risk estimates before and after receiving them (and 
accompanying counselling and education) it offers insights into how the context of disclose 
might affect these attitudes. 555 The REVEAL findings do, however, also have some limitations 
for my purposes. The study was not designed specifically to investigate identity impacts – 
although some REVEAL-based publications do analyse the findings in this light.556 There are 
also issues of representativeness. In particular, it does not capture the views of individuals who 
declined to be tested, participants were not socioeconomically or ethnically diverse,557 and (of 
course) it can only tell us about one kind of test.  
I attempt to address this last limitation to a modest degree by also looking at studies reporting 
participants’ attitudes to receiving results from BRCA testing for breast and ovarian cancer in 
clinical settings.558 Because this further example functions chiefly as a comparator, I only draw 
on a small number of BRCA-focused studies and have selected those which speak particularly 
to the identity-related impacts of this kind of susceptibility testing. Two of these are qualitative 
and small (involving around 50 participants),559 two are larger (with several hundred 
participants).560 I also draw upon one systematic review,561 and findings from the development 
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of the ‘BRCA Self-Concept Scale’ – an evidence-based tool designed to be used in counselling 
and determining care pathways for those undergoing BRCA1/2 testing – which was subject to 
validation testing with 241 women.562 
Analytical approach   
I will start by outlining findings relating to attitudes and reactions to APOE and BRCA test 
results In Sections 4 and 5 respectively. For the most part these do not make explicit reference 
to identity, even less so to identity narratives. So, as with the previous chapter, my 
prioritisation and inclusion of the findings I take to be relevant to the present inquiry will 
involve inferences on my part, informed by the theoretical interest perspective of this project. 
In Section 6, I will then offer my own interpretation of the evidence in terms of how these test 
results might be seen as impacting on recipients’ identity-narratives. And in Section 7 I will 
take stock of factors which appear to influence whether and how results from genetic 
susceptibility testing affect someone’s sense of who she is. In Sections 6 and 7 I will reflect 
upon the references to identity in the empirical literature that I am considering, as well as some 
prominent arguments in the theoretical literature about the identity roles that genetic 
susceptibility testing might play. In doing so I shall make it clear what a narrative analysis 
might add to our understanding of the potential identity-significance of this category of 
personal bioinformation. 
SECTION 4: ATTITUDES TO APOE-BASED TEST RESULTS  
In this section I will provide an overview of the REVEAL findings that are most relevant to 
my research aims. To expose evolution in participants’ views I will divide the summary of 
relevant findings here into: 
 Participants’ motivations for testing and expectations of test results prior to 
undergoing testing or receiving genetic counselling and educational materials; and  
 Participants’ attitudes and reactions to their test results (after also receiving genetic 
counselling and educational materials). 
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Motivations and expectations  
Most participants in REVEAL cited the desire to find out their own genotype as a major 
motivation for taking part and most felt broadly optimistic about the value of this 
information.563 Some participants expressed a naked desire “to know”.564 Many of the most 
highly endorsed reasons565 for being tested were rooted in beliefs that the personal risk 
estimates would be practically useful. 566 Some of this perceived utility was health-related, for 
example, it would provide a spur to finding out about preventive measures, or undertaking 
health-improvement behaviours.567 And some wanted to be prepared should effective 
prevention or treatment become available.568 Other practical motivations went beyond health-
protection. Some wanted to know if they should arrange their personal and financial affairs or 
purchase health insurance.569 Others gave less specific, but still future-focused reasons. For 
example, one participant said if she knew she was at high risk of Alzheimer’s disease, “[t]here 
are some things that I haven’t done that I might want to start doing”.570  
This last comment points towards another category of reported motivations, which had little 
to do with specific practical decisions, and more to do with susceptibility estimates offering 
the basis for reflection or reprioritisation. So, for example, one participant reported that the 
information could be useful for “see[ing] where I am at”, and another wondered whether 
“maybe it will make me look at my life in a different way”.571 
All of the REVEAL participants had a family history of Alzheimer’s. The pertinence of this 
may be seen reflected in the widely expressed hope that genetic risk estimates would supply a 
means of confronting and taking control of a suspected, though unquantified, heritable risk of 
this disease and assessing their priorities accordingly.572 Several interviewees reported that 
(because of their family history) they were “scared to death” that they were “already doomed” 
to a future with Alzheimer’s, or believed they were already exhibiting signs of impaired 
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memory.573 And many viewed genetic testing as a possible means of confirming or dispelling 
such fears.574 One of the more commonly cited motivations was “put[ting] my mind at ease”.575 
And, for some, participating in the REVEAL study itself offered a way of coping with an 
uncertain risk status, providing a sense of purpose, where there had hitherto been doubt and 
impotence.576  
A second category of motivations also linked to the shared nature of genetic susceptibility 
were those rooted in feelings of responsibility for, or connections with, others. The motivation 
that provided the best predictor for participants that actually went on to get tested was the need 
to prepare their family members for the possibility of Alzheimer’s, for example, in terms of 
future care requirements.577 And one participant reported having undergone testing as an 
expression of solidarity with her sister.578 Participants knew that the genetic data gathered by 
REVEAL would be used in epidemiological research.579 The wish to contribute to research 
emerges strongly in the literature, with some interviewees cited the desire to reciprocate 
indirectly for the care that their relatives had received, or an expression of solidarity with other 
families affected by Alzheimer’s.580 
I will now turn to look at participants’ reactions to their risk estimates based on their APOE 
carrier status and how these related to their prior expectations.581  I shall return to consider 
possible reasons for any differences between pre- and post-testing attitudes in Section 7 below. 
Reactions to results  
The post-testing/education findings reveal a “slight discordance” between how participants 
expected they would use genetic risk information and how they actually ended up doing so.582 
This mismatch manifests in three ways that are of particular interest here.   
First, responses to the post-testing questionnaire tended be less enthusiastic about the practical 
utility of the results for informing preventative action or preparing for the future. 583 The second 
change was that in some cases – and contrary to participants’ prior expectations – the results 
                                                             
573 Hurley et al. (2005), p379. 
574 Ibid., p379. 
575 Christensen et al. (2011), p.412. 
576 Hurley et al. (2005); Roberts (2012), p.142. 
577 Roberts et al. (2003).  
578 Lock (2008), p.75. 
579 Roberts et al. (2003). 
580 Christensen et al. (2011); Hurley et al. (2005). 
581 The findings reflect patterns of change, rather than tracking changes in individual attitudes.  




failed to supplant their existing risk perceptions.584 Several discounted the evidence of their 
low risk estimates – for example, in the words of one interviewee, “[s]o technically I should 
feel better. But I don’t believe it.”585 While some, who had received high risk estimates, reacted 
with equanimity, viewing the results as ‘nothing new’ to worry about.586  
The third striking finding pertains to individual’s medium-term retention of details of their test 
results. A year after receiving their results, about half the participants remembered the general 
gist of their risk estimate, but around three quarters could not recall it accurately, and about a 
quarter misremembered or had wholly forgotten.587 Even where participants could recall which 
versions of the APOE gene they carried, many could not explain its significance.588 As 
Margaret Lock describes it:  
“Risk estimates provided in the REVEAL study rarely displace ‘lay knowledge’ 
that participants bring with them… Rather this ‘scientific’ information is either 
nested into pre-existing knowledge, simply forgotten, or even actively 
rejected.”589 
The post-test findings do not, however, indicate a total eradication of the personal significance 
of the test results, even if their immediate practical utility was diminished.590 One of the 
headline conclusions from REVEAL is that the traditional assumption – that genetically-based 
risk estimates provided in the absence of effective clinical options leads chiefly to distress –
may be misplaced. The REVEAL study found that APOE-based risk estimates generally 
brought greater benefits than harm to those tested.591 Many recipients, particularly those who 
had thought Alzheimer’s disease was their inevitable fate, reported relief and a reduction in 
distress.592 And high risk estimates sometimes prompted behaviour changes (which, though 
innocuous, would be ineffectual against this disease).593 Although there was some evidence of 
misplaced reassurance amongst those told they did not carry the Ɛ4 allele (misplaced, given 
that this is only one risk factor for late-onset Alzheimer’s), there was no evidence of fatalism 
amongst recipients high risk estimates.594 However, it is worth noting that a separate, more 
recent, study has observed that participants who were informed that they had a genotype 
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associated with increased risk of late-onset Alzheimer’s disease not only underestimated their 
performance in memory tests, but actually performed worse.595 This was despite those 
participants having being informed of the predictive limitations of APOE testing. This 
provides a warning about the risk of ‘anticipatory dementia’ as an unintended consequence of 
genetic testing for this condition.596 
The significance of the results in terms of family relationships also persisted for many. For 
example, several participants reported being pleased that they and their children now knew 
“where they stood”.597 One respondent felt that the results would have held greater significance 
for her had she been a parent.598 And, while one participant reported particular distress at 
learning of her sister’s higher risk status given painful family memories of Alzheimer’s,599 
others found it helpful to gain what they felt was an explanation of their parents’ illness. 600 
Some participants reported that discussing their results with family members exacerbated their 
distress at higher risk estimates, which, the researchers hypothesise, might be attributable to 
anxiety about what this implied for their relationships and familial responsibilities.601  
Echoing the findings regarding donor conception discussed in the previous chapter, some 
simply regarded it as preferable to have the information, as illustrated by the following 
statement from one REVEAL participant:  
“Knowledge is power…I don’t think you can necessarily change your destiny, 
but certainly to go through life with your eyes only half open doesn’t help you at 
all…”602 
One of the key conclusions that the lead investigators have drawn from the REVEAL study is 
that the information provided by APOE testing for late-onset Alzheimer’s disease can have 
“personal value” for those tested.603 I would suggest the kinds of motivations for, and reactions 
to, testing cited above indicate that the potential to use this information in construction of a 
self-narrative could be seen as constituting one aspect of this personal value. I will return to 
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discuss this in Section 6. First I will consider what the literature relating to attitudes to BRCA 
test results might add to this picture.  
SECTION 5: ATTITUDES TO BRCA TEST RESULTS  
In this section I will consider the findings from a handful of studies looking, this time, at 
individuals’ expectations of and reactions to receiving the results from susceptibility estimates 
for breast and ovarian cancer based on detection of the BRCA mutations. As noted above, my 
intention here is not to provide a detailed or thorough review of the BRCA-related literature, 
but rather to highlight similarities and differences between attitudes to BRCA test results 
compared with APOE testing. My hope is that this comparison will expose any ways in which 
differences between these tests, particularly, their clinical utility, might affect recipients’ 
attitudes and the roles that these test results play in their self-conceptions. Again I shall again 
divide the findings by: 
 Motivations and expectations; and  
 Attitudes and reactions to receiving and reflecting upon test results.604  
Motivations and expectations  
One angle that the REVEAL study does not address is why individuals might choose not to be 
tested. One BRCA-focused study found that some did so because of the fear that results 
confirming carrier status would impact negatively on their lives.605 For example, one 
participant cites the worry that “cancer [would become] this consuming thing in your life”. 606 
And another study observed that some believe that the available clinical interventions for 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer are insufficient to make the anxieties associated with 
testing worthwhile.607  
When it comes to positive reasons for seeking BRCA testing, as with APOE testing, planning, 
control and mitigating uncertainty about possible risk emerge as common themes.608 
Participants in one ethnographic study reported that “knowing gives you more control”, and 
“the more I know, the more I can help myself”.609 Altruistic motivations, similar to those 
observed by the REVEAL study, are also in evidence, with some individuals reporting seeking 
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testing because of the results’ possible utility to close relatives, or because these results could 
contribute to research.610 However, others express the contrary concern that, if they tested 
positive, their relatives might feel “almost like a person who’s been diagnosed”.611  
Reactions to results  
Evidence of responses to BRCA testing are diverse and there is no straightforward correlation 
between adverse reactions and mutation-positive results, or between positive attitudes and 
mutation-negative results.612 One large study (660 participants) found “a generally low level 
of potential distress” and an “overwhelming positive attitude toward genetic testing”.613 And, 
while many studies report mutation-negative results bringing relief,614 a “renewed appreciation 
for life”, or a feeling of finally being “part of the normal population”,615 others have more 
complex reactions. For example, some report feeling numb, dislocated or guilty, having 
‘escaped’ the threat faced by family members.616  
Recalling the caveat noted in the previous chapter, it is important not to assume that the 
presence or absence of distress is indicative or exhaustive of the range of potential wider and 
longer-term impacts of receiving personal bioinformation.617 Recognising and responding to 
potential impacts beyond emotional distress was a key motivation for the development of the 
BRCA Self-Concept Scale. 618 This validated, evidence-based tool measures impacts across 
seventeen indicators under the three headings of “self-mastery”, “stigma” and “vulnerability” 
(the third includes feelings about impacts on relatives and relational roles).619 
In contrast to the REVEAL findings, BRCA test results have been observed to make 
differences to individual’s health-related behaviours. Receipt of mutation-positive test results 
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are observed to be associated with an increase in uptake of prophylactic surgery and 
screening.620 Uptake of more general kinds of health protection behaviours are also reported.621  
However, as with APOE testing, the perceived utility of (both positive and negative) BRCA 
test results extends beyond health-related or other practically-focused decisions and actions. 
The receipt of positive test may be experienced as “life-changing”, or as precipitating “re-
evaluation of priorities”.622 One systematic review reports that test results improve recipients’ 
perceptions of their own risk.623 Some individuals report that (given their family health 
histories) even positive results provide welcome relief from uncertainty, or represent a 
validation of their own pre-testing self-perception that they were at risk.624 And some value 
knowledge of their risk status so they can emotionally and psychologically prepare for 
illness.625 Others report simply needing to know “what’s going on with my body”.626 However, 
this is not a straightforward picture. The developers of the BRCA Self-Concept Scale suggest 
that learning one is a carrier could in some circumstances interfere with capacities for future 
planning.627  
One adverse impact of high risk estimates, which is not evident in the REVEAL findings, is 
that of negative self-labelling. It is reported that reactions to positive BRCA status could 
include feelings of stigmatisation, alienation and difference.628 Positive results may also affect 
recipients’ body image, for example by undermining their confidence and trust in their bodies, 
or causing them to see themselves as “damaged goods” or reproductively “impaired”.629  
While, for some recipients, obtaining their risk estimates is a way of enacting their care and 
responsibilities for close relatives, for others it may be experienced as disruptive to family 
relationships or the fulfilment of relational roles.630 For example, parents sometimes report 
feelings of guilt upon receiving a positive BRCA test result because of the fifty percent chance 
of their children inheriting the mutation, or a failure in their parental role because they feel it 
undermines their capacity to protect their children.631 But guilt is not confined to positive test 
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results. Some receiving negative results report experiencing guilt at escaping risk when others 
in their family have not.632 Similar, observations have also been made in families following 
testing for Huntington’s disease, where different risk status has been observed to be a source 
of conflict and alienation within some families.633  
Carrier status may also give rise to group affiliations beyond immediate family relationships. 
Sahra Gibbon has noted that hereditary breast cancer is particularly associated with patient 
activism and awareness-raising activities.634 A further, relational angle that emerges in the 
BRCA context is the possibility that testing might be seen as a means of enacting and 
constituting a particular aspect of one’s cultural identity. The BRCA mutations associated with 
cancer risk have been observed to occur with greater frequency in Ashkenazi Jewish 
populations.635 It has been suggested that carrying these mutations (and what their prevalence 
is taken to imply about a shared history of oppression and migration) may be perceived as 
providing a connection between members of Ashkenazi communities and a “reiteration of 
Jewish identity”.636 For example, one campaign group portrays being tested for BRCA1/2 
mutations as one way of contributing to protecting the survival of future generations of Jewish 
people.637 
One study found that in general recipients’ reactions to test results – irrespective of whether 
they were positive or negative – manifested in various kinds of “turmoil”.638 Yet over time this 
dissipated and most participants came to take a more optimistic and constructive view of their 
results, seeing them as having initiated “important and positive life changes.639 Some 
observations relating to the longer-term impacts of negative results, also throw up interesting 
findings that echo those from REVEAL. For example, some people’s prior assumptions that 
their family history of cancer placed them at high risk proved remarkably resilient to the 
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information that they were not carriers.640 And another study found that some who received 
negative test results felt vulnerable in their liminal ‘lower risk’ status – neither eligible for 
follow-up screening, nor wholly free from risk.641 These observations are a valuable warning 
that, as with information about donor conception and susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease, it 
is important not to assume that information recipients’ initial reactions tell us everything we 
might want to know about the role of bioinformation in their lives. 
As the examples in this and the previous section illustrate, there is considerable diversity 
amongst individuals’ reactions to receiving the genetic susceptibility test results. In the next 
section I shall turn to consider what might be inferred from the findings relating to both BRCA 
and APOE testing about the impacts of genetic susceptibility estimates on recipients’ identity 
narratives.    
SECTION 6: INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS IN TERMS OF IMPACTS ON NARRATIVE 
IDENTITY 
My intention in this section is to suggest that one way we might interpret the findings above 
is in terms of the contribution (or lack thereof) of genetic susceptibility estimates to an 
individual’s construction of her own identity.  In the following analysis I will suggest that 
existing proposals about the role of susceptibility testing in identity-formation may reflect 
aspects of what makes this category of information potentially identity-significant, but that 
they fail to capture the full picture. I wish to suggest that viewing the evidence of individuals’ 
reactions to their genetic susceptibility estimates through the lens of its role in their identity 
narratives may provide a wider perspective on the ways in which the identity impacts of this 
category of personal bioinformation may be understood. I will unpack this claim under the 
following headings: 
i. The adoption and enactment of a ‘risk identity’; 
ii. Changing or reinforcing the labels an individual applies to herself;  
iii. Impacts on relational aspects of self-characterisation; and  
iv. Revised outlook and priorities. 
i) Risk identity  
One kind of response to receiving (positive) test results that is considerably more evident in 
the BRCA-related literature, though not wholly absent from the REVEAL findings, is the 
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adoption of behaviour changes or healthcare measures undertaken by recipients to protect or 
to feel in greater control of their health and their lives. 
It might be assumed that the role of test results in instigating health protection measures simply 
indicates the clinical utility of this information and is quite separate from its potential 
significance to identity. However, it is too swift to treat clinical value and (potential) identity 
value as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I would suggest that the narrative role of personal 
bioinformation could sometimes be predicated on its clinical utility in two ways. The first is 
that health protection measures could comprise part of recipients’ efforts to imagine whether 
and how their narratives might unfold into the future – I will return to discuss this under the 
fourth sub-heading below. The second is that the activities directed at protecting one’s health 
could themselves constitute key practical aspects of one’s self-narrative.  
The second of these suggestions draws upon Carlos Novas’s and Nikolas Rose’s account of 
the constitution of a particular form of ‘identity’ centred on knowledge of one’s risk status 
(introduced in Chapter 2 above). According to their account, learning of one’s risk of genetic 
disease may be a spur to adopting the self-characterisation of being “a person genetically at 
risk” of illness.642 These authors posit that an individual’s awareness of her own risk, her sense 
of agency and responsibility in respect of her health, and the activities she undertakes to 
understand and manage her risk, may be constitutive of a particular kind of practical identifier, 
that of being ‘at risk’.643 Although Novas and Rose’s proposal is not based in an explicitly 
narrative conception of identity, it is possible to view a ‘risk identity’ as potentially 
contributing a strand of someone’s story of who she is – a strand that is  enacted and constituted 
by the priorities and activities that it informs. And, (insofar as the limited BRCA-related 
literature considered in this chapter permits) it is plausible to interpret some of the responses 
to positive BRCA tests, whereby individuals’ come to think of themselves as ‘BRCA carriers’, 
undertake health-protection measures, or participate in patient activism, as exemplifying the 
adoption and constitution of risk identities.644 
The same kinds of practically-focused, health-protective response are, however, not evident in 
the REVEAL literature. This leads Lock and her co-authors to conclude that:  
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“…it is an open question whether these [REVEAL] volunteer subjects 
experienced anything remotely approaching a profound personal or identity 
change based on the test results.”645  
and 
“…little if any significant changes take place with respect to their sense of 
identity…”646 
However, I would counter that these conclusions are dependent on a particularly narrow 
conception and high threshold for what an identity-impact looks like. Lock and her co-authors 
appear to take Novas’s and Rose’s conception of a risk identity as their sole measure of identity 
impact. Furthermore, they demand that in order for an identity impact to be worthy of note it 
must involve significant change. I will indicate, over the following sub-sections, how a 
narrative conception of identity challenges each of these assumptions. First, such a conception 
highlights that undertaking health protective behaviours and the formation of a risk identity 
are by no means exhaustive of the potential identity impacts of genetic susceptibility testing. 
Secondly, it illustrates that the identity significance of this information may be just as evident 
in the reinterpretation or reinforcement of existing self-characterisations as in the adoption of 
new ones. 
The REVEAL literature frequently describes the less practically-focused explanations that 
participants gave for valuing their test results as their ‘emotional’ reasons.647 I will suggest that 
this inadequately captures the nature of some of these participants’ reactions and proposed 
uses of their results. Furthermore, it highlights precisely the kind of gap that needs to be filled 
in securing the appropriate recognition of the possible identity impacts of health information. 
I submit that it is possible to interpret participants’ reactions to their results as having personal 
significance not merely because they affected their feelings, but because these results affect 
how some participants think about who they are shape the lens through which they view the 
world and assess their priorities. I shall illustrate what I mean by this over the following three 
sub-sections.  
ii) Self-labelling 
There are indications that genetic susceptibility information may play a role in changing or 
reinforcing a range of labels or self-descriptors which recipients use in characterising 
themselves. These may be concrete and specific as in instances where someone comes to think 
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of themselves as a ‘BRCA carrier’ or where their sense of themselves as a member of a family, 
or a wider community, of those living with the threat of Alzheimer’s. Or they may be broader 
or more value-laden, for example, where someone testing positive for a BRCA mutation comes 
to think of herself as ‘damaged goods’ or where a high risk estimate for Alzheimer’s disease 
leads someone to think of themselves as already cognitively impaired. These observations 
echo Christine Hauskeller’s suggestion that genetic disease testing can provide the basis for 
individuals to adopt or reinforce “intra-species classifications” along risk or diagnostic 
category lines, which they then use to group themselves with or differentiate themselves from 
others (as introduced in Chapter 2).648 And, lending weight to Hauskeller’s ambivalence about 
the identity value of such genetically-informed self-classifications, it is apparent that the 
impacts on someone’s self-conception could be positive – as in cases where such 
classifications underpin solidarity with others – or negative – for example where the acquired 
label is experienced as stigmatising.  
It might be objected here that it is plausible to hold that genetic susceptibility estimates can 
provide the basis for new or reinforced, welcome or unwelcome, modes of self-description, 
but that this does not in itself speak to a specifically narrative role for this category of 
information.  However, I would suggest that we can only appreciate why such self-
classifications matter to someone, and understand why they take one form rather than another 
– why coming to think of oneself as ‘a carrier’ is undermining or empowering in any particular 
instance – when we attend at how this descriptor interacts with and is interpreted in the light 
of other aspects of that individual’s existing story of who she is.  
So, while the suggestion that genetic susceptibility testing can impact upon how we categorise 
ourselves is not a new one, I would argue the ethical significance (for good or ill) of this for 
the individual is inadequately captured when we think of this only in terms of unitary 
identifiers. The nature of the impact on the individual and the ethical significance of this only 
really comes to light when we look at it in the context of someone’ wider narrative – for 
example, when we understand that undermining someone’s self-conception as a parent does 
not merely subtract a discrete ‘label’, but has repercussions throughout the web of values, 
commitments and other aspects of self-characterisation that exist in mutual-interpretation with 
this self-descriptor. One aspect of self-characterisation for which this may be most readily 
apparent is that relating to the impacts of disease susceptibility information on the way in 
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which our self-narratives intersect with those of other’s and are informed by the relational and 
group roles that we occupy – as I shall now outline. 
iii) Relational aspects of self-characterisation 
One theme that emerges as much from the REVEAL findings as BRCA literature is the way in 
which undergoing genetic susceptibility testing  may function in part as a means by which 
individuals enact and reinforce their conceptions of themselves as members of families, or 
wider social groups with whom they share the experience or threat of hereditary disease. For 
example, the wish to contribute to genetic research through being tested – cited by many in 
the research reviewed above – may be seen the desire to engaged in activities through which 
a mode of group identification, such as family membership, Jewishness, or affiliation with a 
patient group, might be reinforced. In the terminology coined by Paul Rabinow, these may be 
characterised as the means by which individuals engage in identity-development through 
“biosocial” means, that is activities centred around shared biological attributes.649 As signalled 
by what I intimated under the first sub-heading above, the significance of the way that genetic 
test results might contribute to these relational aspects of recipients’ self-characterisations is 
not diminished because it reinforces existing affiliations rather than introducing new modes of 
identification.  
Further identity-related effects may be observed in this information’s impacts on how some 
recipients characterise themselves in terms of their relationships with and responsibilities to 
particular others. I would submit that the findings outlined above indicate that test results can 
have important impacts – both positive and negative – on those aspects of individuals’ 
identities that are constituted by familial roles and relationships. As Lori d’Agincourt-Canning 
notes with respect to participants in her own study (who had undergone BRCA testing) –    
“Participants did not view their decision to seek testing in isolation from everyone 
else. Rather, obtaining genetic information allowed them to express their identity 
as embodied selves as well as selves-in-relation.”650 
I would, however, go further than this. In accordance with the explanation of practical identity 
that I outlined in earlier chapters, I would argue that undergoing testing could be more than 
merely expressive of identity; it could be seen as (partially) constitutive of particular relational 
modes of self-characterisation. For example, seeking testing in order to gain information of 
wider benefit to one’s family may be understood as expressing the kind of care that makes one 
a loving sister or daughter. Conversely, someone might experience discovering that she is at 
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high risk (and could have passed this risk to her child) of hereditary cancer as undermining her 
capacity to fulfil a particular conception of herself as ‘a parent’ insofar as this entails protection 
and care.651  
iv) Outlook and priorities   
I finally wish to suggest that the empirical literature highlights a range of further identity-
related impacts that might escape attention outwith a narrative analysis, because they are not 
reducible to particular self-classifications or programmes of activity. I would offer instances 
on which individuals report that their genetic test results have served to change their priorities 
and outlook as archetypal indications of identity impacts. It is precisely these kinds of shifts 
in perspective that can alter the interpretive framework through which someone’s self-
narrative is constructed. Similarly, I would suggest, that indications that genetic test results 
can sometimes help recipients to deal with the uncertainty that accompanies coming from a 
family with a history of genetically-linked illness, explain the experiences of illness that have 
shaped their family narratives and this their own, or to prepare psychologically for the 
possibility of future illness, are also plausible manifestations of this information’s narrative 
roles. In each of these cases, I would suggest that we might conceptualise the role played by 
the test results as one in which the information recipient is equipped to bring her self-narrative 
closer into line with what her embodied future might hold in terms of the onset of illness, or 
the diminution of this threat. And this may (though not inevitably) help to protect the 
coherence of her self-conception from present uncertainty and future disruption.  
I do not seek to suggest it is necessarily the case that susceptibility estimates are welcome or 
useful to all recipients in the ways described above. For some, this information may be 
experienced as upsetting or stigmatising and it may do little to alleviate some recipients’ 
epistemic insecurity about their embodied future. Nor do I wish to deny the importance of 
Lock and her co-author’s findings from the REVEAL study, which indicate that the specifics 
of participants’ susceptibility estimates were no longer at the forefront of their minds a year 
later.652 However, I would like to offer a possible alternative interpretation of this observation 
– that this need not necessarily indicate that this information has no identity impacts, but rather 
the kind of interpretive and selective digestion of information that is integral to the narrative-
building endeavour. According to such a view, identity development does not necessarily 
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entail wholesale disruption or reinvention. Furthermore, it is best understood as a bi-directional 
process, whereby the individual’s conception of herself may be seen not only as being shaped 
by new personal bioinformation, but also as the prism through which information passes, 
bending and colouring the eventual role it plays in her life. Bioinformation that facilitates non-
seismic changes in perspective or priorities are no less important if these adjustments 
contribute to a narrative that better equips its subject to make sense of her embodied 
experiences. 
Having said this, it is undeniable that the REVEAL participants’ reactions to their test results 
were in many cases more moderate than their prior expectations, and also differed in several 
ways from responses to BRCA testing. These contrasts offer an opportunity to interrogate the 
question of what kinds of factors might contribute to the nature and extent of the identity 
impacts of genetic susceptibility tests for different disorders. This is a task I will undertake in 
the next, and final, section.  
SECTION 7: FACTORS POTENTIALLY INFLUENCING IDENTITY IMPACTS  
In this final section I will consider what the empirical literature indicates about the factors that 
may influence the roles that the results from genetic disease susceptibility tests play (or do not 
play) in individuals’ self-conceptions. As in the previous illustrative chapter I will divide this 
into two questions: 
 What does the empirical evidence indicate about the features of the results from 
genetic susceptibility tests that might contribute to their playing a role in individuals’ 
self-conceptions?  
 What factors appear to account for diversity amongst individuals’ responses to this 
information? 
I will address these in turn. 
Accounting for the potential narrative significance of this information 
As in the previous chapter, one question that presents itself here is the extent to which it is the 
genetic character of this category of personal bioinformation that contributes to it playing a 
role (where indeed it does) in recipients’ self-conceptions. Perhaps surprisingly, the literature 
reviewed in this chapter does not indicate widespread genetic essentialist assumptions amongst 
participants, such that they believe that their test results reveal something about who they 
really are. However, what does emerge from the empirical research, and the analyses applied 





significance that recipients invest in them either. The literature suggests that three features of 
genetic information might account for the roles that, I have suggested, susceptibility tests 
results can play recipients’ self-narratives. These are its: 
i) Predictive capacities; 
ii) Perceived credibility and authority; and 
iii) Shared nature. 
i) Predictive capacities  
The first relevant feature of genetic information is its capacity to provide predictions of risk 
long before symptoms appear. Monica Konrad notes that  
“…one way or another predictive medicine makes us ‘see’ ourselves in a different 
light”.653  
This might involve adopting the “anticipatory status” of being “at genetic risk”.654 Or it might 
permit someone to prepare practically or psychologically for future ill-health, or reassess her 
priorities and outlook. In any if these respects it may assist someone in interpreting her present 
self-conception in light of her possible future embodied experiences. However, as I will 
indicate in the next sub-section, the extent to which this is possible, or possible to any useful 
extent, may be contingent on the predictive precision of the risk estimate and what practical 
options are available for addressing it. 
ii) Perceived credibility and authority 
It has been suggested (in the context of testing for genetic markers of neurodegenerative 
disease) that individuals might look to genetic testing as a source of “credible” information.655 
So even if someone already has a belief about her own risk based on her family history, genetic 
testing is often seen as having the authority to overturn or confirm these.656 Similarly, Anders 
Nordgren and Eric Juengst talk about “the glamour” of genetic test results.657 A number of 
authors, however, question the capacity of genetic testing, especially for common complex 
disorders to provide information about health that is markedly more prescient or authoritative 
than information from other sources.658 Indeed, the findings discussed above, particularly the 
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resilience of some individuals’ prior beliefs about their risk, indicate that some recipients of 
genetic susceptibility estimates take the same view. Nevertheless, D’Agincourt-Canning 
suggests that the truth might lie often somewhere between belief in the unassailable authority 
of susceptibility testing and its banality. She suggests that many approach BRCA testing 
“pragmatically”, recognising its limitations, but also embracing it because it represented their 
best hope of taking control of their state of epistemic insecurity in the face of the threat of 
cancer.659 
iii) Shared information 
Finally, but perhaps less equivocally than the previous two factors, it is suggested that 
inherently shared nature of genetic information is central to the kind of personal impacts that 
I have identified as being identity-significant.660 As d’Agincourt Canning observes: 
“…within genetics, people might see their selves inscribed onto the lives of 
others.”661  
These others include not only family members whose own risk status may also be implicated, 
but also wider patient groups who might be befitted by research to which individual 
susceptibility data can contribute.662 D’Agincourt Canning argues that because of this, 
decisions about being tested and are not solipsistic concerns, but call upon the individual to 
exercise the ‘moral’ aspects of her identity. Similarly, Konrad argues that evidence of people’s 
motivations and responses to predictive testing for Huntington’s disease give lie to the “myth 
of pre-emptive individualism” – that is, that genetic tests are only valuable (or harmful) insofar 
as they inform our solo choices.663 As outlined above, the empirical literature indicates that it 
is precisely these other-regarding aspects of individuals’ motivations for and reactions to their 
test results that may be seen as having particular salience for the relational (familial, social and 
cultural) threads of people’s self-narratives.  
These three shared features of the results of genetic susceptibility test results notwithstanding, 
it is plainly not the case that every recipient responds to or uses their results in the same way. 
And there are marked differences between how recipients respond to APOE testing as 
compared to BRCA testing for hereditary cancer. This then leads me to the final question for 
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this chapter – what does the literature suggest about the kinds of features that might account 
for these differences?  
Accounting for diversity in identity impacts 
I would suggest that four factors emerge particularly strongly from the empirical literature as 
those that might influence recipients’ reactions to genetic susceptibility test results in ways 
that (I would posit) are relevant to the roles these results play in their self-narratives. These 
are: 
i) The clinical utility and predictive precision of the information; 
ii) The wider informational and interpretive context in which the results are conveyed; 
iii) The nature of the disorder in question; and 
iv) The family history and role of the recipient.  
i) Clinical utility and predictive precision  
I have suggested in Section 6 that the absence of clinical utility in genetically-based risk 
estimates does not necessarily obviate all identity-value. However, contrasts between 
recipients’ reactions to BRCA and APOE testing suggest that it could play some role in the 
form this value takes. Similarly the complexity, relative lack of predictive precision and 
provisional nature of the APOE-based risk estimates for Alzheimer’s disease does not seem to 
remove all identity impacts. But, the divergences in the ‘before’ and ‘after’ findings from the 
REVEAL study indicate the recipients’ appreciation of the epistemic and practical limitations 
of APOE testing did have some marked impacts on the personal significance that they invested 
in this information.664 This is evident not only in respect of their views about its practical 
utility, but also, for example, in downgrading its capacity to unseat their own prior risk 
assumptions. However, it is useful to note that it has been observed that even where a particular 
genotype, such as that for Huntington’s disease, indicates an inevitable disease risk, recipients 
do not invariably interpret a positive test result as self-defining.665 This suggests that although 
recipients’ beliefs about a test’s predictive strength might contribute to its identity 
significance, it is not determinative. 
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ii) Wider interpretive context 
The above point signals a second possible key factor in shaping the impacts of susceptibility 
estimates on recipients’ self-conceptions – the contextual and explanatory information 
provided to help them interpret their results.  The REVEAL literature attributes both the lack 
of distress amongst participants and their more ambivalent reactions to receiving their risk 
estimates to the educational element of REVEAL delivered to participants, in which the 
“provisional and probabilistic” nature of the risk estimates was emphasised, alongside the 
complex, multifactorial nature of late-onset Alzheimer’s disease.666 Accordingly, Michael 
Arribas-Ayllon has argued that commuicating genetic susceptibility for common complex 
diseases like Alzheimer’s carries inherent challenges and responsibilities in terms of managing 
recipients’ expectations.667 
Two other aspects of the manner and context of the informational transaction might be relevant 
are the language used and the quantity of information conveyed. For example, it has been 
suggested that using the language of ‘mutations’ and ‘abnormalities’ might contribute to 
negative self-image.668 And Roberts and his co-authors speculate that the relatively distress-
free experiences of REVEAL participants might not be sustained in contexts were risk factors 
for multiple conditions to be simultaneously disclosed.669   
Contextual information provided at the point of disclosure might not be the only relevant 
factor. For example, Lock and her co-authors also speculate that REVEAL participants’ 
phlegmatic responses to their APOE test results could be attributed to their existing 
appreciation of the multifactorial nature of late-onset Alzheimer’s disease as a result of, for 
example, coverage of the condition in the popular media.670   
iii) The nature of the disorder    
A further factor cited as potentially influencing recipients’ reactions to genetic risk estimates 
is nature of the disorder itself. Researchers on the REVEAL study suggests that a number of 
variables might be at work in this respect, including, whether the disease affects one’s mental 
capacities, whether it is particularly debilitating, and the typical age of onset.671 Hereditary 
                                                             
666 Christensen et al. (2011); Lock et al. (2006), p.282. 
667 M. Arribas-Ayllon (2011), "The Ethics of Disclosing Genetic Diagnosis for Alzheimer's Disease: 
Do We Need a New Paradigm?" British Medical Bulletin, 100(1): 7-21. 
668 Esplen et al. (2009), p.1217. 
669 Roberts et al. (2011). 
670 Lock M. Lock et al., 'Genetic Susceptibility and Alzheimer's Disease: The Penetrance and Uptake 
of Genetic Knowledge', in Thinking About Dementia: Culture, Loss, and the Anthropology of Senility, 
ed. A. Leibing and L. Cohen (Rutgers University Press, 2006). 





breast and ovarian cancer and Alzheimer’s disease present a mixed picture with respect to 
these attributes. However, it is also suggested that the significance attributed to a particular 
condition might not be due not only to its intrinsic biological features, but also with how the 
condition is popularly perceived. For example, in this respect, some have posited that BRCA-
linked breast cancer may be particularly “captivating”.672 
iv) Family history and roles  
Turning from the information and the condition it concerns, the fourth factor that appears – 
unsurprisingly – to help shape recipients’ reactions are characteristics of recipients themselves. 
As d’Agincourt-Canning observes: 
“…facts (e.g. information that a genetic mutation exists in one’s family) are not 
received neutrally. People interpret them differently according to their 
understandings, life contexts and experiences.”673 
Presumably many contexts and experiences could be instrumental here, but two aspects 
particularly highlighted by the findings discussed above are, first, experiences of illness in the 
family and, secondly, an individual’s role within her family. 
The first of these is apparent both in individuals’ stated motivations for being tested and their 
responses to their results. For example, Lock hypothesised that the tempering of REVEAL 
participants’ reactions to their results has been may be attributable in part to their existing 
assumptions about their risk. She maintains that:  
 “…[l]earning about one’s APOE status does not provide information about a 
highly probably future; it only raises a possible scenario, one that anyone living 
in a family where AD [Alzheimer’s disease] is present has already entertained.”674  
I have already discussed how, particularly high risk, susceptibility estimates may impact upon 
individuals’ conceptions of themselves as fulfilling particular familial roles. This is illustrated 
by the observations of their gendered nature of such impacts.675 For example, one analysis of 
the REVEAL findings posits that female participants were more likely to invest value in APOE 
because they were more likely to have cared for affected relatives.676  
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I will return in Chapter 8 to consider the features outlined in this section, alongside those which 
emerge from the other two illustrative examples, in my analysis of the factors that seem most 
likely to shape the identity significance of personal bioinformation more widely. That analysis 
will indicate where extrapolation of conclusions drawn from these illustrative examples may 
be warranted and inform my recommendations in Chapter 9 regarding the responsibilities of 
those who hold our personal bioinformation to respond to our identity interests in accessing it.   
SECTION 8: CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The suggestion that genetic susceptibility test results might affect recipients’ self-conceptions 
is not radically new – this much is already recognised in genetic counselling practice, specific 
counselling tools such as the BRCA Self-concept Scale, as well as (to some extent) in the 
theoretical literature. However, my intention in this case study has been to draw out how we 
might recognise and interpret the scope and significance of identity impacts if one adopts a 
narrative conception of identity – and, in particular – if one does so in the context of tests 
presumed to be of little clinical value.  
The empirical literature offers a clear warning against assuming that the impacts of this 
category of personal bioinformation will be the same for all recipients or in all circumstances. 
I do not seek to argue here that genetic susceptibility test results invariably have significant, 
much less, positive, impacts on recipients’ identities.  Furthermore there are not always 
obvious or straightforward correlations between the degree of risk conveyed and whether the 
contribution of this information to the recipient’s self-narrative is welcome.  Nevertheless, I 
would suggest that, it is apparent that, for many recipients, information about genetic disease 
susceptibility can impact on individuals’ identities in ways that are neither trivial nor 
ephemeral. Furthermore, the REVEAL findings, in particular, demonstrate the breadth of 
potential identity impacts, which do not depend on the clinical utility of the results or practical 
decision-making.  Amongst such impacts are shifts in self-labelling (not always in welcome 
ways), outlook, priorities and psychological preparedness. But perhaps most prominent is the 
way that this information can play a significant role in shaping the relational aspects of 
recipients’ identities. This is a valuable reminder of the intertwined nature of the relational and 
embodied aspects of our accounts of who we are, and the way that genetic personal 
bioinformation might feed into both.  
Nevertheless, while the REVEAL findings hint at the breadth of possible identity impacts, 
they also signal the kinds of factors that might limit the depth or profundity of some of these. 
The empirical literature indicates that, amongst the several factors that appear to shape the 





appear to be how precise predictive capacities of these estimates are and how much they 
change the recipient’s existing perception of her own risk. This observation is in keeping with 
the hypothesis that I proposed in Chapter 3 – that personal bioinformation can make important 
contributions to our self-narratives because it helps us to construct identities that remain 
coherent within, and support us in navigating, embodied experiences. So, it makes sense that 
it only fulfils this role insofar as it provides reliable insights into our embodied states and 
dispositions. This is a theme that I will explore further in my third and final illustrative 










CHAPTER 7: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE III – DIAGNOSTIC 
PSYCHIATRIC NEUROIMAGING  
 
SECTION 1: TOPIC AND AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER 
This chapter contains my third and final illustrative example. As with the previous two 
chapters, my aim here is to consider the empirical literature reporting individuals’ attitudes to 
a particular category of personal bioinformation in order to lend plausibility to, to illustrate 
and to refine my argument that personal bioinformation can play a significant role in our 
construction of coherent identity narratives. This argument provides the basis for the central 
contention of this thesis: that policies and practices governing our access to bioinformation 
about ourselves ought to attend to the impacts of this information on our identities. With this 
third illustrative example, I seek to lend weight to this claim by exploring a further context in 
which bioinformation may have such impacts, and extend my analysis beyond genetics, to 
neurological information.  
The category of bioinformation on which this chapter will focus is findings from functional 
neuroimaging that purport to offer insights relevant to individual diagnoses of serious 
psychiatric disorders such as major depressive disorder (MDD), bipolar disorder or 
schizophrenia. Currently, psychiatric diagnoses depend chiefly on subjective judgements by 
clinicians applying to categorisations of different disorders.677 However, neuroimaging studies 
have identified statistically significant differences in the structural or functional features of the 
brains of ill or at-risk or groups when compared with healthy controls, indicating possible 
associations between these biomarkers and a range of psychiatric disorders.678 Some 
commentators express the hope that neuroimaging could provide means of identifying pre-
symptomatic at-risk individuals, making more precise diagnoses, revising diagnostic 
categories, or developing better-targeted therapies.679 Other commentators, however, are 
sceptical about the practicality or desirability of clinical applications, for reasons I will review 
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in Sections 2 and 7).680 Research investigating potential clinical applications of neuroimaging 
is ongoing.681 
According to the definition established in Chapter 1, diagnostic information produced by 
functional neuroimaging can be understood as personal bioinformation on the grounds of both 
is source and interpretive pedigree. That is, this information is based (in part) upon data 
sourced from observations of activity in an individual’s brain and are interpreted, and purport, 
to tell that individual something about her health.682 It is possible that the form in which 
neuroimaging-based diagnoses could be communicated to patients might include images as 
well as verbal advice. Functional neuroimaging (fMRI) generates images showing cross-
sections of a brain, shaded or coloured to represent the analyses of data about blood 
oxygenation levels (and thus inferred neural activation) in different brain regions.683 These 
images are not literal pictures of individuals’ brains, but rather graphical representations of 
statistical analyses of, often highly processed, data.684  Nevertheless, it is reported that 
individuals may be keen to see these images.685 And such images may play a part in recipients’ 
interpretations of and responses to their diagnoses (see section 6).686  
Reasons for choosing this example  
There are four reasons that I have chosen diagnostic psychiatric neuroimaging as my third 
illustrative example. The first is that this is a field in which there is considerable interest in 
clinical applications, amongst both psychiatric professionals and prospective patients.687 Given 
the global prevalence of psychiatric disorders such as depression,688 and the possibility that 
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clinical applications could be developed in the foreseeable future, it is timely to examine what, 
if any, the identity-related impacts of providing this kind of information might be. The 
remaining three reasons pertain to the instrumental value of this example for the wider research 
aims of this thesis. My second reason, then, is that this example looks at neurological 
information and thus allows me to depart from the genetic focus of the previous two examples. 
The third reason is that, by looking at diagnostic information and the attitudes of recipients 
who might have existing psychiatric diagnoses it provides a useful opportunity to examine the 
impacts of bioinformation that does not necessarily bring radically new news about ill-health, 
but the possibility of reinterpreting existing beliefs. The fourth reason is that psychiatric 
neuroimaging is at a relatively early developmental stage, and this provides a useful 
opportunity to interrogate what the current limitations in the validity and reliability of this 
information might mean for any identity-value that recipients invest in it (see Section 7).  
Research questions 
As with the previous two illustrative examples, the headline research question from Chapter 1 
to be addressed here is: what grounds are there for holding that the narrative conception of the 
relationship between personal bioinformation and identity developed in Chapter 3 is robust 
and plausible in light of people’s actual experiences? In order to answer this, my specific 
research questions for this chapter will be: 
i. What do findings reported in the empirical literature indicate about recipient’s 
attitudes and reactions to receiving neuroimaging-based psychiatric diagnoses? 
(Section 4) 
ii. What might be inferred from these findings about the roles that neuroimaging-
based diagnoses could play in individuals’ self-narratives? (Section 5) 
iii. What kinds of factors appear to influence whether it would play these roles? 
(Section 6) 
My intentions in addressing these questions are not only to consider what viewing the findings 
from the empirical literature through the lens of narrative identity might tell us about the 
identity significance of this particular category of personal bioinformation. My wider aim is 
to consolidate insights from the prior examples that speak to the practical objective of this 
thesis – that of addressing what responsibilities fall to those in a position to disclose personal 
bioinformation. Two matters upon which the present example will shed further light are the 
importance of the manner and context in which personal bioinformation is communicated to 
the nature of its identity impacts, and the relevance of the epistemic qualities of the information 
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to these impacts. For this reason, I will pose a further research question in respect of this 
illustrative example: 
iv. How might the current epistemic limitations of neuroimaging-based diagnoses 
affect the role of this information in recipients’ self-narratives? (Section 7) 
I will turn to address each of these research questions shortly, but before doing so I will briefly 
review the extent to which this category of personal bioinformation is currently accessible to 
information subjects (Section 2) and my approach to the empirical literature (Section 3). 
SECTION 2: CURRENT ACCESSIBILITY OF NEUROIMAGING-BASED DIAGNOSES 
Clinical and research contexts 
Diagnostic applications of functional neuroimaging are not yet available in clinical psychiatric 
practice in the UK.689 This technology is not considered ready for clinical translation for a 
number of reasons, including methodological limitations.690 For example, research tends to 
focus on comparisons between healthy controls and participants with known psychiatric 
diagnoses, which is a cruder comparison than is likely to be useful in differentiating diagnoses 
in a clinical context.691 There is also little standardisation of methods, including those for data 
acquisition, device settings, experimental tasks, and the statistical analyses applied – each of 
which can impact significantly on findings.692 Furthermore, findings tend not to exhibit 
sufficient sensitivity (to individual differences) or specificity (to distinguish between different 
conditions).693 This carries the risk of high incidence of false negative or positive results,694 
which in some studies has been observed to be high as 40 percent.695 There are therefore 
grounds to doubt the clinical validity (whether it identifies the clinical status of interest)696 and 
reliability of neuroimaging-based diagnoses at present. The methodological limitations are not 
thought to be irresoluble.697 However, there may be more fundamental reasons to question 
whether neuroimaging can provide a suitable psychiatric tool (see Section 7).  
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The developmental stage of this application of neuroimaging means that research studies are 
currently the principal setting in which diagnostic neuroimaging findings are generated. 
Clinical utility remains the dominant arbiter of whether participants are informed of individual 
research findings.698 It is unlikely that at this developmental stage that research findings would 
meet this criterion, so it is unlikely they would be offered to participants. For example, in one 
study, participants were advised, as part of consent procedures, that they could expect 
incidental findings of clinically significant structural abnormalities to be disclosed to their 
GPs, but they were not given an option to receive individual findings relating to the study’s 
investigation of the links between neural activity and depression risk.699 
Commercial contexts 
Some commercial services in North America and Japan purport to provide neuroimaging-
based diagnoses for conditions such as depression or ADHD using single-photon emission 
computed tomography (SPECT).700  There are concerns, however, that results from these 
services are of dubious scientific merit or value to consumers – not least for the reasons 
outlined in the preceding paragraphs.701  
I shall return in Chapter 9 to consider what my ethical framework implies for accessing 
findings given the current state of the art and in future.  
SECTION 3: SOURCES AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH  
As with the previous two illustrative examples, the discussion below draws on findings in the 
empirical literature which indicate information subjects’ (likely) attitudes to receiving this 
particular category of personal bioinformation, before considering what these might tell us 
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Empirical literature  
The empirical literature I draw upon in this chapter is that which provides insights into how 
recipients (might) react to psychiatric neuroimaging findings that purport to provide diagnoses 
of their own psychiatric disorders (chiefly MDD and schizophrenia).  
There appear to be few empirical studies exploring this topic.702 And, given the context 
outlined in the previous section, it is unsurprising that even fewer studies involve participants 
who have actually received neuroimaging-based diagnoses (here I cite three).703 For this reason 
I have extended my scope to include two studies eliciting patients’ speculative attitudes to 
hypothetical receipt of this information.704  For the same reason I have also included findings 
from three further studies reporting clinicians’, neuroimaging researchers’, parents’ and the 
general publics’ views about the (possible) impact on patients.705 Given the lessons from the 
previous chapters about the potential divergence between recipients’ prior expectations and 
subsequent reactions to information, and the diversity of possible reactions, these speculative 
and proxy views must be treated with some caution. Another reason to be cautious about 
generalising from these findings is that most of these studies are small,706 they are also 
substantially mutually-referencing and several share authors. Nevertheless, with appropriate 
caution, this limited evidence is sufficient to serve my research purposes outlined in Chapter 
4, which entail neither proving nor quantifying identity significance of this category of 
bioinformation.   
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Analytical approach   
Having outlined what the empirical literature indicates about how individuals might react to 
or use neuroimaging-based diagnoses (Section 4), I will address what this might tell us about 
the potential narrative roles of this information (Section 5). Some, though not all, of the 
empirical studies I have drawn upon already frame the findings in terms of the impact on 
recipients’ identities or sense of self – invoked in a range of ways that do not necessarily 
coincide with the conception of narrative self-constitution that underpins this thesis. In my 
own analyses of these findings I do not, therefore restrict my attention to findings that make 
explicit reference to identity impacts. I bring my wider conception of narrative identity to 
consider what people’s reported attitudes might tell us about the range of roles that 
neuroimaging-based diagnoses might play in the construction of information subjects’ 
accounts of who they are how they make sense of an inhabit these accounts in the context of 
their illness experiences.  
SECTION 4: EVIDENCE OF ATTITUDES TO NEUROIMAGING-BASED DIAGNOSES 
The empirical literature reports that both patients who have used commercial neuroimaging 
services and those speculating about the clinical availability of diagnostic neuroimaging are, 
for the most part enthusiastic about what these (might) offer.707 As I shall return to discuss in 
Section 6, healthcare professionals and researchers’ views are somewhat more sceptical about 
the value to patients of neuroimaging-based diagnoses.708 In the following paragraphs I break 
down the attitudes, expectations and reactions expressed by all research participants under the 
following eight (often interconnected) roles that these diagnoses could play in individuals’ 
lives:  
i) Providing robust diagnosis; 
ii) Explaining and legitimising illness experiences; 
iii) Encouraging treatment access and compliance; 
iv) Permitting dissociation of self from illness;  
v) Reducing stigma and self-blame;  
vi) Contributing to prognostic pessimism; 
vii) Instigating identification with a disordered brain; and 
viii) Underpinning self-descriptors, 
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I shall expand on each of these here. 
i) Robust diagnosis  
Many participants report that (what they perceived as) the greater authority and objectivity of 
neuroimaging-based assessment would provide, or had provided, them with a more “clear and 
objective”, “certain” or “concrete” diagnosis.709 One study found that the majority of 
participants believed neuroimaging results would help them accept their condition and 
understand its biology.710 
ii) Explaining and legitimising experiences  
Several participants report that the (perceived) objectivity and authority of a neuroimaging-
based diagnosis would also help them better to explain, understand and cope with the 
experiences of serious mental illness.711 Buchman et al describe one participant’s hopes that 
neuroimaging would offer the means by which he could “reconfigure the meaning of his 
experience [of illness]”.712 These kinds of views are echoed by responses from mental 
healthcare providers, who hope that this information could provide a “meaningful explanation” 
for their patients, or provide a kind of “existential relief” by offering biological reasons for 
their mental suffering.713 However, one study found that a small proportion of patients were 
concerned that a neuroimaging-based diagnosis might increase their worry about their 
illness.714  
Closely related to the explanatory power invested in this category of bioinformation, is its 
perceived capacity to validate or legitimise individuals’ experiences of mental illness – both 
in their own eyes and in those of others, including their families and clinicians.715 It is seen by 
many as potentially alleviating others’ scepticism about the reality of the illness, facilitating 
acceptance, or reframing its nature.716 For example, Buchman et al cite one participant with 
MDD as saying that he would welcome neuroimaging as “acknowledgement of what I am 
going through” and proof that he was not “just crazy”.717 
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Several accounts indicate that the visual nature of neuroimages themselves may be an 
important part of their perceived power to legitimise an individual’s experiences of mental 
illness, not least by offering a way to communicate the illness’s ‘reality’ to family or friends. 718 
For example, one individual living with schizophrenia describes the printed neuroimage he 
had been given as: 
“…proof now about my schizophrenia… It’s there on the scan, no one needs 
question it any more.”719 
Simon Cohn hypothesises that such images provides a means by which a patient is able to 
“convey private subjective suffering within the social world”.720 However, Cohn’s study also 
illustrates that such efforts may prove futile if patients’ significant others do not regard what 
neuroimages coveys as supplanting their existing beliefs or prejudices about the nature of 
mental illness. And some patients themselves express scepticism about the power of 
neuroimages to explain or legitimise their experiences, for example, seeing neuroimages as 
mere “crude limitation of what constitutes their illness”.721 Similarly Joseph Dumit quotes an 
individual with bipolar disorder as saying that he finds functional neuroimages as  
“genuinely exciting but… [they] do not explain my madness, nor do they guide 
me in what I can do about it.”722 
Nevertheless, as the following sections indicate, not all patients share this view. 
iii) Treatment access and compliance  
Several studies note speculation amongst both patients themselves and mental healthcare 
professionals that neuroimaging-based diagnoses could lead to improved access to, uptake of, 
or compliance with health-protective behaviours and treatment.723 These findings run contrary 
to the commonly expressed concern that a biologised explanations of mental illness might 
encourage greater reliance on medical treatments such as psychopharmaceuticals, at the 
expense of psychotherapy, or other (possibly more effective) protective strategies.724 Indeed, 
one study found that far from biasing patients towards medicalised interventions, the majority 
of participants in one study with patients with MDD reported that a neuroimaging-based 
diagnosis would make them more likely to attend psychotherapy and to examine the role of 
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their own thinking patterns in their illness.725 Based as they are on hypothetical scenarios, these 
findings cannot tell us what patients would actually do were they to receive a neuroimaging-
based diagnosis. 
iv) Separation of self from illness 
Moving from more practical concerns to those more explicitly associated with identity and 
self-characterisation – a number of studies have observed that some patients hope that the 
attribution of a psychiatric disorder to a structural or functional features of the brain might 
help them to externalise their illness, so it becomes less part of who they are and more just 
feature of their brain as part of their body.726 Cohn describes this as the power of brain scans 
to facilitate patients in making a “a categorical separation” of themselves from their disease.727  
v) Reduced self-blame and stigma  
One hoped-for advantage of this kind of separation, cited by both patients and clinicians, is 
the alleviation of self-blame.728 The reasoning is that, by reducing mental illness to biology – 
to a “brain disease” – it becomes reclassified as just a “normal” physical illness like any 
other.729 Cohn argues that this interpretation can help to redress individuals’ “narratives of 
responsibility” for their own illness and recovery.730  Indeed, in one study, 71% of patients 
who reported feeling self-blame for their depression expected that a diagnostic brain scan 
would have a significant impact on mitigating this.731  
Similarly, in another study, patients with MDD express the hope (one promulgated by mental 
health charities)732 that neurological diagnoses might reduce the extent to which their illness 
is the object of stigma or fear.733 Though this expectation is reported as widespread, some 
research indicates that increased awareness the role of genetic factors in mental illness could 
instead increase fear and prejudice.734 This is attributed to the perception that disorders with a 
genetic basis are more serious and intractable (because this places the cause outwith the 
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patients’ control), and it is plausible that this perception might extend also to neurological 
accounts of mental illness. 
vi) Prognostic pessimism 
Some commentators express a related concern that a possible negative corollary of patients’ 
relegation of their illness to ‘mere biology’ might be fatalism about their own capacity to 
manage their illness.735 The studies considered here provide mixed indications of such 
“prognostic pessimism”.736 In one study, many of the participants who had used commercial 
neuroimaging services said they subsequently felt more in control of their health, with only a 
few reporting decreased hope.737 And, as indicated above, widespread optimism is reported 
that a neuroimaging-based diagnosis would encourage treatment uptake. However, one study 
observes that some participants view their illnesses as permanent, intrinsic biological 
‘defects’.738 
vii) Identification with a disordered brain 
In contrast with the roles just outlined, some sources speculate that rather than facilitating a 
separation of an individual’s sense of who she is and her illness, neuroimaging-based 
diagnoses might have precisely the opposite effect. The concern is that, because of the widely 
perceived close association between the brain and the self, evidence of a demonstrably 
disordered brain might lead patients to think of themselves as being inherently disordered.739 
For example, Dumit cites one individual’s account of her depression in which she questions 
the very possibility of disassociating who she is from her ‘sick brain’, given its role in her 
consciousness and agency.740 Fears that neuroimaging might lead patients to think of 
themselves as essentially defective, qua whole selves or persons, appears (in the empirical 
literature reviewed here at least) to be restricted to clinicians – for example, one of whom fears 
that it might lead patients might feel there is “an error in them”.741 This view is not prominent 
amongst the reported views of patients.742 Nevertheless, this is not a straightforward picture. 
Buchman et al note that their empirical findings reflect: 
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“…the complex and sometimes contradictory ways in which people integrate 
notions of a disordered brain into a concept of self that at once has a brain and is 
a brain.”743 
This tension, or ambivalence, has also been observed in empirical studies addressing the wider 
relationship between neuroscience and self-conceptions.744 For example, Pickersgill et al 
observe that, while participants in their study report being drawn to neuroscientific accounts 
of selfhood or personal development, they also often continue to view their brains not as a 
“magnificent epicentre of subjectivity” but as “an object of mundane significance”.745  
viii) Self-description  
Finally, some studies indicate that some patients may use neuroimaging-based diagnoses as 
the basis for applying a descriptor relating to their diagnosis to themselves, for example, seeing 
themselves as ‘a depressed person’ or someone with defective brain chemistry.746 This is a less 
thoroughgoing kind of self-characterisation than that captured under the previous heading. 
Dumit, for example, suggests that patients may engage in what he calls “objective-self 
fashioning” whereby they use neuroimages to construct their sense of themselves as biological 
beings or objects in the world, which may then in turn inform their social identities and their 
own accounts of who they are.747  
This ends my extraction of the key themes in the empirical literature, which provide insights 
into the ways that neuroimaging-based psychiatric diagnoses might impact on recipients’ self-
characterisations. Care needs to be taken in drawing conclusions from any of the findings 
summarised above given that, in many cases, they report speculative responses to questions 
about hypothetical information availability. Moreover, in most cases the responses are 
predicated on the assumption that neuroimaging delivers robust and reliable diagnoses in a 
way that that it probably cannot yet do. Nevertheless, bearing these caveats in mind, the range 
of findings sketched above already takes me some considerable way into unpacking the ways 
in which a neuroimaging-based diagnosis of psychiatric disorders could impact on recipient’s 
identities were it to be validated in a way that supported its being offered in clinical settings. 
The task for the next section is to explore more specifically what these kinds of observations 
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and analyses might mean in terms of the role of this category of personal bioinformation in 
identity as narratively-conceived. 
SECTION 5: INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS IN TERMS OF IMPACTS ON NARRATIVE 
IDENTITY 
In this section I will suggest some of the ways that one might interpret the findings outlined 
above through the framework of identity conceived in terms of narrative self-constitution. As 
I have indicated there are legitimate questions about the capacity for functional neuroimaging 
to provide robust diagnostic information. The analysis here will first proceed on the 
provisional, ‘naïve’ assumption that it does. In Section 7 I will return to (re)consider what its 
current epistemic limitations mean for its possible identity impacts. 
I wish to suggest that the findings summarised above indicate that diagnoses based in 
neuroimaging could play two kinds of broad roles in the construction of someone’s self-
narrative: 
i. It could provide grounds for an individual to edit or modify the characteristics that 
comprise her self-narrative by appropriating, enacting or rejecting specific self-
descriptors associated with mental illness; and 
ii. It could help an individual to achieve, maintain or restore some degree of coherence 
in her self-narrative in the face of her experiences of mental illness. 
i) Modifying self-descriptors 
Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached suggest that the neurosciences have joined genetics and 
psychology by “becom[ing] a rich register for narratives of self-fashioning”, heralding the 
emergence of the “neurobiological self”.748 The attitudes reported in the empirical literature 
outlined in the previous section endorse this claim to some extent, indicating that 
neuroimaging-based diagnostic findings could provide a tool with which individuals describe 
and seek to make sense of who they are in the context of their experiences of mental illness. 
And this might indeed involve (re)describing themselves in terms of their diagnostic status or 
the functioning of their brains.  
However, I submit that it may be misleading to frame this use of diagnostic information as a 
wholesale neuro-information-driven reinvention of how an individual characterises herself. 
Someone need not, for example, come to think of herself as ‘a depressed person’ to the 
exclusion of all other self-descriptions. While such an outcome is not impossible, the evidence 
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considered above suggests rather that this category of bioinformation is more likely to provide 
(for some) the impetus or the means for editing, modifying or enacting the characteristics, 
contents, or self-descriptors that contribute to their wider self-narratives. Thus where this 
information invites the self-description of being depressed or being someone with defective 
brain chemistry, this may be more appropriately understood (for reasons I will explore under 
the next sub-heading) as just one thread woven into and contributing to the interpretation of 
their narrative as whole and its relationship to their lived experiences. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that the present example usefully illustrates the potential roles 
of this category of personal bioinformation in someone’s self-characterisation are not limited 
to the introduction of new self-descriptors. In several of the studies, individuals had existing 
psychiatric diagnoses. Their experiences may be viewed less in terms of the acquisition of 
wholly new elements of their self-narratives. Rather they anticipated that this information 
could change the meaning and connotations of their diagnosis and thus the nature and weight 
of the role it plays in how they think about themselves and present themselves to others – for 
example, where it is hoped that it could reduce stigma or self-blame, or encourage better self-
care. These interpretive modifications are not inevitably positive.  Although patients’ views 
reflected in the empirical literature are broadly optimistic or pragmatic, it is possible that a 
neurological explanation of mental illness could be experienced it as more stigmatising, or as 
undermining an individual’s sense of control over her own health. 
The literature also illustrates the possibility that a neuroimaging-based diagnosis could support 
someone’s exclusion of mental illness from her self-characterisation. For example, the 
biologisation of mental illness putatively afforded by neuroimaging might allow someone to 
reject characterisation of being ‘crazy’. Or it might permit her to relegate her illness to a mere 
bodily fact – in Dumit’s terminology, an aspect of her “objective self”749 – rather than 
something that contributes to the story of who she really is as a person, and the characteristics 
and values that are attributable to her. I suggest that using bioinformation to exclude an aspect 
of one’s life from one’s self-narrative is no less a manifestation of this information’s identity-
significance insofar as this edit shifts the interpretive relationships between other aspects of 
her story of who she is, the way she interprets experiences and the sources of her motives and 
values.  
As I have suggested in my discussions in the preceding two illustrative chapters, the kinds of 
narrative roles that we might understand personal bioinformation as occupying are not limited 
                                                             





to the modification of the particular characteristics that make up our accounts of who we are. 
Bioinformation might also play a wider interpretive role in supporting an individual in making 
sense of her self-narrative as a whole and, specifically, in relation to her experiences of her 
embodied existence, her health and her interactions with others. I suggest that the attitudes 
reported in the empirical literature reflect – at least the hope – that neuroimaging-based 
diagnoses could occupy a similar explanatory and sense-making role, as I shall now outline.  
ii) Supporting narrative coherence  
My suggestion in this sub-section is that the evidence reviewed above indicates that diagnostic 
findings from psychiatric neuroimaging could also support an individual to make sense of 
some of the cognitive, affective and behavioural experiences of mental illness and how these 
impinge upon her sense of who she is. And in doing so, these findings might help her to 
develop, maintain or restore a degree of narrative coherence and to thus to construct an identity 
that allows her to navigate her lived experiences, including those of her illness.  
First person accounts given by those living with mental illness sometimes characterise the 
experiences of illness in terms of a struggle to manage identity.750 The onset of serious mental 
illness has been described as a bifurcation in an individual’s self-narrative.751  For example, as 
referred to in Chapter 2, Mackenzie and Poltera cite Helen Saks’s account of living with 
schizophrenia in which she describes experiencing her sense of who she is as fragmented by 
the illness.752  
These profoundly distressing experiences of a “loss of self” are unlikely to be comprehensively 
addressed by the availability of neuroimaging-based diagnoses.753 Nevertheless, the responses 
outlined in Section 4 above, and discussions of the relationship between self-narratives and 
mental illness in the wider literature, suggest ways in which (what are perceived to be) reliable 
and definitive diagnostic categories and explanations of mental illness symptoms might 
support some restoration of narrative coherence. For example, both patients and clinicians 
contributing to several of the studies cited above report the hope that neuroimaging-based 
diagnoses would provide welcome explanation, legitimisation and context for individuals’ 
illness experiences – demonstrating that they are not ‘just crazy’ and that the source of their 
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distress is real and a physical disease just like any other. Some authors have suggested that 
acknowledgement of the reality of illness and being able to accommodate this within one’s 
account of who one is may be both therapeutic and contribute to the restoration of a coherent 
sense of self in the face of the disruptive experiences of mental illness. For example, some 
psychiatric research indicates that those living with psychosis may benefit from the 
construction of ‘recovery narratives’, in which the individual acknowledges her illness and 
incorporates understanding of this into the construction of a self-narrative that helps her to 
make sense of its effects on her life.754 Meanwhile, Mackenzie and Poltera describe how, by 
“appropriating her illness as part of herself”, Saks was able to undertake treatment which 
helped her to bring some coherence to her self-narrative and “enable[d] her to be the self she 
wants to be”.755  
The kinds of identities we are able to sustain and inhabit are influenced and constrained by the 
ways that others characterise us. For this reason, it is important that our self-narratives are not 
only intelligible on their own terms and in relation to our experiences of our embodiment and 
our health, but that they also broadly accord with how others view us and the world (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). The findings outlined in Section 4 indicate that the value that some research 
participants invest in neuroimaging-based diagnoses may be rooted in the desire to achieve 
this kind of relational coherence. Here the information’s anticipated value lies in its perceived 
objectivity and legitimising power. This power relates both to its capacity to reinforce the 
individual’s own account of who she is (as ill, or ‘not just crazy’), and also in its potential to 
persuade others to adjust their view of the nature of her illness (including its cause and 
associated stigma) and its reality (and the reality of her suffering), and thus their view of her. 
As noted above, however, the success of this last endeavour is contingent on other’s investing 
neuroimaging findings with the same meaning and explanatory power as the patient herself.756 
My intention in this section has been to explore what the attitudes reported in the empirical 
literature indicate about the potential impacts of neuroimaging-based psychiatric diagnoses 
might be on individuals’ identities, were one to adopt a narrative conception of identity. 
Echoing themes emerging in the preceding two chapters, I have suggested that this particular 
category of personal bioinformation could play a role in modifying the characteristics that 
comprise someone’s identity narrative – in this instance the extent and ways in which mental 
illness features amongst these. It might also play a role in supporting an individual in making 
sense of her own and others’ experiences of her mental illness and accommodating these 
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within her self-narrative in a way that helps (to some extent) to maintain or restore its 
coherence. My suggestion is not that the impacts of this category of information on an 
individual’s self-conception will always be welcome, on the contrary they could be distressing 
or challenging. Nevertheless, my contention is that the possible consequences of these impacts 
are neither trivial – to the extent that they shape her understanding of who she is and her 
capacity to inhabit and enact this self-conception – nor are they reducible to the role of this 
information in shaping her health behaviours or healthcare choices.   
However – and this is no small caveat – the suggestions made in this section are premised on 
the provisional assumption that the diagnoses generated by psychiatric neuroimaging do 
provide individuals with robust information about their mental health. I have indicated in 
Section 2 why this is unlikely currently to be the case. And in Section 7 I will turn to consider 
what this entails for the capacity of this information to fulfil the kinds if narrative roles that I 
have suggested in this section. Before doing so it will be instructive to at the factors that appear 
to be influential in (potential) recipients according neuroimaging-based diagnosis significance 
in their self-conceptions. Exploring these factors will inform both generalisable insights into 
what shapes the identity-significance of personal bioinformation, and the specific sceptical 
critique of Section 7. 
SECTION 6: FACTORS POTENTIALLY INFLUENCING IDENTITY IMPACTS  
As in the previous illustrative chapters, I will divide this section of my analysis into two 
questions: 
 What does the empirical evidence indicate about which features of neuroimaging-
based diagnoses might contribute to their playing a role in individuals’ self-
conceptions?  
 What factors appear to account for diversity amongst individuals’ responses to this 
information? 
I will address these in turn. 
Accounting for the potential narrative significance of this information 
I have already indicated the kinds of factors that may to contribute neuroimaging-based 
diagnosis playing a role in an individual’s self-characterisations in my discussion of the 
findings from the empirical literature, so it just remains to bring these together here for the 




i) The assumed close association between the brain and the self, and 
ii) The perceived objectivity and reliability of neuroimaging findings.  
i) Close association of brain and self 
Some of the significance that individuals invest in this category of personal bioinformation 
could be attributable to the perceived close relationship between the brain and self – a 
perception possibly fed by the way in which the research outputs from the neurosciences are 
represented in popular culture and the non-specialist media as providing insights into our 
minds and characters.757 There is not space to explore the problems of neuro-reductive view 
of the self here.758 And I shall return in Chapter 8 to the question of the extent to which the 
perceived significance of personal bioinformation to our self-narratives can be attributed to 
social constructions of identity-significance.  However, it is important to note here that neither 
the reported attitudes reviewed above, nor the wider literature on neuroscience and the self, 
indicate that neuro-reductive or neuro-essentialist views of the self are universally or 
straightforwardly held. On the contrary, this literature points instead to widespread 
ambivalence about the extent to which who we are is shaped by the functioning of brains.759 
ii) Perceived objectivity and reliability 
There are indications that patients invest neuroimaging-based diagnoses with personal 
significance because they view these as providing authoritative and reliable insights into the 
nature and cause of their mental illness. Specifically, the studies discussed above suggest that, 
because these diagnoses are based on putatively objective data about brain activity, they are 
seen as more dependable than diagnoses based on the clinical judgements of mental health 
professionals.  This belief seems to lie behind participants’ perception that that findings 
derived from neuroimaging have the power to explain, legitimise and help them make sense 
of their experiences of mental illness.  
This factor echoes indications in the previous two illustrative examples that the bioinformation 
in question is valuable to the recipients’ self-conception because it is true760 or carries the 
authority of genetic science.761 And this accords with my proposal in Chapter 3 that the value 
of personal bioinformation to narrative self-constitution lies in its capacity to explain or 
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anticipate embodied and health-related experiences and thus help individuals to construct 
identities that make sense in the context of the realities of embodied existence. However, as I 
shall go on to discuss in Section 7, the problem in this instance is that neuroimaging does not, 
or at least does not yet, provide robust or reliable diagnostic information. And I will suggest 
that this carries important consequences for its value to patients’ self-conceptions and ethical 
implications for provision of this category of personal bioinformation. Before unpacking these 
claims, though, I will review what the studies discussed above indicate about which factors 
influence differences in individuals’ expectations of the impacts and value of this information.  
Accounting for diversity in identity impacts 
The evidence regarding which variables influence (potential) information recipients’ differing 
attitudes to neuroimaging-based diagnoses is thinner here than in the previous two illustrative 
examples. Some very tentative inferences might be drawn from single studies. For example, 
one study (addressing the role of neuroscience in general in informing self-conceptions) posits 
that neuro-explanations for experiences or behaviour may have greater traction with 
individuals who have had personal experience of brain damage or disorders.762 And, as I have 
noted above, scepticism amongst friend and family about the explanatory power of 
neuroimaging could undermine an individual’s own optimism about its capacity to reconfigure 
what their mental illness means to them.763 However, two further factors that emerge more 
clearly from several studies. These are the parts played by: 
i) The medium in which the information is conveyed, and 
ii) Awareness of the information’s epistemic limitations.  
 
i) Information medium 
The availability of actual, printed neuroimages appears to contribute to the meaning and 
significance with which patients invest in psychiatric neurological findings. Cohn’s study 
indicates that the materiality and portability of these images were key to their deployment by 
patients in bearing witness to their suffering and attempts to deploy them in legitimising and 
explaining their experiences of schizophrenia.764 Similarly Dumit describes neuroimages as 
“potent objects”, whose power to persuade and to designate people into categories according 
to their diagnosis lies in their compelling visual nature and apparent simplicity and 
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objectivity.765 This phenomenon has been observed more widely in relation to medical imaging 
technologies.766 I shall return in Section 7 to discuss why this potency may be problematic.  
ii) Awareness of epistemic limitations 
It has been observed that patients’ enthusiasm and optimism about the capacities of 
neuroimaging to manage their illness and its relationship to their sense of who they are is in 
marked contrast to the much more cautious expectations of neuroscience researchers working 
in this field.767  And a similar, though less stark, contrast can be observed between the 
expectations of patients and some healthcare professionals.768 It might be surmised that this is 
attributable to researchers and clinicians having greater insight into the current (un)reliability 
and epistemic limitations of psychiatric neuroimaging.  
The two variables outlined here are clearly closely connected to the role that the assumed 
reliability and objectivity of neuroimaging-based diagnoses plays in patients’ expectations of 
their value, as outlined in the previous sub-section. It is to the problems with these assumptions 
and the consequences of these for recipients’ self-conceptions that I turn in the final section. 
SECTION 7: NEUROIMAGING-BASED DIAGNOSES AND NARRATIVE JEOPARDY 
My aims in this section are, first, to review the chief reasons why neuroimaging may not in 
fact yet – and (on some views) perhaps not ever – provide reliable psychiatric diagnoses and, 
secondly, what this implies for the kind of impacts this category of personal bioinformation 
could have on recipients’ self-conceptions. I suggest that, contrary to the useful self-
descriptive and interpretive roles outlined in Section 4 on the basis of the naïve assumption of 
their reliability, these diagnoses could instead have detrimental narrative impacts.  
Epistemic limitations of findings  
The first reason that psychiatric neuroimaging is not able to provide the kind of unambiguous 
or dependable diagnoses on which many of the hopes and expectations reflected in Section 3 
depend is that, as already noted, this application of the technology is still at a developmental 
phase. There are currently problems with producing replicable or reliable findings.769 Some 
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commentators maintain that, with methodological and analytical improvements, these kinds 
of problems might yet be effectively addressed.770 However, other challenges to the putative 
authority of psychiatric neuroimaging, rooted at a deeper, ontological level, may not be quite 
so easily overcome.  
Clearly if one were to take a thoroughgoing antirealist position on mental illness, then 
psychiatric neuroimaging would appear wholly misguided.771  However, even if one allows 
that the brain has some role to play in mental illness, but that brain facts are insufficient to 
capture everything about its causes, aetiology or phenomenology,772 one might still be 
sceptical that neuroimaging can provide a more reliable or appropriate means of diagnosis than 
existing clinical methods.773 To provide just one illustration – psychiatric diagnostic categories 
do not pick out biologically homogenous natural kinds by ‘carving nature at its joints’, but are 
normative categories, dependent on clinical judgements.774 This means that neural biomarkers 
are unlikely to align neatly with existing classifications, presenting challenges for 
unambiguous diagnosis and appropriate care. Furthermore, if mental illness is more than a 
brain disorder, it is problematic to reduce psychiatric disorders and their associated 
phenomenology to biological categories based on neural activity, especially if the effect of this 
is to ignore or occlude the wider embodied, social or environmental nature of the causes and 
experiences of disease.775   
These caveats apply to an even greater extent with respect to bioinformation in the form of 
graphical neuroimages themselves. As noted above, when made available to patients, these 
images may be instrumental in giving the impression that an accompanying diagnosis is 
objective and incontrovertible. However, as noted in Section 1, neuroimages are the result of 
statistical analyses and therefore both less immediate and less objective than their pictorial 
form suggests.776 Meaningful clinical differences are unlikely to be visible from them.777 
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Clinicians in one study acknowledged that, despite giving neuroimages to research participants 
as thanks for taking part, they were meaningless.778 This illustrates how someone’s intention 
in supplying personal bioinformation may be very different from the meaning invested in the 
information by the recipient. This echoes findings in the previous illustrative example which 
highlighted the crucial role played by the wider informational and interpretive context within 
which genetic test results are conveyed in the significance that recipients invest in them and 
the uses to which they apply them. The ethical consequences of effective communication of 
the epistemic limitations of personal bioinformation come into sharp focus as I now turn to 
consider what a failure to appreciate the epistemic limitations of psychiatric neuroimaging 
might mean for the impacts that it has one someone’s self-narrative.  
Potential for identity detriment 
One response to this question is simply to conclude that if neuroimaging cannot, or does not 
yet provide reliable diagnoses, or reflect the complex, multifactorial nature of mental illness, 
then its outputs may simply fail to fulfil the kinds of narrative roles that I have proposed in 
Section 6. However, I wish to argue, that this overlooks the possible negative consequences 
for someone’s identity, were she to place great faith in the abilities of a neuroimaging-based 
psychiatric diagnosis to inform the role of mental illness in her self-narrative, without being 
aware of its epistemic limitations.  
The most obvious identity-related consequence of someone investing misplaced faith in 
objectivity and authority of a neuroimaging-based diagnosis is that it might lead her 
erroneously to adopt a particular kind of self-description – ‘I am someone with illness x’. But 
I wish to suggest that the detrimental impacts may also be woven more deeply into the 
intelligibility and integrity of her account of who she is than this implies.  
This may be most readily appreciated where the contribution of the information to a recipient’s 
identity is predicated upon its clinical utility. I suggest that if a misleading diagnosis, or a 
neuroreductive conception of a disorder, leads someone to undertake unsuitable preventative 
behaviours or treatments, this might then jeopardise her capacities to construct a coherent self-
narrative in one of two ways. First, the pursuit of effective interventions might contribute to 
protecting the very capacities for memory, and cognitive and affective interpretation that make 
the construction of a coherent, enduring self-narrative possible at all. Secondly, someone’s 
specific diagnosis and pursuit of associated therapeutic strategies may be integral to her 
                                                             





particular mode of practical self-characterisation.779 If someone’s diagnosis is unsound and the 
strategies she adopts are inappropriate and ineffective, then her enactment and constitution of 
this self-characterisation may be critically undermined. 
The pursuit of inappropriate therapies is not, however, the only way in which someone’s 
orientation towards her illness and recovery could be misdirected by her assumption that her 
illness is of one kind rather than another. For example, misdiagnosis might ill-prepare someone 
to anticipate or tackle the particular experiences of living with her disorder and their impact 
on her sense of who she is. Or, if a neuro-reductive perspective leads someone to overlook or 
devalue bodily, environmental, or social contributors to her mental illness, she may struggle 
to make sense of or respond to the ways that these impinge, for good or ill, upon her own 
illness experiences and account of who she is. A welcome ‘meaningful explanation’ of one’s 
illness is no kind of explanation if it is partial, to the occlusion of other more significant factors. 
My suggestion here is that, to the extent that someone uses misplaced assumptions about the 
nature of her disorder to construct and interpret her self-narrative she is, in effect, building her 
identity on precarious foundations. What I mean by this is (as argued in Chapter 5) even if her 
sense of who she is not is not inevitably or immediately rendered incoherent, it is nevertheless 
vulnerable to challenge and disruption by her experiences of illness, and provides a self-
conception that ill-equips the individual to navigate and make sense of these experiences as 
they assail her.  
This analysis casts doubt on the potential, given the current state of the art, for findings from 
psychiatric neuroimaging to fulfil the kind of useful or welcome narrative roles suggested by 
the discussion in Section 4. Indeed, it raises the question of whether, given that its epistemic 
limitations may not be wholly dependent on the developmental state of this technology, this 
category of personal bioinformation could ever provide a suitable foundation for making sense 
of who one is. But, at the very least, it points to the critical importance of making recipients 
aware of the limitations of neuroimaging-based diagnoses so that they have the opportunity to 
revise, or at least reflect upon, their expectations or hopes about how they might use these to 
interpret the role of mental illness in their accounts of who they are. I will return in the 
remaining chapters to discuss what this entails for the responsibilities of those who disclose 
personal bioinformation. 
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SECTION 8: CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
There are indications that those living with psychiatric disorders may be keen to access 
neuroimaging-based diagnostic information for reasons that extend beyond its health utility. 
These reasons may include the desire to reinterpret the meaning of their illness and their sense 
of who they are in light of neurological information. I have suggested that evidence of people’s 
attitudes to this information offers prima facie grounds for positing that the outputs of 
diagnostic neuroimaging could contribute to recipients’ construction of their self-narratives in 
two broad ways – by providing particular modes of self-categorisation, or by helping to locate 
illness experiences within a wider, intelligible, sense of who they are.  
However, at its current developmental stage psychiatric neuroimaging is unlikely to provide 
robust diagnostic information. My suggestion has been that where individuals invest value in 
this as a means of self-conception, this is often dependent their perceptions that it is authorities 
and objective. While it lacks these qualities, its capacity to contribute constructively to 
recipients’ identities is undermined. Moreover, where these limitations are not appreciated by 
information recipients, reliance on the authority of the bioinformation could be actively 
detrimental to their construction of coherent self-narratives.  The unwitting use of misleading 
or inadequate bioinformation is a key consideration in developing an account of the role of 
personal bioinformation in identity development. This underscores two central propositions of 
this thesis that I shall develop further in chapter 8. The first is that personal bioinformation 
contributes to the construction of a coherent self-narrative only insofar as it provides a reliable 
and useful means of interpreting lived, embodied experiences. Secondly (and relatedly) the 
way that bioinformation is communicated, and the interpretative support that is provided when 
it is, could be crucial in shaping the impact it has on the recipient’s self-conception. 
Individual’s identity-related interests extend beyond whether they receive particular 
information, to the manner, medium and context in which they do.  
This chapter is the last of my three illustrative examples. My task in Part III of this thesis is to 
bring together my analyses of all three and apply them to addressing the central ethical and 
practical aims of this thesis – those of justifying my assertion that policies and practices 
governing information subject’s access to personal bioinformation should attend to their 
identity-related interests, and of providing an ethical framework to guide these policies and 
practices in doing so. In Chapter 8 I will build on my analyses in these illustrative chapters to 
refine my theoretically-based argument from Chapter 3 and to demonstrate the way in which 
the potential narrative roles of the three categories of bioinformation explored here may be 





these examples to address why any particular instance or kind of personal bioinformation is 
significant or valuable to someone’s identity. These steps will then set the scene for Chapter 9 
in which I will characterise the specific nature of our identity-related interests in accessing 
personal bioinformation and the corresponding responsibilities of those who could disclose it 
























CHAPTER 8: REFINING THE THEORY: ACCOUNTING FOR 
IDENTITY VALUE, DETRIMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE   
 
SECTION 1: AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER  
In the preceding three chapters my aim has been to demonstrate that the argument I developed 
in Chapter 3 – that personal bioinformation can play an important part in the development of 
embodied identity narratives – is consistent with people’s actual experiences as reported in the 
empirical literature. I have suggested that it does indeed appear to be broadly consistent – a 
conclusion I will further underline in this chapter. My purpose in exploring the three 
illustrative examples was also to refine my theoretically-based argument in light of empirical 
evidence. This chapter will consolidate my analyses (from each of the illustrative chapters) of 
the nature and extent of the roles played by those three kinds of personal bioinformation in 
information subjects’ self-narratives. From this I will build a more nuanced picture of the 
normative relationship between bioinformation and identity.  
Whereas the argument I presented in Chapter 3 focused upon the significance of personal 
bioinformation as a broad category, here my intention is to drill beneath this, to the question 
of what shapes the impacts of particular kinds or instances of personal bioinformation on our 
self-narratives. My aims in doing so are not only to permit generalisation beyond the specific 
examples discussed in the preceding chapters, but also to suggest ways we can discriminate 
between circumstances in which personal bioinformation is likely to be relevant and valuable 
to our identities from those in which it is not. To this end, I will develop the conceptions of 
‘identity value’, ‘identity detriment’ and ‘identity significance’. Clarifying the nature of these 
qualities will enhance the analytical insights offered by the normative argument I have offered 
thus far and will provide the foundations for the practical goal of this thesis. That goal is to 
construct an ethical framework to guide decision-making about how access to personal 
bioinformation might be managed and regulated in light of individual information subjects’ 
identity-related interests. That framework in follow in Chapter 9.  
To prepare the ground for the framework, this chapter will address the following three 
questions: 
i. What refinements are needed to my central claim that personal bioinformation 
has an important part to play in our self-narratives? (Section 2) 
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ii. What does my analysis suggest about what it means for particular personal 
bioinformation to be valuable or detrimental to our identities? (Section 3) 
iii. What factors contribute to our experiencing particular personal bioinformation 
as being significant to who we are, such that it has valuable or detrimental 
identity impacts at all? (Section 4) 
The answers to these questions will help me to answer the third and fourth of the headline 
research questions posed in Chapter 1. Those are respectively: what are the nature and scope 
of our identity-related interests in accessing personal bioinformation? and what ethical 
responsibilities for disclosure accrue to those who hold personal bioinformation about 
us? I will address these questions in Chapter 9.  
The three substantive sections of this chapter will take the following form:  
In Section 2 I will first take stock of the potential narrative roles of personal bioinformation 
suggested by my illustrative examples. I will group these into seven categories. On the basis 
of this analysis I will then outline the four key refinements that are needed to take my 
normative argument through to its practical application.  
In Section 3 I will build on these refinements by suggesting that the value and detriment of 
personal bioinformation to our self-narratives are attributable to two kinds of impact: that of 
the information on the constituent contents of someone’s self-narrative; and that on the 
narrative’s overall coherence. I will argue that recognising this duality is important to 
understanding the scope and ethical significance of identity impacts, the relevance of 
bioinformation’s epistemic qualities, and the pertinence of how information is presented to its 
value.  
In Section 4 I will turn to the question of what the illustrative examples suggest about the 
factors that contribute to whether we experience particular kinds or instances of personal 
bioinformation as significant to who we are. I will suggest that there are four key factors at 
work, the combination of which carries implications for the predictability of identity 
significance and the role of others in shaping it. 
I will now turn to address the first of my three research questions listed above. 
SECTION 2: REVIEWING THE NARRATIVE ROLES OF PERSONAL BIOINFORMATION 
AND REFINING MY ARGUMENT  
This section will review and consolidate the suggestions I have made over the previous three 





bioinformation can play.  This will provide the basis both for identifying the refinements 
needed to my theoretically-based argument in this section, and for my two-strand analysis of 
what constitutes identity value and detriment under a narrative conception in Section 3.  
Diverse narrative roles  
As the three preceding illustrative chapters indicate, where personal bioinformation does affect 
the identity narratives of those to whom it pertains, it does so in many different ways. 
Nevertheless, I would suggest that some common themes emerge, which permit me to group 
these effects under seven broad headings, corresponding to the possible roles that personal 
bioinformation may play in our self-narratives:  
i) Editing self-descriptors; 
ii) Fulfilling normative self-descriptors; 
iii) Changing relationships;  
iv) (Re)interpreting experiences; 
v) Projecting oneself into the future; 
vi) Disrupting one’s narrative; and  
vii) Changing one’s outlook and priorities. 
These categories are based on my analysis of the findings reviewed in Part II. As such they 
are not purely inductively derived, but the product of interpreting this evidence through the 
framework of narrative identity and its normative implications.780 These categories are 
intended to capture the range and diversity of possible narrative roles, not to provide definitive, 
discrete or exhaustive categorisations. On any given occasion, bioinformation might occupy 
none, or more than one, of these roles.  
i) Editing self-descriptors 
In an important sense the entire multi-stranded web of an identity narrative is a complex, 
composite self-descriptor. But incorporated within it may be more specific identifiers or labels 
relating to, for example, particular aspects of our health, our relationships, or group 
memberships. The illustrative examples indicate that bioinformation can play a part in 
changing the possible self-descriptors available to us – for example, revealing disease risk 
status781 – or by modifying existing descriptors – for example, by reducing the stigma of a 
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prior psychiatric diagnosis.782 These edits could be welcome – for example, learning she is 
donor-conceived makes someone feel special – or is painful – for example, where this 
information severs an assumed and valued genealogy.783   
ii) Fulfilling normative self-descriptors 
Some, perhaps many, of the self-descriptors referred to under the previous heading will be 
normative (or ‘practical’) ones – meaning that they are not just passively acquired, but 
constituted or undermined by the kinds of motives we pursue and how we conduct ourselves.784 
Personal bioinformation sometimes operates as a means of constituting such an identifier. For 
example, obtaining information about genetic disease susceptibility in order to share this with 
family members, or contribute to health research, might be integral to someone’s role as a 
loving daughter or sister.785 Conversely, for someone else, acquisition of the same information 
could lead someone to feel they have failed in their parental role to protect their children.786  
iii) Changing or reinforcing relationships  
There are a number of different ways that personal bioinformation can impact on relational 
aspects of identity and the ways in which someone sees her narrative as entwined with those 
of others, or as part of wider, shared narratives. It might reinforce or undermine relationships 
with particular others where these roles constitute self-descriptors – for example by revealing 
genetic relationships, or (as indicated under the previous heading) permitting or inhibiting 
someone’s ability to enact her relational roles within her family. On a broader scale, personal 
bioinformation might contribute to the acquisition (or loss) of a group identifier, such as that 
of being a ‘BRCA carrier’.787 Or information about disease risk status might play a role in 
underpinning ‘biosocial’ activities – that is group activities centred around shared biological 
attributes – such as patient activism, that serve to contribute to someone’s self-conception.788 
As this last example illustrates, the relationships that are served (or undermined) by the 
acquisition of bioinformation may not only contribute to how we characterise ourselves, but 
provide the contexts in which we do so.  
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iv) (Re)interpreting experiences   
Personal bioinformation can provide fresh or additional interpretive context that permits an 
individual to fill out or make sense of aspects of her existing self-narrative and how these relate 
to her lived experiences. This might apply where personal bioinformation helps someone to 
account for tensions, anomalies or gaps. For example, donor-conceived individuals may 
welcome learning of their donor conception because it helps to resolve questions and 
confusion about family resemblances or interactions.789 Similarly, the perceived authority of a 
neuroimaging-based diagnosis may help someone to make sense of her symptoms and to think 
of herself as ill rather than ‘crazy’.790 
v) Projecting oneself into the future 
The stories we tell of who we are, are coloured not only by what has already happened to us, 
but also by our anticipation of what could yet happen. For example, probabilistic information 
about the risk of future disease, might help an individual to imagine and plan for how her 
narrative could unfold and to orient and reinterpret her current self-narrative accordingly. 
Some of this might amount to psychological preparedness, or alleviation of a burdensome 
uncertainty about the risk of developing a condition like Alzheimer’s disease.791 Practical steps 
such as health-protective measures or financial planning, are no less part of someone’s identity 
development, if for example, these serve to avert or mitigate future narrative disruption by the 
onset of hereditary cancer, or constitute the ways in which someone enacts conceptions of 
themselves as ‘at risk’.792 The role of bioinformation in reorienting one’s self-narrative 
towards a possible future is not inevitably positive. For example, learning that one is of 
elevated risk of a serious genetic illness could lead to reinterpretation of current experiences 
in light of imagined symptoms or feelings of being doomed.793  
vi) Disrupting one’s narrative  
It is possible that the divergence is so great between someone’s existing narrative and the state 
of affairs conveyed by her personal bioinformationthat it disrupts her existing narrative, 
making it difficult for her to locate who she is. For example, some donor-conceived individuals 
report enduring disorientation in their self-conceptions upon discovering their donor.794 
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Similarly, learning that one is at high inherited risk of breast and ovarian cancer could disrupt 
someone’s prior self-conception as a heathy person, or a prospective parent, or hinder 
someone’s inability to see her self-narrative persisting in a recognisable or desirable form.795 
As noted in Chapter 5, with respect to revelations of donor origins, narrative disruption need 
be neither permanent nor entirely unwelcome if the individual is able to reconstruct a new and 
satisfying account of who they are with the new information available.  
vii) Changing one’s outlook and priorities 
The narrative impacts of personal bioinformation need not be connected to clearly defined 
actions. Instead they may amount to changes in outlook or interpretation. For example, 
predictive information about possible future illness that lacks clinical utility may nevertheless 
instigate reflection on priorities and values.796 And, as illustrated by the example of 
information about donor conception, some individuals may welcome the opportunity to place 
elements of their narratives in a wider context, or to reassess how aspects of their stories fit 
together.797 
What do these roles indicate? 
Corralling the analyses of the range of bioinformation’s potential roles in our self-narratives 
from Part II of this thesis under the seven categories above helps to bring some order to the 
detail within the illustrative examples. The list above is not intended to be exhaustive. But I 
would submit that it both illustrates and offers support for my claim that personal 
bioinformation can impact in important ways on an individual’s development, maintenance or 
restoration of her identity narrative in the context of her embodied existence.  
Furthermore, I submit that outlining these roles in generic, high-level terms serves to open up 
the space to imagine how each of them could potentially be filled by many different kinds of 
personal bioinformation – other than the three specific examples discussed in the illustrative 
chapters. Any further examples will inevitably be piecemeal, but, for example, we might 
imagine how, for someone with a rare, undiagnosed disease, the identification of the genetic 
mutation associated with their condition could galvanise their sense of hope and commitment 
to research participation. Or suppose that research involving whole-body imaging incidentally 
reveals that a participant has extensive scarring on her fallopian tubes consistent with a prior 
infection – this finding could both initiate a reassessment of her past sexual relationships and 
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alter her conception of herself as a future parent. And results obtained from an online genetic 
ancestry tracing service might provide means for someone to feel connections to, and solidarity 
with, those with whom she shares (apparently) similar genealogical geography.798  
The transferability of my analysis beyond the specific examples of Part II is critical to my 
claim that, in principle, very many different kinds of personal bioinformation could contribute 
to or detract from our development of our self-narratives. However, it is not my intention to 
suggest that all and every instance of personal bioinformation could or would make a 
difference, let alone a valuable difference, to its subject’s self-narrative – as I shall now go on 
to discuss. 
Refining my central claim  
This section now turns to address the first of my research questions for this chapter, outlined 
above. Even though the preceding review of the potential narrative role of personal 
bioinformation broadly supports my central claim to the potential importance of this 
information to our identities, I wish to suggest that the evidence from the illustrative examples 
also provides texture and nuance, which indicate the need for some refinements to that claim. 
I shall outline here what I take to be the four most important clarifications and refinements. 
These pertain to: 
 The diversity of narrative roles; 
 Limits to authorial control; 
 The possibility of negative impacts; and 
 Impacts on contents and coherence.  
Diversity 
The first of these clarifications is to note the sheer number and variety of possible identity-
related roles that personal bioinformation might play. Furthermore, it appears that this 
information may affect our accounts of who we are with varying degrees of pervasiveness or 
gravity. And sometimes it will have little or no effect. This variation holds both between 
different kinds of bioinformation and between different information subjects and disclosure 
contexts. This presents a formidable challenge to any attempt to govern information access in 
a way that supports and protects subjects’ development of their identities. The conceptions of 
                                                             
798 I note my concerns with the epistemic limitations, and thus the identity value, of genetic ancestry 
information in Section 3 below.  
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identity value and identity significance that I will develop in Sections 3 and 4 respectively will 
provide some indications of how this complex terrain might be charted.  
Authorial control 
Secondly, the illustrative examples make it clear that, although we are the chief authors of our 
own identity narratives, we do not have absolute control over the roles that personal 
bioinformation plays in our self-conceptions. For example, some information might precipitate 
the involuntary severing of relationships, or we may have only a limited capacity to resist the 
stigmatising connotations of some self-descriptors. In these cases, the narrative consequences 
of receiving the information might be better thought of as passive incursions, rather than active 
uses. In Section 4 I shall consider the factors that influence whether particular personal 
bioinformation plays any role in a recipients’ self-narrative and the degree to which she herself 
and others may control or shape this. Before turning to that question, however, I wish to 
address two further refinements that lie at the very heart of understanding the nature of the 
impacts that personal bioinformation can have on our identities, and which will provide the 
basis for my analysis in Section 3. 
Positive and negative impacts 
The third refinement, then, is the need to relinquish the purely positive picture sketched in 
Chapter 3. There I proposed that personal bioinformation can contribute constructively to our 
self-narratives because it enhances their congruence with our embodied experiences. However, 
it is clear that the impacts on our self-narratives of receiving personal bioinformation are more 
complex than this. These impacts are not always welcome or constructive. The account I will 
build from here needs to accommodate the possibility of negative effects, and to be grounded 
in a robust understanding of what it means for personal bioinformation to be valuable or 
detrimental to our identities.  
Impacts on contents and coherence 
The fourth refinement will be key to my characterisation of identity value and detriment. I 
wish to suggest that, amongst the seven roles listed above, it is possible to identify two broad 
ways in which personal bioinformation can affect our identities for good or ill. It may impact 
upon specific contents of our self-narratives or our abilities to develop, maintain or restore the 
coherence of the overarching narrative. Broadly speaking, the first three of the roles listed 
above – editing and enacting self-descriptors and changing our relationships – may be seen as 
chiefly falling in the former category, while the remaining four fall under the latter. However, 





3, there will be cross-over and interdependency between impacts on the contents and 
coherence of our identities.  
This thesis is concerned with how access to personal bioinformation should be managed so as 
to best protect information subjects’ abilities to develop and inhabit their identities. Therefore, 
the first challenge emerging from the refinements above is to address the second of my 
research questions listed at the start of this chapter: what does it mean under the account I am 
developing for personal bioinformation to be valuable or detrimental to our identities? 
SECTION 3: CHARACTERISING IDENTITY VALUE AND DETRIMENT 
My aim in this section is to unpack what it means under a narrative account of identity – 
refined in light of the illustrative examples I have considered – for personal bioinformation to 
be either valuable or detrimental to our identities. Addressing this question is a basic condition 
for appropriately characterising and responding to information subjects’ identity-related 
interests in information access.799  
Two dimensions of identity value and detriment  
I wish to suggest that the matter of whether particular personal bioinformation is valuable or 
detrimental to an individual’s self-narrative may be understood as coming down to one or both 
of the following factors: 
i) How the bioinformation affects the quality or character of particular constituent 
characteristics, roles, relationships or self-descriptors that make up her narrative, 
i.e. its contents. 
ii) The role the bioinformation plays in her being able to develop, maintain or restore 
the coherence of her self-narrative seen as an identity-constituting whole. 
In this section I will first describe these two dimensions of identity value and detriment, and 
intersections between then. I will then turn to consider four important contributions that 
recognising these dual-aspects makes to the practical task of responding to possible identity 
impacts.  
i) Impacts on constituent contents    
Under this first dimension, personal bioinformation can be seen as being valuable to 
someone’s personal narrative when it contributes to her being able to adopt, develop, reinforce, 
constitute or maintain self-descriptors, roles, relationships, projects or commitments that she 
                                                             
799 This is a task for Chapter 9. 
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finds pleasing, worthwhile or important. It helps her to tell the kind of narrative that, in terms 
of its substance, she wants to tell and is comfortable inhabiting. Conversely then, information 
can be detrimental to someone’s self-narrative when it threatens valued modes of self-
characterisation or contributes unwelcome, oppressive or distressing contents that make her 
feel negatively about herself. It is information that prevents someone from constructing the 
kind of account of who she is that she would like to tell, understood from a qualitative 
perspective. However, I would suggest, that it would be a mistake to assume that contents-
related value is necessarily synonymous with an especially pleasurable experience of receiving 
information. For example, undergoing BRCA testing may be very trying, but valued 
nevertheless insofar as it allows someone, for example, to enact and demonstrate familial 
commitments that are important to her sense of who she is.  
ii) Impacts on the coherence of the narrative as a whole 
This dimension of identity value or detriment pertains not to the impacts of personal 
bioinformation on any discrete self-descriptors or ‘contents’ of someone’s self-narrative, but 
on the relationships between these contents on one hand, and between her self-narrative and 
her experiences of her health, body and biological relationships, on the other. This dimension 
is therefore to do with the interpretive process of identity development and the structure of 
the individual’s overall self-narrative in that it concerns the impacts of receiving or being 
denied bioinformation that impinge for good or ill on her capacity to construct and to inhabit 
a narrative that makes sense on its own terms, and when confronted by her embodied 
experiences. Valuable bioinformation is, therefore, that which allows someone to develop, 
maintain or restore a coherent self-narrative and to understand how its parts add up to a totality 
that is ‘who she is’. It also includes that which helps to make her narrative resilient (as far as 
this is ever possible) to probable and non-trivial disruption by lived experiences. Detrimental 
personal bioinformation, on this view, includes that which seriously disrupts someone’s 
existing self-narrative. It also includes that which leaves her narrative exposed and vulnerable 
to such disruption, for example by leading her to premise her self-conception on false or 
misplaced beliefs. I will return in the discussion of the relevance of bioinformation’s epistemic 
qualities to this last kind of detriment later in this section.    
The interdependence of contents and coherence  
The reason that I do not wish simply to assert that the first three of the seven narrative roles 
listed in Section 2 map neatly to the contents-related value of personal bioinformation, while 





that affect the content of our self-narratives from those that serve their overall coherence. The 
very nature of a narrative is that its contents and it coherence are interdependent.  
What I mean by this is that, on one hand, the value of welcome narrative contents is likely to 
be contingent on the intelligibility of the wider story to which they contribute. For example, a 
misplaced but cherished belief that one is never likely to succumb to Alzheimer’s disease is of 
questionable value if one is then unable to accommodate the incipient symptoms of illness 
within a stable overall sense of who one is. Meanwhile, profoundly distressing or alienating 
contents could threaten the integrity of someone’s wider account of who she is. For example, 
if someone thinks of herself as ‘doomed’ to a serious neurological disorder, she might 
experience this as being so stigmatising and upsetting that its impact pervades and undermines 
her capacity to make sense of or feel at home in who she is.800 And some kinds of 
bioinformation may simultaneously impact on the contents and structural conditions of 
someone’s self-narrative in different ways. For example, a revelation of donor origins may not 
only reconfigure the recipient’s relational self-descriptors, but also alter the nature of the very 
relationships that had provided the supportive contexts within which she negotiated and 
developed her sense of who she was.801  
One implication of the interdependency of these two dimensions, I would suggest is that when 
it comes to characterising the kind of self-narrative one might aspire to, the outcome is not an 
unremittingly delightful story. Rather it is one that reflects the light and shade of ordinary life 
and is, as such, a realistic and intelligible account of who one is. For this reason, in the 
remainder of this project I shall refer to the desired outcome as the development, maintenance 
or restoration of a coherent and satisfying self-narrative. ‘Satisfying’ here is intended to 
capture the modest goal of realistically desirable contents given what we are (unable) to control 
about our lives and experiences. ‘Coherence’, meanwhile, refers to an ideal goal which perhaps 
none of us will ever achieve, but which we may aspire to and approach.  
I have suggested here that the two dimensions of identity value and detriment are often closely 
intertwined. This notwithstanding, I want to suggest that recognising that there are two 
dimensions at work is key to effective and thorough mapping of the ethical landscape, as I 
shall now outline.  
                                                             
800 Hilde Lindemann Nelson holds that some of the kinds of self-characterisation that are socially-
available to us – and to some marginalised groups in particular – may be oppressive or limiting as to 
constrain our capacities for agency, H. Lindemann Nelson (2001). 
801 See Chapter 5. 
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The importance of recognising both contents-related and structural impacts 
What does this two-stranded conception of identity value and detriment bring to this project 
that is lacking from other theoretical accounts of the relationship between bioinformation and 
identity? I wish to suggest that this analysis brings four insights – each of which contributes 
to a more robust and thorough mapping of the ethical terrain. These insights serve to:  
 broaden the scope of attention to relevant identity impacts;  
 locate the ethical weight of these impacts;  
 highlight the importance of bioinformation’s epistemic qualities; and  
 signal how value and detriment might be influenced by the manner in which 
bioinformation is communicated.  
I shall unpack each of these in turn in the remainder of this section. 
Broadening the scope of attention 
Many prominent non-narrative accounts of the roles that bioinformation might play in identity 
construction focus on the ways in which knowledge of our health, biology or biological 
relationships can invite, sustain or undermine identity ‘contents’ – for example, self-
descriptors, roles or social identifiers (see Chapter 2). As indicated by what I have said in 
Section 2, these are entirely plausible characterisations of some potentially valuable or 
detrimental roles fulfilled by this information, but they not the complete picture. They ignore, 
or at least underplay, the fact that our identities are not made up of discrete islands of 
characteristics and labels. In doing so, they pay insufficient attention to the effects of 
bioinformation on the interpretive and structural features of our identities operating as dynamic 
wholes. 
Having said this, it is equally the case that focusing solely on what is entailed by theories of 
narrative self-constitution, as I have in Chapter 3, might lead one to miss the importance of 
the nature of the contents that make up our identities. The normativity inherent in these theories 
emphasise the importance of an identity narrative being articulable and realistic, but is silent 
on what the contents of the story should look like. However, as the illustrative examples 
considered in Part II make plain, we do not just care about being able to give a coherent story 
of who we are, but also about being able to develop, maintain and inhabit a particular kind of 
story, comprising particular kinds of characteristics, relationships, activities and commitments.  
Omitting to attend to both dimensions of identity value and detriment means that one risks 





someone’s life. Furthermore, as I shall outline towards the end of this section, responding to 
coherence- and contents-related impacts may make distinct demands on those disclosing 
bioinformation. Perhaps most importantly, a solely contents-focused analysis of the identity 
impacts fails to account for, or to properly characterise, why the question of whether we are 
able to access personal bioinformation can be a matter of profound ethical significance, as I 
shall now discuss.  
Locating the ethical weight of bioinformation’s impacts 
If we only think of bioinformation as impacting on discrete self-descriptors, we might be 
inclined to shrug at the prospect that someone is (or is not) able to describe themselves in a 
specific bio-informed way (excepting, perhaps, cases where these are markedly stigmatising 
or oppressive). After all, someone in these circumstances can still give an account of who she 
is, just a qualitatively different one. As sceptics about the value of knowledge of donor origins 
are swift to point out, there are myriad ways that various kinds of information could change 
how we think about ourselves – why would one way be more, or less, valuable than another?802 
Part of the answer, as noted above, is that it is likely to matter to us that we can tell a story 
with a specific plot or tenor, and the personal implications of this are not negligible. But it 
might still be queried whether deep interests in (not) accessing information are engaged – deep 
enough to warrant attention and responses from others.  
I hold that such deep interests are indeed engaged. The weight of this argument is grounded in 
the interpretive and contextualising roles that personal bioinformation may play in enhancing 
or undermining the overall intelligibility and coherence of our self-narratives. It is here that 
(what I have termed) the ‘double normativity’ of the narrative conception of identity on which 
this project is based comes into play.803 The intelligibility and coherence of our self-narratives 
are necessary conditions for supporting a range of valuable capacities, including those for self-
understanding and autonomy (as outlined in Chapter 2). This explains why being able to access 
information that helps one to develop, maintain or restore intelligibility and coherence – or to 
be protected from that which would critically undermine them – are not trivial matters. They 
impinge upon our very abilities to understand who we are and to lead fulfilling, engaged lives. 
The coherence dimensions of identity value and detriment strike at the heart of what is at stake 
in developing and maintaining an identity-constituting self-narrative.  
                                                             
802 See, for example, de Melo‐Martín (2014) 
803 See, Chapter 3. 
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This does not mean that impacts of bioinformation on narrative contents are of no ethical 
significance. On the contrary, they may matter a great deal. But their importance may be best 
understood by viewing their role in an identity understood as a whole, not in relation to 
atomised descriptors. For example, we might more fully understand why accessing results 
from a genetic disease susceptibility test is so important to someone, when we appreciate not 
only how this impacts on her self-conception as a loving, protective parent, but how this self-
conception fits into her wider story, to which it lends and by which it is leant, meaning. The 
ramifications of the test results extend beyond the impact on her perception of her parental 
role to the way her story fits together and makes sense to her as a whole. Again, I would 
emphasise, it is artificial to think of the impacts of personal bioinformation on the contents of 
our identities as wholly separable from its impacts on their coherence.   
Recognising the importance of bioinformation’s epistemic qualities   
The third reason that it is instructive to recognise that identity value and detriment depends on 
bioinformation’s impacts on the coherence as well as the contents of our self-narratives, is that 
the former carries crucial implications for the relationship between identity value and the 
epistemic qualities of the bioinformation in question. By ‘epistemic qualities’ I mean those 
relating to the information’s “fit with the world” and its “adequacy for the practical purposes 
for which [it] is used”.804 I wish to suggest that identity value is contingent on bioinformation 
providing its subject with reliable and empirically robust insights into her past, present or 
(likely) future health, bodily states or functions, and biological relationships. This is because 
these qualities are necessary for the information to contribute to a self-narrative that makes 
sense in the context of her embodied experiences and supports an individual in navigating 
them.  
The kinds of bioinformation that would fail to fulfil this criterion extend beyond the 
straightforwardly false. I would include information which lacks – in the terminology of 
clinical genetics – ‘clinical validity’, by failing accurately or reliably to predict the presence 
of the characteristic, disorder or disease risk of interest,805  or that which generates risk 
predictions that are so broad as to be meaningless.806 I would also include information that 
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Influences in Scientific Research Processes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p.79). In the 
present context, I take ‘purposes’ to mean those of understanding biological states of affairs.   
805 Burke (2014). 
806 There is a grey area here. It is possible (as suggested by the example of APOE testing in Chapter 6) 
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draws unwarrantedly reductive or deterministic inferences from biological findings to the 
presence of complex multifactorial conditions or traits, or that which is incapable of speaking 
relevantly to the state of affairs that it purports to. An example of this last kind would be the 
results from so-called ‘genetic ancestry tracing’ services, which not only are unable to provide 
meaningful insights into ancestral geographical, ethnic or national origins at an individual 
scale, but also implicitly reduce substantially socially constructed categorisations such as 
ethnicity or nationality to biological categories.807  In each of these cases it is not solely the 
epistemic limitations of the information that matters here, but the recipient’s lack of 
appreciation of these limitations. 
In the case of this last example, ancestral information seems likely merely to lack identity 
value. However, I wish to suggest that sometimes, when an individual wrongly believes 
bioinformation to be a reliable source of knowledge about her health, body or biological 
relationships, and depends on this information in the construction of her self-narrative, this 
may render her identity vulnerable to dissonance with, or disruption by, her experiences, and 
thus threaten its coherence. As such, if the aspects of her narrative that are premised on this 
information are core to her self-conception and implicated in values, activities and 
commitments that are central to her life then, I wish to suggest, false, unreliable or meaningless 
bioinformation may not just lack value, but be actively detrimental to her identity. For 
example, in Chapter 7 I suggested that, if neuroimaging cannot (yet) provide definitive 
psychiatric diagnoses or account for the complex aetiology and phenomenology of mental 
illness, those who premise their story of who they are on the authority of such diagnoses as to 
the organic cause and nature of their condition, may find that their capacity to inhabit this story 
is challenged by the ineffectiveness of medical interventions, or the continued impact of social 
and environmental factors on their experiences of illness. Anders Nordgren and Eric Juengst 
raise a similar concern when they argue that the misleading and “inadequate” health 
information supplied by some DTC genetic testing services may serve to “distort rather than 
clarify [their] clients’ subjective experience of their identities.”808 But I would hold that it is 
not just the subjective experience of identity that is distorted. What suffers is the coherence 
and sustainability of the resultant identity narrative as basis for living and acting in the world 
and as the framework through which we continue to interpret and constitute who we are. 
                                                             
purposes. So, my intention here is not to rule out all information that does not meet the strictest 
clinical criteria. 
807 Royal et al. (2010); M.D. Shriver and R.A. Kittles (2004), "Genetic Ancestry and the Search for 
Personalized Genetic Histories" Nature Reviews Genetics, 5(8): 611-18 
808 Nordgren and Juengst (2009), p.166 
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My argument in this sub-section parallels that made by Bunnick et al: in which they hold that 
genetic test results from DTC services that lack clinical validity, are meaningless, or otherwise 
uninterpretable, cannot be said to have ‘personal utility’.809 Their argument is based on the 
premise that the normativity implicit in ‘utility’ means that test results displaying this quality 
must at least “answer the question with which testing was initiated”.810 If personal utility is 
taken to include identity-related purposes (as it sometimes is),811 then my argument adds a 
further source of normativity and grist to their contention.812 It also goes beyond their argument 
by highlighting why providing access to false or meaningless bioinformation (not only 
findings from DTC genetic testing services) represents not just an absence of utility, but a 
possible source of harm. 
I am not seeking to claim here that simply being true, reliable or meaningful is sufficient for 
personal bioinformation to be valuable. Much bioinformation, no matter how robust, will 
simply be irrelevant or otiose to our self-narratives. And some of it may invite unwelcome 
contents. Selectivity is intrinsic to narrative self-constitution. As noted in Chapter 3, it is not 
better (and perhaps much worse) for the intelligibility of one’s self-narrative to attempt to 
include all available insights into one’s biological existence.  
The possibility that true or reliable bioinformation could introduce unwelcome contents, 
however, poses a challenge for the dual-aspect picture of identity value that I have presented. 
It raises the possibility that contents-value and coherence-value could pull in different 
directions. For example, we might imagine how disclosing to a research participant incidental 
findings of brain lesions consistent with serious illness might be distressing and undermine 
her sense of herself as a healthy person, but also offer her the opportunity to reconfigure her 
narrative around the possibility and symptoms of ill-health, thus protecting its future coherence 
and sustainability. This then demands the question of which carries greater ethical weight on 
my account – the detriment to her narrative contents or possible benefit to its coherence? I do 
not claim to have a definitive answer here. I am inclined to suggest that a self-narrative 
comprising comforting contents is not a desirable end at any cost to its concordance with 
biological states of affairs. This is because being able to develop a coherent narrative that 
permits one to navigate embodied existence is the more basic value – it is the condition upon 
which (at its most extreme) having an identity-constituting narrative at all depends. This 
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suggests that ‘true and distressing’ trumps ‘false and comforting’. But, this conclusion may be 
too swift and blunt, given the interdependence of contents and coherence noted above. Perhaps 
inevitably, the answer to this question is likely to be context-dependent – depending at least in 
part on how the information is communicated (as I shall discuss further in Chapter 9). This 
brings me to the fourth, and final, reason why it is useful to attend to the two dimensions of 
identity value.  
Influencing value and detriment 
As will be clear from what has been said so far, the identity value or detriment any particular 
kind of personal bioinformation is not a fixed property. The evidence reviewed in the 
illustrative examples suggests that this variability may be, at least in part, amenable to 
influence by the manner in which the information is presented to an individual.  
Both the contents-related and coherence-related impacts of personal bioinformation may be 
equally susceptible to this kind of influence, though each might entail somewhat different 
considerations. Contents-related value may be chiefly susceptible to particular normative 
connotations acquired through the manner of presentation. For example, couching genetic test 
results in the language of ‘mutations’ and ‘abnormalities’ may lead recipients’ to see 
themselves as impaired.813 Meanwhile, value or detriment to the coherence of the recipient’s 
identity could be influenced by what the disclosing party contributes by way of wider 
informational context and interpretive tools to support the recipient in accommodating or 
rejecting the bioinformation in ways that minimises the risk of narrative disruption. For 
example, explanation of the epistemic limitations of susceptibility testing may help to avert 
someone’s unwarranted reliance on the results in orienting her self-conception towards the 
future.814 Or a donor-conceived individual may find revelation of her conception more 
disorienting if she is not able also to access information about her donor.815 I shall address 
further the ways in which the manner of communication might influence recipients’ 
perceptions of the relevance of personal bioinformation to their identities in the following 
section and return, in Chapter 9, to consider what these observations imply for the 
responsibilities of those disclosing information. 
This brings to a close my characterisation of identity value and detriment and the implications 
of their two, interconnected, dimensions. I now wish to turn to the third and last research 
                                                             
813 See Chapter 6. 
814 See Chapter 6. 
815 See Chapter 5. 
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question for this chapter and what is, in a sense, the more basic matter of what accounts for 
our experiencing personal bioinformation as contributing or detracting from the contents or 
coherence of our self-narratives at all? That is, what factors influence whether we experience 
particular personal bioinformation as being significant to who we are?   
SECTION 4 – ACCOUNTING FOR IDENTITY SIGNIFICANCE  
I start here from the premise that identity significance is not an intrinsic feature of any 
particular kind of bioinformation; it is an interpretive matter, determined from the perspective 
of each information subject. This section concerns the question of what factors are likely to 
contribute to someone experiencing a particular kind or instance of personal bioinformation 
as being seen as sufficiently relevant or important to play a role (either valuable or detrimental) 
in the contents or coherence of her self-narrative. I shall label this quality ‘identity 
significance’. 
In this I will first enumerate the four factors that appear most likely to influence ascriptions of 
identity significance I will then address two concerns arising from my acknowledgement that 
identity significance is likely to be, to some extent, socially constructed. Unpacking the nature 
of identity significance is an essential step towards developing the ethical framework in 
Chapter 9. It highlights some of the challenges and opportunities facing those required to make 
disclosure decisions in ways that respond to the information’s potential identity impacts. It 
does so by emphasising that attributions of identity significance will vary between individuals, 
but these attributions may nevertheless sometimes be somewhat anticipatable, and amenable 
to influence by others, including potential disclosers.   
Factors contributing to identity significance  
In assessing which factors are likely to contribute to identity significance, I have drawn on the 
findings discussed in the examples in Part II and the narrative conception of identity at the 
heart of this project, as well as wider literature regarding the relationship between 
bioinformation and identity. On these bases I wish to suggest that four factors plausibly make 
considerable joint and interacting contributions to the identity-significance of a particular 
instance or kind of personal bioinformation. These are:  
i) The information subject’s existing self-narrative and personal circumstances;  
ii) The scale of what the information implies for human existence; 
iii) How authoritative and reliable the information subject perceives the bioinformation 
to be; and 





I will expand each of these here.  
i) Existing narrative and personal circumstances  
Whether someone sees, or would see, particular personal bioinformation as pertinent to her 
identity will depend to a great extent on how it relates to her existing self-narrative and the 
descriptors, plotlines, roles, relationships, concerns and values of which it comprises, and how 
she imagines this narrative unfolding into the future. This might look somewhat circular. But 
it is crucial to appreciate that internal to the very concept of narrativity is that the (potential) 
constituents of someone’s identity acquire their meaning and significance by virtue of the role 
they play in her self-narrative.816 The contribution of personal factors to identity significance 
is captured by Lori d’Agincourt-Canning’s assertion that it is not possible to understand the 
significance a BRCA test for susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer holds for someone 
without understanding how the result will impact on her relationships and relational roles 
within her family.817 Similarly, an authoritative psychiatric diagnosis may be important to 
someone’s account of who she is, precisely because it offers a way of removing imputations 
of guilt and ‘craziness’ from her existing self-narrative.  
ii) The scale of its implications for human existence 
The idea that specific categories of personal bioinformation are inherently identity-significant 
is not supportable given the evidence reviewed in the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, it does 
seem plausible that our investment in some features of our lives might transcend the 
particularity of each of our self-narratives. That is to say, because of the embodied, relational, 
rational and mortal nature of human existence, there will be some biological states of affairs 
that are likely to encroach upon our lives, and thus our self-narratives, more than others. For 
example, serious illness, perhaps especially illness that affects not only our bodies but our 
cognitive and affective capacities, will make a substantial difference to how we live and 
experience our lives. And our family relationships, roles and responsibilities also seem likely 
to play a central role in our daily lives and personal development. The suggestion here, then, 
is that personal bioinformation relating to such central or pervasive aspects of human life is 
particularly likely to be seen as significant to our identities. Illustrating this, it has been 
observed that people’s reactions to the results from genetic susceptibility testing tend to vary 
relative to the severity and nature of the condition tested for – including, its age of onset, 
amenability to treatment, the severity of its symptoms, or whether it affects mental 
                                                             
816 See Chapter 2. 
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capacities.818 This is not to claim that bioinformation with ‘big’ implications will inevitably be 
seen as identity-significant. For example, it has been observed that, despite the debilitating and 
terminal nature of the disease, some carriers of the mutation responsible for Huntington’s 
disease refuse to be defined by their carrier status.819 It is, however, to suggest that some 
ascriptions of identity significance will be widespread despite our individual differences.  
iii) Perceptions of information’s epistemic qualities   
A third factor that appears to make a difference to ascriptions of identity-significance is the 
extent to which particular bioinformation is perceived by its subject to be authoritative and 
reliable as a source of knowledge about her health, body or biological relationships.820 There 
are several indications in the illustrative chapters of this contributory factor in operation. The 
baldest of which is the importance invested by many donor-conceived individuals in 
(re)building their self-conceptions around the truth about their conceptions.821 A further 
example is provided by the accounts of patients’ attitudes to the potential for psychiatric 
neuroimaging to change the role of their mental health diagnosis in their sense of who they 
are, which appear to be intimately connected to their perceptions – albeit perceptions that are 
(at present) probably misplaced – that neuroimaging offers superior objectivity and authority 
as a diagnostic method.822  A further illustration is provided by the REVEAL study, in which 
participants’ expectations about the ways in which genetic testing for susceptibility to 
Alzheimer’s disease would alter their behaviour and risk perception were notably tempered 
once the limitations of the test in precisely or reliably pinpointing their individual risk has been 
explained to them.823 However, this example also illustrates that the relationship between 
epistemic capacities and identity significance is not all-or-nothing – with some kinds of less 
practically-focused narrative roles (such as those based on feelings of solidarity) persisted even 
when the limitations of the test results had been explained.824  
iv) Socially-constructed identity significance    
I wish to suggest that the fourth potential contribution to ascriptions of identity significance 
might come from the bioinformation arriving pre-freighted with these connotations. In the 
                                                             
818 Lock et al. (2007); Roberts et al. (2003). 
819 Konrad (2005). 
820 This example highlights that perceptions of bioinformation’s identity significance and its likely 
value to narrative coherence could diverge where information subjects do not appreciate the epistemic 
limitations of the information. 
821 See Chapter 5. 
822 See Chapter 7. 
823 Christensen et al. (2011). 





terminology introduced in Chapter 1, this is bioinformation with an identity-related 
‘interpretive pedigree’, such that it purports to speak not only to biological states of affairs, 
but who someone is. It will be helpful to unpack two possible ways in which this pedigree 
could be obtained: it might be the product of socially-pervasive constructions, or occur at the 
level of individual informational transactions.  
Socially-pervasive constructions  
The suggestion here is that some biological states of affairs have, in Jeanette Edwards’s phrase, 
been “socially activated” to have particular meanings and connotations – in the present 
context, a connotation of identity relevance.825  
One way in which this might be manifest is where ways of categorising people for healthcare 
or research purposes come to be understood as ways of describing or understanding who we 
are. As Ian Hacking observes, classifications developed by the human sciences as means of 
studying or seeking to intervene in the lives of the people thus classified do not always remain 
sequestered in the disciplines that coined them.826 They may “break free” into the wild, where 
they are taken up by those to whom they pertain, for whom they function as modes of self-
definition, or “human kinds”.827  Similarly, Nikolas Rose argues that predictive and diagnostic 
information generated by genetic science and neuroscience are widely used as tools of self-
understanding and self-development.828 And Andreas Veith holds that “genetic scientism has 
won the status of an individual and cultural hermeneutics”.829 
There is not the space to explore the mechanisms by which aspects of our biology (and thus 
the information reporting these) may come to be seen as speaking to who we are as persons, 
or providing means of self-classification. However, just taking the example of neuroscientific 
information, it is possible to find suggestions of myriad social practices – for example in the 
criminal justice system, policy, education or popular media – which (mis)use neurological 
research to explain differences between people, or behavioural, cognitive or affective 
phenomena, and thereby contribute to widespread views that findings from neuroscience can 
tell us something about our identities as persons.830 For example, Racine et al note that reports 
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of functional neuroimaging in print media commonly frame research findings in 
neuroessentialist ways, presenting the phenomena reified by their neurological correlates to be 
constitutive of who we ‘really’ are.831  
Similarly, it is widely noted that it is not possible to understand the significance of knowledge 
of donor conception to donor-conceived individuals in abstraction from the meaning assigned 
to genetic and family relationships in their cultures.832  It is suggested that, to the extent that 
donor-conceived individuals do view information about their donor origins as important to 
their identities, this may be fostered, inter alia, by the provision of assisted reproduction 
services, trends towards asserting children’s interests in knowing their biological parentage in 
family law, the popular interest in genealogy and ancestry.833 Indeed, some have posited that 
open-identity gamete donation policies that seek to respond to the possible identity-value of 
information about donor origins might themselves drive a feedback loop, reinforcing the 
perception that this information is important to donor-conceived individuals’ self-
understanding.834 
Clues that socially constructed insinuations of identity-significance do play a role in 
individuals’ attitudes towards some kinds of personal bioinformation emerge most vividly 
where distinct types of information are observed to be assigned markedly different 
significance, where the implications they carry for our health, bodies or biological 
relationships would seem to be very similar. For example, there are indications that individuals 
conceived using donor sperm tend to invest more importance in knowing about their donors, 
than those conceived using donor eggs.835 And, in contrast to other serious genetically-linked 
cancers, BRCA-linked breast and ovarian cancer have been observed to have particular power 
to “captivate”,836 and to generate biosocial activity and group affiliations.837  
Transaction-specific constructions  
In addition to the operation of wider social associations of biology and identity (and playing 
against the background of them), it is also possible that the context and manner in which 
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particular bioinformation is conveyed to an individual might be such as to invest it with an 
interpretive pedigree of identity significance (or, indeed, insignificance).  
DTC genomic testing provides a possible illustration here. The language used in the marketing 
materials, customer testimonials, and online interfaces for accessing results often implies that 
the information conveyed will tell users who they are.838 Nordgren and Juengst note that these 
services frequently play on a combination of genetic essentialism regarding identity and “the 
cachet of genetics” as a source of authoritative knowledge in appealing to customers.839 For 
example, the strapline for the 23andMe service is “Welcome to you” and its website proclaims: 
“23 pairs of chromosomes. One unique you”.840 Meanwhile, the homepage of Ancestry.com 
invites users to “discover what makes you uniquely you”.841 And Bronwyn Parry describes the 
way in which the online environments in which users share and discuss their results provide 
settings in which these users are active in fostering the meaning of their results as tools for 
“scripting the self”.842 
Ethical concerns about DTC genomics often include the lack of counselling provided to 
customers, counselling which might mitigate unqualified perceptions of identity-
significance.843 However, I would tentatively suggest that it seems possible that in clinical 
contexts, the sheer provision and tone of genetic counselling, even if non-directive, could be 
taken as conveying the identity-significance of the test results in question precisely because it 
focuses on the impacts of test results on factors such as personal resilience and fulfilment of 
familial roles.844  
The medium in which personal bioinformation is conveyed might also be pertinent to its 
investment with identity significance. For example, Joseph Dumit refers to the images derived 
from neuroimaging as “potent objects” which, because of their visual nature and apparent 
immediacy, may foster a conflation of brain and identity amongst those viewing their own 
scans.845  
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This indicates that it is not only whether bioinformation has valuable or detrimental impacts 
on an information recipient’s self-narrative that might be influenced by the context and manner 
in which the information is conveyed, but the matter of whether it has any impact at all. This 
serves to underscore that information subjects’ identities may be affected not only by whether 
they can access particular bioinformation, but how they do so. This will be a critical 
consideration in characterising the responsibilities accruing to information disclosers in 
Chapter 9. 
Concerns about socially-constructed significance  
Before taking stock of what the identification of these four possible contributory elements to 
identity significance might mean for practical questions of governing access to personal 
bioinformation, I first wish to deal with several concerns or misapprehensions about the 
potential role that I have accorded to socially-constructed significance here. The first of these 
is that social construction undermines claims to bioinformation’s identity value. The second is 
that it challenges the very idea that we are authors of our own identities.  
Does social construction undermine identity value?  
Some sceptics about the identity significance of knowledge of donor origins suggest that this 
significance is the product of “culturally dominant narratives”, and would dissolve were these 
narratives to be challenged.846 The implication is that the reality and depth of this information’s 
identity value are somehow less real for being culturally shaped. I would contend, however, 
that the contribution of social factors to ascriptions of identity significance does not inevitably 
render the identity value of the information in question illusory. I would suggest that 
scepticism of the kind just outlined is based on two misconceptions. The first is that if social 
construction is a factor, then it must be the only factor. The second is that any interests in 
accessing bioinformation must be grounded in the inherent identity value of that information. 
The account of value and significance I have outlined in this chapter challenges each of these 
assumptions. First, I have suggested that ascriptions of significance may have multiple 
sources, so may transcend the vagaries of, for example, popular genetic essentialism. 
Secondly, it locates the value of knowing in the instrumental roles that the information could 
play in its subject’s self-narrative, and this value is not necessarily diminished just because it 
occupies these roles (in part) for socially contingent reasons. Acknowledging that identity 
                                                             





significance may be somewhat socially constructed is not in itself a reason to dismiss 
individuals’ potentially considerable interests in accessing it. 
Does social construction undermine self-authorship? 
The question here is whether the role of wider social narratives about what aspects of our 
biology are relevant to who we are in our own ascriptions of identity significance undermines 
our authorship of our own identity narratives?  
Of course, it is conceivable that the power of socially constructed identity significance is such 
that the information subject is unable to resist its effects on her self-conception. Indeed, the 
same might hold if it coveys devastating news about her health. However, it is unwarranted to 
hold that we are always passive in respect of the ways that we interpret and use the personal 
bioinformation that we encounter, or that individuals cannot adopt a critical stance with respect 
to what it means for them.847 For example, as noted in Chapter 7, despite the prevalence of 
‘neuroexplanations’ for aspects of our lives intimately connected with the self, Pickersgill et 
al. found that participants in their study displayed mixed and ambivalent attitudes to the role 
of their brain in their subjectivity.848 And some actively resisted defining themselves in 
neurobiological terms, choosing instead to attribute their experiences to social and 
environmental factors. The authors conclude that:  
“Neuroscientific concepts compete with, integrate into and only occasionally 
fully supplant, pre-existing ideas about subjectivity.”849 
This signals that we ought not to be too swift in assuming that everyone’s narrative self-
conceptions are inevitably subsumed by socially pervasive ascriptions of identity significance 
to particular aspects of our biological lives.850  
A further reason why concern is misplaced that socially constructed identity significance 
undermines self-authorship is that the conception of narrative identity, on which this project 
is based, does not depend on an individual constructing her self-narrative in isolation (see 
Chapter 2). On the contrary, the language and forms of self-understanding that we share with 
those around us and that are common within the culture or “tradition” in which we live are 
essential tools in our capacities to articulate and make sense of who we are.851  
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A related anxiety might be raised here – perhaps particularly by those of a Foucauldian bent – 
that socially constructed identity significance facilitates the colonisation of our self-narratives 
by the knowledge claims of the biomedical sciences.852 I would submit, however, that the 
implication that any such ‘colonisation’ is invariably problematic is insufficiently nuanced. I 
would hold that it is positively advantageous to incorporate empirically robust understanding 
of one’s embodied state, dispositions and relationships into one’s self-narratives insofar as this 
helps us to construct identities that are resilient to and help us to navigate embodied existence. 
What is of concern, however, is if those whose skills properly extend to interpreting matters 
of biomedical significance, overstep their epistemic authority by purporting to know, and to 
tell us, which bioinformation defines who we are and if they do so in ways that inhibit our own 
critical and interpretive role in using this information.  
Practical implications of this view of identity significance  
It is my contention that an individual’s perception that particular bioinformation is significant 
on any particular occasion – meaning that the information has, or would have an impact (either 
beneficial or detrimental) on her self-narrative – is attributable to a combination of the four 
factors listed above (in variable proportions).853 Highlighting the multifaceted nature of this 
quality has practical implications for the governance of access to personal bioinformation. 
First, it is instructive as to some of the opportunities, obstacles and risks confronting those 
faced with disclosure decisions in anticipating whether disclosure would impact on the 
information subject’s identity. The account I have offered here cautions against too swift an 
extrapolation from paradigm examples of identity-significant bioinformation – or the 
illustrative examples I have provided in this project – on simple category grounds. For 
example, it cannot be safely assumed that all genetic information or even all information about 
genetic disease susceptibility will be accorded the same significance. Rather it is necessary to 
attend to the possible constellation of all four factors.  
The fact that amongst these four factors are the particular narrative contexts of individual 
information subjects undoubtedly presents a challenge to anticipating ascriptions of 
significance in every instance. However, this four-factor account of significance also indicates 
that this maze of variability is not without signposts. Specifically, both the socially-ascribed 
significance of the biological state of affairs in question and the scale of its impact on any 
                                                             
852 Sulik (2009). See also Rose (2007). 
853 These four factors might not capture all possible influences. Empirical research would be useful for 
identifying others. As it stands, though, this list is sufficient to highlight that identity-significance is a 





human life will be discernible to potential disclosers, and may therefore provide clues (albeit 
broad ones that might not be borne out in every circumstance) of bioinformation that is 
particularly likely to be seen as significant.  
The second way this account of identity significance may be of practical utility is that it 
highlights the opportunities for potential disclosers to influence (for good or ill) the extent to 
which recipients see particular bioinformation as significant. They may do so through what 
they themselves communicate about its relevance to the recipient’s identity and in their 
explanation of its epistemic qualities. I shall return in Chapter 9 to consider how each of these 
insights feeds into ethical information disclosure practices and policies. I shall now take stock 
of the groundwork that this chapter has laid for that final chapter and my ethical framework. 
SECTION 5: CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have sought to bring together the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 
3 with the examples considered in Part II, with the aim of refining the former in the light of 
the evidence of how information subjects’ view and respond to personal bioinformation, while 
also extracting some broad lessons from the particularity and detail of the illustrative 
examples. In doing so I have addressed three questions. What refinements to my central 
normative argument are suggested by the evidence of the illustrative examples? What does it 
mean to say that bioinformation is either valuable or detrimental to our identity development? 
And, what are the factors that contribute to this information being seen as significant to who 
we are, such that it has valuable or detrimental impacts on our identities at all? 
My aim in addressing these questions has in part been to develop a clearer normative 
conception of the relationship between personal bioinformation and identity – one that both 
accords with the available evidence of how information subjects respond to this information 
and allows us to understand how and why it is that bioinformation might contribute to the 
development of our self-narratives going better or worse. But my aims extend beyond 
conceptual clarity. The analyses I have offered in this chapter provide four insights that are 
particularly useful for the purposes of developing my ethical framework in the next chapter. 
First and most fundamentally, I aim to have demonstrated that personal bioinformation can 
indeed impact on our self-narratives in a range of positive and negative ways, and that these 
impacts are neither esoteric nor trivial. These impacts may affect the character of the 
constituent parts of our accounts of who we are and the way these stories are bound together 
and function as coherent wholes. It is important to recognise both of these dimensions of 
bioinformation’s potential identity impacts in order to develop a rounded picture of our 
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information-related identity interests and the ethical significance of what is at stake in being 
able to develop, maintain or restore a satisfying and coherent self-narrative.   
Secondly, whether any particular kind of bioinformation plays a valuable or detrimental role 
in our self-narratives, or none at all, is likely to vary between individuals and contexts. This is 
an important observation in itself and one that should be reflected in any recommendations 
about managing access to personal bioinformation in light of potential identity interests. But 
it also presents challenges to those responsible for disclosure decisions in determining when 
and how potential recipients’ identities might be affected. However, as the next two points 
suggest, these challenges are not insurmountable. 
Thirdly, the analyses I have offered in this chapter suggest some ways that potential disclosers 
might identify factors contributing to the value, detriment or significance that transcend 
specific circumstances and thus navigate the variability of identity impacts. For example, false, 
unreliable or meaningless bioinformation is unlikely to be valuable to our identities and may 
indeed be detrimental. And it may be possible to discern, for example, where widespread social 
ascriptions of identity significance, or the scale what the information implies for any human 
life make it more likely that the bioinformation would have identity impacts. 
Fourthly, it is apparent that both identity value and significance are malleable properties. The 
preceding discussion highlights several ways in which potential disclosers might themselves 
play a part in shaping the nature and extent of bioinformation’s impacts on recipients. For 
example, by supporting recipients’ understanding of the epistemic qualities of the information 
conveyed, or by refraining from pre-empting the recipient’s own assessment of its identity 
significance. This point highlights that it is not just whether someone can access personal 
bioinformation that matters, but also the context and manner in which they do so. This is a key 
theme to be developed in the next chapter. 
This chapter offers insights into the importance of appreciating the ethical significance of our 
(not) being able to access personal bioinformation, and of the opportunities and capacities of 
those who hold this information to help meet our needs. My task in the next chapter is to 
develop these insights further in applying them to the development of an ethical framework 





CHAPTER 9: AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
PROTECTING IDENTITY INTERESTS IN PRACTICE 
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters I aim to have demonstrated that information relating to our health, 
bodies and biological relationships can impact in various ways, which are neither trivial nor 
obscure, on the coherence and contents of our identity narratives. The proposition with which 
I started this project was that policies and practices related to information subjects’ access to 
their personal bioinformation ought to take account of their potential identity-related interests. 
In this final chapter my intention is to bring together the arguments and observations from 
those chapters to address the questions of what is means to protect those interests and how 
protection may be achieved in practice. To this end, this chapter will provide the final step in 
answering the third of my four headline questions from Chapter 1: what are the nature and 
scope of our identity-related interests in accessing personal bioinformation? Building on 
this, I will then address the fourth of those questions: what ethical responsibilities for 
disclosure accrue to those who hold personal bioinformation about us? The answers to 
these questions will then provide the basis for the ethical framework for guiding information 
disclosure decisions that I propose at the end of this chapter. 
In Chapter 8 I characterised the ways in which personal bioinformation may be valuable or 
detrimental to individuals’ construction of their own identities and the kinds of factors that 
influence these impacts. My first task in this chapter is to make the conclusions of these 
arguments concrete by identifying three specific interests relating to information access 
(Section 2). I will demonstrate that these identity interests are neither reducible to nor 
coextensive with those interests more commonly invoked in respect of access to 
bioinformation, and therefore warrant attention in their own right (Section 3). Reframing my 
discussion in terms of interests is the first step in grounding the practical focus of the current 
chapter in which I turn my attention to the nature of responsibilities relating to information 
disclosure and to the kinds of ethical considerations that policies, practices and the law must 
take into account if they are to respond appropriately to the impacts of personal bioinformation 
on identity.  
I will propose three broad responsibilities relating to information disclosure, corresponding to 
our three interests relating to information access. I argue that these responsibilities arise 
because of the strength of our interests in developing and making sense of our identities and 
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because those who could provide us with bioinformation about ourselves are in a position to 
promote or undermine these interests (Section 4). Nevertheless, I hold that these 
responsibilities are pro tanto – conditional on the absence of strong countervailing interests 
and the practicability and propriety of discharging them within particular contexts and 
relationships (Section 5). A key contribution of this project is to demonstrate that attending to 
the identity impacts of personal bioinformation emphasises that the manner of disclosure is 
just as ethically significant as the question of whether or not to disclose. Indeed, an inability 
to disclose in a way that supports identity development could in some instances recommend 
not doing so at all. In Section 6 I unpack the principles and practical considerations that are 
integral to discharging the responsibility to disclose bioinformation in a way that supports 
recipients’ capacities to develop coherent and satisfying accounts of who they are. 
I shall close this chapter by bringing together the preceding characterisation of identity 
interests, associated responsibilities, and recommendations in an ethical framework intended 
to guide practical decisions about disclosure of personal bioinformation (Section 7) and 
consider what this framework implies for responsibilities in respect of managing access to the 
three categories of bioinformation considered in my three illustrative chapters (Section 8). 
SECTION 2: THE NATURE AND STRENGTH OF IDENTITY INTERESTS  
This section picks up the baton of what I have said in Chapter 8 about the nature of personal 
bioinformation’s identity value or detriment. Here I reframe the argument in terms of interests 
pertaining to information access, and specify the nature of these interests with a view to serving 
the practical policy-focused aims of this chapter. In this section I will first identify our three 
core interests in respect of access to bioinformation about ourselves and their foundation in 
our basic interest in narrative self-constitution. I will then clarify four features of the nature 
and scope of these interests that will be relevant to my subsequent discussion. Finally I will 
indicate the further steps to be taken in this thesis to demonstrate how recognising identity 
interests makes a concrete difference to the ethical landscape. 
When I talk of interests here, what I mean is that an individual has a stake in a particular kind 
of outcome. The outcome that is the central concern of this thesis is that of developing, 
maintaining or restoring a coherent and satisfying self-narrative. The bioinformation-related 
interests I specify below hold to the extent that access to bioinformation serves this outcome, 
or fails to do so. Unlike some kinds of interests, which may be predicated on individual 
preferences, in this thesis I take it that our interest in the coherence and tone of our self-
narratives is something that is common to all of us in virtue of the kinds of beings we are. This 





rather than rights for two reasons. First, I take it that interests are conceptually prior to rights. 
Characterising the nature of interests is, therefore, the more immediate and illuminating task, 
because this is where the values, objects of value, activities or relationships at stake are 
detailed.854 Secondly, rights imply inevitable correlated duties. In this chapter I will argue that 
identity interests do indeed give rise to responsibilities. Nevertheless, these responsibilities do 
not inevitably follow in all circumstances, and I do not want to short-circuit discussion of why 
and when they may do so by using the language of entitlement. 
Bioinformation-related identity interests 
On the basis of the arguments presented in the previous chapter I propose that we have the 
following three interests in respect of our access to our own personal bioinformation: 
I. An interest in being able to access personal bioinformation that would contribute 
to our development, maintenance or restoration of a coherent and satisfying self-
narrative.  
 
II. An interest in being protected from exposure to personal bioinformation that 
would undermine our development, maintenance or restoration of a coherent 
and satisfying self-narrative.  
And, given that both our perception of the identity-significance of particular personal 
bioinformation and the extent to which it has valuable or detrimental impacts on the contents 
and coherence of our self-narratives are interpretive matters, subject to influence by the way 
in which it is conveyed to us, I would further suggest that each of the above entails: 
III. An interest in receiving personal bioinformation in a manner that supports us in 
using it in, or excluding it from, our development, maintenance or restoration of 
coherent and satisfying self-narratives.  
I shall term these, our ‘bioinformation-related identity interests’ (or ‘identity interests’ for 
brevity). My contention is that they are all significant interests that warrant serious ethical 
attention when deciding whether and how to disclose personal bioinformation to those whom 
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it concerns.855 They warrant this attention because they are derived from and serve the more 
fundamental interest: 
An interest in developing, maintaining and restoring a coherent and satisfying self-
narrative (which I shall refer to as ‘the basic identity interest’).  
Claims to the strength and basic nature of this interest lie in the argument that being unable to 
develop, maintain or restore a reasonably coherent identity narrative threatens one’s capacities 
for leading a full, meaningful and practically engaged human existence (see Chapter 2).856 This 
is an argument that I have refined in Chapter 8 by observing that, although a coherence is a 
condition for developing an identity-constituting narrative, we are neither indifferent to the 
qualities of the contents that make up our self-narratives, nor can our attitudes to these contents 
be neatly quarantined from our abilities to make sense of and comfortably inhabit coherent 
accounts of who we are. Therefore, our identity interests are also engaged where personal 
bioinformation contributes to or detracts from narratives that are, as far as possible, satisfying, 
rather than alienating or distressing. The strength of our bioinformation-related identity 
interests is derived from the fact that, and the extent to which, they serve our basic identity 
interest. 
Features of our bioinformation-related identity interests  
There are four observations I would wish to make about the nature of bioinformation-related 
interests before moving on to consider what they imply for others’ responsibilities.  
First, these are interests held by an individual in virtue of her role as the author of her own 
identity-constituting self-narrative. However, while individual, they are not individualistic. 
We do not and cannot build our identities alone (see Chapter 2). And the significance and 
value of particular bioinformation to our identities is influenced by the interpretation and 
activities of those around us (see Chapter 8). Moreover, the way in which particular 
bioinformation engages someone’s identity interests may well not be separable from the 
meaning it has for others around her, or how its disclosure affects them and her relationships 
with them. In this thesis I focus on how individual interests should be addressed, while 
remaining aware that these will often be interdependent with, or compete with, those of others. 
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Secondly, whether particular personal bioinformation is valuable to someone’s identity in any 
particular case is a contingent matter dependent on the individual information subject and the 
wider circumstances in which it is revealed. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from 
this that her identity interests in accessing this information in any given situation are 
themselves weak, just because the information might not be similarly valuable to someone 
else. Where the bioinformation in question would impact on someone’s account of who she is, 
or capacity to give an intelligible account at all; it fulfils a particular, non-fungible, role in the 
complex, interwoven whole of her self-narrative. Its contribution is, therefore, not trivial. 
Thirdly, as described in Chapter 2, narrative coherence admits of degree. A failure to meet 
bioinformation-related interests on any particular occasion will not necessarily entail a total 
loss of identity. But, such a catastrophic outcome is not necessary for the basic identity interest 
still to be harmed and to be a legitimate matter of ethical concern, insofar as the impacts of 
(not) accessing the bioinformation means that the individual has difficulty making sense of 
who she is and what she values and in navigating her embodied existence. As this implies, 
some failures to meet identity-related interests will be more serious, with more far-reaching or 
enduring consequences than others.  
Fourthly, according to this account, the development of a coherent and satisfying self-narrative 
is a constant work-in-progress, subject to external influence and impacts, re-evaluations and 
reinterpretations. So our associated interests are ever-present and ever-evolving. 
Realising the practical implications of this thesis 
My aim in this section has been to bring to a conclusion my argument, built over the preceding 
chapters, that the matter of whether we are able to access personal bioinformation, and to do 
so in manner that supports us in using it constructively, can impact on our self-conceptions in 
ways that can make a real difference to our capacities to construct and inhabit our sense of 
who we are, and thus to the richness and quality of our lives. In the preceding chapters I aim 
to have demonstrated that many different kinds of bioinformation could have such impacts in 
a wide range of settings and circumstances. 
A significant tranche of the practical value of my contribution, therefore, lies simply in 
highlighting, first, that information subjects’ identity interests are not trivial and, secondly, 
that they are potentially widely engaged. These two insights are valuable in themselves 
because they counsel against complacency that, in any given situation, provided the clinical 
utility of the bioinformation, or the recipient’s expressed wishes, or other parties’ privacy 
interests, have each been taken into account, the relevant ethical landscape has been 
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exhaustively mapped. My contention is that, if identity interests have not also been accounted 
for, then there remains an important gap. These interests could either add grist to, or provide 
significant countervailing reasons against, the ethical case for (non)disclosure.  
In order for this observation to have practical teeth and make a difference to disclosure policies 
and practices, however, two things need to hold. First, it must be possible for those who control 
our access to our personal bioinformation to know when identity interests are engaged and 
should be taken into account. I will return to deal with that question in Section 4. Secondly, it 
must be the case that responding to identity interests would change something about 
deliberations and practices of information disclosure decisions. When it comes to laws and 
policies governing our access to bioinformation about ourselves, and ethical debates about 
these provisions, a number of interests (other than those in identity development) are 
commonly invoked as reasons to provide or withhold access. In the next section I will outline 
how the identity interests proposed here differ from, or relate to, the existing suite of interests 
more commonly invoked in this context. This is an important step because it will make it clear 
what attention to interests grounded in a narrative conception of identity adds to the current 
ethical landscape and where attending to these might recommend a different course of action.  
SECTION 3: DISTINGUISHING IDENTITY INTERESTS FROM OTHER INTERESTS  
Here I will consider the relationship between identity interests (as characterised in this thesis) 
and five other interests that are currently commonly invoked in relation to information 
subjects’ access to bioinformation, either in existing legal or policy provisions, or in the 
bioethical literature.857 These are interests pertaining to:  
i) Avoidance of distress or psychological harm;  
ii) Health protection;  
iii) Personal utility;  
iv) Developing or exercising autonomy; and  
v) Privacy protection. 
There is insufficient space to characterise the nature or ethical basis of each of these in any 
detail here. My intention is to sketch how the identity-related interests I am proposing intersect 
with or diverge from each, with the aim of indicating were identity interests would not be met 
by attention to these other interests alone.   
 
                                                             





i) Distress or psychological harm  
Avoidance of distress, or more strongly, psychological harm, is sometimes invoked as grounds 
for not providing individuals with information about themselves. For example, prevention of 
unnecessary anxiety may be considered grounds for not offering genetic tests that lack clear 
clinical utility.858  Under UK data protection law a data subject may request that her personal 
data is not processed on the grounds that this would cause her “substantial distress”.859 And 
there is an exception to subjects’ legal entitlements to access their medical records if it is 
judged that it would cause “serious harm” to their mental health.860  
Someone may indeed experience the detrimental impacts of access to bioinformation on her 
identity as distressing, but I have argued that the significance of these impacts are not reducible 
to this distress. They extend well beyond this to encompass our very abilities to understand 
who we are and what we value. Furthermore, as I have argued in the preceding chapters, 
distress is neither straightforwardly correlated with identity detriment, nor its absence with 
identity value. Bioinformation that someone actively seeks on identity grounds could 
nevertheless be distressing to receive (for example learning of the risk of serious disease).861 
Conversely, as I argued with respect to knowledge of donor origins, identity interests may be 
harmed even if there is no synchronous psychological harm (for example, where false 
bioinformation places the future coherence of someone’s self-narrative in probable, non-trivial 
jeopardy).862 Therefore, policies or practices that simply seek to protect us from situations in 
which (in)access to personal bioinformation would cause distress will not, on their own, meet 
all possible identity interests.  
ii) Health protection 
When it comes to provision of bioinformation to information subjects in healthcare or research 
contexts, disclosure is often conditional upon the information having ‘clinical utility’ – the 
capacity to inform healthcare-related decisions. For example, the Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for 
Health Purposes, holds that clinical utility is “an essential criterion” offering a genetic test.863 
Similarly, the UK National Screening Committee recommends that screening programmes 
                                                             
858 Roberts (2012). 
859 Data Protection Act 1998, s.10(1). 
860 Data Protection (Subject Access Modification) (Health) Order 2000, s.5. 
861 See Chapter 6. 
862 See Chapter 5. 
863 Council of Europe (2008) Article 6.    
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should only be offered if they support reproductive decision-making or are effective in 
reducing mortality or morbidity.864 And the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) ethical research guidelines recommend that:  
“In general… life-saving information and data of immediate clinical utility 
involving a significant health problem must be offered for disclosure, whereas 
information of uncertain scientific validity or meaning would not qualify for 
communication to the participant.”865 
I have indicated in the preceding chapters that, although some identity interests may be 
predicated upon the bioinformation’s clinical utility, identity interests are neither equivalent 
nor wholly reducible to interests in protecting or improving one’s health.866 Identity concerns 
may run contrary to such interests (as where someone would prefer not to know about her risk 
of cancer), or be present where no health-related interest is served (as where someone wants 
to know if she has genetic siblings, or wishes to participate in genetic research for reasons of 
solidarity). The key implication of this for information access policies and practices is that it 
challenges any assumption that assessments of the information’s clinical utility exhaust all 
possible ethically relevant reasons for providing personal bioinformation. And, as I have 
argued, although identity-related considerations may not be a matter of life or death, they 
protect basic elements of a rich and fulfilling human life and, as such, they are capable of 
giving health-related interests a run for their money in terms of ethical significance. 
iii) Personal utility   
In the bioethical literature, it is increasingly common to encounter suggestions that ‘personal 
utility’ could justify access, for example, to individually-relevant research findings or to 
genetic test results.867 Personal utility is often only loosely defined in terms of information that 
the individual might find useful, fun, or simply be curious about, despite its lack of clinical 
utility.868 Some authors include unspecified identity-related value.869  
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I have argued elsewhere that the kind of identity value I am proposing here could (with some 
provisos) be considered a species of personal utility – one that would add ethical weight to 
claims to utility.870 And, in principle, policies that would permit information access on grounds 
of personal utility might serve interests in accessing identity-valuable bioinformation. 
However, it is not clear the extent to which such policies already operate in healthcare or 
research settings (outwith commercial contexts such as direct-to-consumer genomics).871 
Moreover, providing bioinformation solely on the basis of its personal utility (where this is 
simply taken as synonymous with fulfilling curiosity or a desire to know) could fail to protect 
recipients’ identity interests by supplying false or unreliable information, or failing to attend 
to how the manner in which it is disclosed affects its meaning or significance to recipients. A 
more refined, normative conception of personal utility might perhaps meet these concerns. 872 
This thesis could contribute to such a conception. 
iv) Autonomy – three kinds 
Where autonomy-related interests are invoked in relation to (in)access to our personal 
bioinformation, this could refer to any one of three different kinds of interests or principles:  
a) An interest in receiving bioinformation to inform a discrete healthcare-related, 
personal or practical choice; 
b) Respecting an individual’s choice about which bioinformation she does (not) want to 
receive; or  
c) An interest in being able to access bioinformation that supports the development of 
autonomy where this is understood as a global capacity for self-determination.  
I shall compare each of these with the identity interests I am proposing. 
a) Informing discrete choices 
This permutation has been largely dealt with under the previous two headings in which I have 
maintained that identity interests are not coextensive with those in having access to 
information that would allow us to make healthcare-related or personal choices. One thing that 
                                                             
870 E. Postan (2016). "Defining Ourselves: Personal Bioinformation as a Tool of Narrative Self-
Conception" Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 13(1): 133-51. 
871 One example of information provision decoupled from clinical utility (though not explicitly 
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whole-body imaging were reported to participants if these revealed “potentially serious” health 
impacts even if these were not clinically actionable. UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council, 
'UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council Review' (2009), p.9. 
872 As noted in Chapter 8, Bunnik et al. (2014) offer a persuasive counterargument to indiscriminate 
ascriptions of personal utility.  
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remains to be said is that, according to my account, our identity interests in accessing 
information extend far beyond desires to use this information in making discrete, identifiable, 
imminent choices. Identity interests may be engaged where there is no particular practical 
choice to be made and where receipt does not directly lead to obvious or immediate action – 
for example, where the information is valued because it allows the recipient to reinterpret her 
past experiences or revise her values and moral outlook.    
b) Respecting individual choices about information access  
To some extent this second autonomy-related permutation has also been covered by the 
discussion of personal utility. I shall unpack the relationship between bioinformation-related 
identity interests and choice a little further here.  
Several legal instruments make an information subject’s choice ‘(not) to know’ the basis for 
information access. For example, the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
provides that “[e]veryone is entitled to know any information collected about his health. 
However the wishes of an individual not to be so informed shall be observed.”873 Meanwhile, 
UK data protection law entitles information subjects to access their personal data without 
giving specific reasons for wishing to do so (although there are exemptions to this 
entitlement).874  
Arguments for the ‘right to know’ based on “informational self-determination” are also made 
in the bioethics literature.875 However, such arguments notoriously struggle to account for what 
should be done, or why non-disclosure might be wrong, when an information subject does not 
know the information exists.876 Moreover, as I shall go on to argue in this chapter, there is no 
necessary connection between an information subjects’ choice to know something and whether 
that information serves her identity interests. Perhaps most obviously, an individual’s choices 
(not) to know and her identity interests do not necessarily coincide if the information she 
desires is false or unreliable.877 And the manner and context in which information is conveyed 
could also be critical to its identity impacts. So approaches that seek solely to respect 
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someone’s choices (not) to know could harm identity interests. I discuss the relationship 
between identity value and choice further in Sections 5 below. 
c) Supporting the capacity for autonomy 
There is indeed an intimate relationship between bioinformation-related identity interests (as 
I have framed them) and the interest in developing autonomy, where this is understood in the 
“thick” sense of a broad capacity for critical reflection on one’s motives and “working out our 
projects in the world”.878 According to my argument, identity interests are rooted in being able 
to develop the kind of self-narrative that supports the capacity for autonomy understood in this 
thick sense.879 One difference is that I do not take autonomy to be as the only valuable capacity 
supported. A coherent self-narrative also underpins, inter alia, being in a position to have a 
clear sense of who one is and what one values, being invested in one’s own past and future, 
and in our commitments to projects and to other people. To unpack further distinctions, it is 
necessary to look more closely at the kinds of information and circumstances in which 
autonomy-related interests in (not) knowing are understood to bite. Inevitably, these vary 
between their different instantiations in law and the literature. 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides an entitlement to 
“practical and effective” access to one’s own medical records.880 Medical data are held to be 
of “fundamental importance” for the right to respect for private and family life.881 This right 
is intimately connected to the protection of autonomy in the ECHR jurisprudence.882 However, 
this entitlement alone would not guarantee protection of identity interests. Rights under Article 
8 are not absolute; interference may be justified if lawful and necessary for the protection of 
other rights and specified interests.883 Moreover, medical records represent only a subset of 
the kinds of personal bioinformation that, I have argued, can engage our identity interests. 
There is also a close connection between provision of medical information and autonomy in 
UK negligence law. Several cases in the past two decades have found clinicians negligent for 
failing to provide information about health or reproductive matters, which would have allowed 
the patient to exercise her autonomy.884 In these, autonomy has been construed as extending 
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beyond making discrete treatment choices, to having the opportunity to deliberate in self-
expressive and self-constituting ways.885  It is unclear whether this signals the emergence of a 
stand-alone harm-to-autonomy tort.886 However, insofar as these cases pertain specifically to 
provision of health-related information in contexts of medical misfortune, they would be 
unlikely to protect the full scope of the identity interests that I have proposed. Furthermore, a 
recent judgment has adopted a restrictive interpretation of what is “fair, just and reasonable” 
in determining the scope of a clinician’s duty of care in respect of the provision of health-
related genetic information to genetic relatives.887 The consequence of that judgment is that a 
failure to supply information of personal significance to a family member would not be found 
negligent if this would involve breaching the confidentiality of the patient who was the 
principle source of the bioinformation.888 I do not seek to argue that identity interests are 
immune to being weighed against competing interests (see Section 5 below). Nevertheless, by 
highlighting the potential strength of identity interests, and the ethical responsibilities of those 
who hold potentially identity significant information about us (see Section 4 below), my 
analysis in this thesis could potentially contribute to assessment both of what constitutes ‘fair, 
just and reasonable’ when determining the scope of duty of care and of the expected standard 
of care in such circumstances.  
Moving from specific legal provisions to a more theoretical footing, positing a connection 
between autonomy and access to personal bioinformation demands the question of whether 
there is a straightforwardly positive correlation between receiving bioinformation and realising 
one’s capacity for self-determination. The bioethical literature relating to this question (usually 
in the context of genetic information) is too large to do justice to here,889 but it will be 
instructive briefly to compare what my account entails with two contrasting answers. 
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One kind of argument, as proposed by Jurgen Husted, holds that imposition of unsought 
personal bioinformation is inherently inimical to autonomy and to autonomous self-
development.890 In contrast, my account recognises that unsought bioinformation could be 
detrimental to our self-narratives, but that is not necessarily so. Indeed, I would suggest that 
Husted’s position is both premised on an implausibly individualistic conception of autonomy 
and sets an unattainably high bar for achieving autonomy or self-creation in a world in which 
we act with and amongst others, and are perpetually assailed by unsought information. 
According to the present account, our identity interests lie not in the impossible goal of 
maintaining an undisturbed self-narrative, but in being able to interpret shifting experiences 
and averting serious and enduring disruption.  
My position can also be distinguished from the inverse position which holds that ignorance of 
potentially decision-guiding personal bioinformation (even if unsought) undermines one’s 
capacity for autonomy. For example (referring specifically to genetic information) John Harris 
and Kirsty Keywood argue that: 
“…where the individual is ignorant of information that bears upon rational life 
choices she is not in a position to be self-governing. If I lack information, for 
example about how long my life is likely to continue I cannot make rational plans 
for the rest of my life.”891 
On this basis the authors hold that an autonomy-based interest in ‘not knowing’ genetic 
information is incoherent.892 My own position overlaps with this position to the extent that I 
recognise that identity interests (and by association, those in developing one’s capacity for 
self-governance) could indeed sometimes be served by receiving unsought bioinformation. 
But I would deny that positing an identity-linked interest in not being exposed to particular 
bioinformation is internally contradictory. Maintenance of a desirable and coherent identity 
does not entail exposing oneself to, let alone incorporating, as many facts about one’s body, 
health or biological relationships as possible. As emphasised in Chapter 2, narrativity is 
necessarily a selective process. What matters is the intelligibility of the resultant self-narrative. 
And I would hold that, while this could be jeopardised by an absence of information, it could 
equally be threatened by information that undermines a valued narrative thread, or by 
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attempted factual completism which inhibits our ability to make sense of what we do know 
about ourselves or to establish priorities. 
In addition to the distinctions I have drawn above, what each of these conceptions of the 
relationship between autonomy and bioinformation again appears to neglect is that the extent 
and way in which personal bioinformation impacts on our capacity for self-governance and 
self-development may be shaped as much by the manner in which it is communicated and how 
the information subject then interprets it, as by the sheer fact of disclosure. This highlights the 
inadequacy of framing the debate simply in terms of the ‘right’ (not) to know.    
v) Privacy  
Privacy interests can provide grounds in law for withholding personal information from an 
individual, if doing so would infringe someone else’s privacy.893 Graeme Laurie observes, the 
information subject’s own privacy does not appear to have been used as a legal basis for 
protecting her own so-called ‘right not to know’ information about herself.894 Nevertheless, 
Laurie argues that protection of privacy – understood specifically as a metaphorically spatial 
“state of (psychological) separateness from others” – could in principle provide the rationale 
for an initial, though not unassailable, presumption against imposing unknown unsought 
genetic information on someone.895 Laurie suggests that privacy derives its value from other 
interests that it protects. One candidate he proposes is that privacy serves a “…valuable 
instrumental role … in creating space to develop one’s own sense of identity and 
personality.”896 
However, although some conceptions of identity development might support a presumption 
against invading privacy,897 the account I have offered here does not. Narrative self-
constitution, in this thesis, does not depend on a state of separateness. First, as outlined in the 
preceding sub-section, unsought information may well serve our identity interests. Secondly, 
narrative self-constitution is inherently a relational undertaking, dependent on interaction, 
negotiations and collaboration with others (see Chapter 2). Disclosure of unknown unsought 
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bioinformation is contrary to a recipient’s identity interests if it is detrimental to the coherence 
or contents of her self-narrative, not because it invades a state of separateness. In Section 6 
below I shall consider how others could support the development of our identities in the ways 
they provide personal bioinformation.  
In this section I have indicated that attending to identity interests – conceived of as those 
supporting the development of a coherent, satisfying self-narrative – would indeed bring 
something new to the ethical landscape regarding information subjects’ access to their own 
personal bioinformation. They are neither reducible to nor coextensive with the other interests 
that are prominent in legal, policy or bioethical defences of information subjects’ interests in 
(not) knowing.  Furthermore, the ‘other interests’ considered in this section tend to be invoked 
as grounds for or against information disclosure tout court. As I will go on to unpack in the 
next section, meeting identity-related interests extends beyond this to the manner and 
interpretive context in which the information is conveyed. In the remaining sections of this 
chapter my aim is to outline the basis and scope of the corresponding ethical responsibilities 
held by those who hold and control our access to our personal bioinformation.  
SECTION 4: THE ETHICAL BASIS FOR IDENTITY-RELATED RESPONSIBILITIES  
As will be apparent from the examples in Part II of this thesis and the analysis of identity value 
and detriment in Chapter 8, the ways in which identity interests are engaged will vary widely 
between different kinds of personal bioinformation, individuals and contexts. My intention in 
the remaining sections is, therefore, not to make broad legal or policy recommendations, but 
rather to offer suggestions about the source and nature of the responsibilities that might inform 
these practical considerations. The responsibilities I am concerned with here are ethical, rather 
than legal, ones. However, they could be useful in assessing the reasonable extent of legal 
responsibilities.  
In this section I will first outline what I take to be the broad shape of the ethical responsibilities 
that fall to those who hold our personal bioinformation. I will then outline the way in which 
these responsibilities fall within a relatively modest requirement to act beneficently. Finally, I 
will address one of the key challenges facing those seeking to protect the identity interests of 
others – knowing when and how these interests are engaged. 
Broad responsibilities relating to information disclosure  
Given the wide range of contexts in which personal bioinformation might be generated, and 
the fact that we share genetic bioinformation with family members, a wide range of actors may 
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be in a position to provide us with personal bioinformation. This thesis is, therefore, not only 
concerned with responsibilities that accrue by reason of professional or administrative roles. 
It is concerned with ethical responsibilities that could fall to clinicians, researchers, regulators, 
institutions, family members, and commercial actors such as DTC testing services. I shall 
return in Section 5 to consider how various factors might vary the extent of the responsibilities 
that fall to different kinds of actors. 
I will argue over this and the next two sections that those who hold our personal bioinformation 
have the following three broad responsibilities, corresponding to the three interests outlined in 
Section 2:  
I. To provide information subjects with opportunities to access personal 
bioinformation that could contribute to their development, maintenance or 
restoration of coherent and satisfying self-narratives; 
 
II. To protect information subjects from exposure to personal bioinformation that 
could be detrimental to their development, maintenance or restoration of 
coherent and satisfying self-narratives; and 
 
III. When offering or disclosing bioinformation that is likely to be identity-
significant, to do so in a manner that supports information subjects in using it in, 
or excluding it from, their development, maintenance or restoration of coherent 
and satisfying self-narratives.  
I shall refine this broad sketch further over the following three sections. As I will unpack in 
Section 5, I take these to be pro tanto responsibilities, meaning that they will not hold where 
there are sufficiently strong grounds for acting otherwise.898 I will detail what is entailed by 
‘supportive manner’ under the third responsibility in Section 6. In Section 7, I will bring 
together the analyses of this chapter to propose an ethical framework for guiding decisions 
about disclosure of personal bioinformation so that they take due account of potential identity 
interests.   
My first step, however, is to clarify what I see as the ethical basis for the three responsibilities 
above. 
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The ethical foundation for these responsibilities  
Given the myriad, diverse interests each of us has and the implausibility of claiming that all of 
these impose responsibilities on others to meet them, the question that immediately presents 
itself is, why should this be the case where bioinformation-related identity interests are 
concerned? 
The answer, I submit, lies first in the strength of these interests, grounded as they are upon the 
basic identity interest and its necessary connection to the conditions for living a full and 
fulfilling human life. Further to this, because narrative self-constitution is an inherently 
relational process, it is not something we can do alone.899 So we are all potentially implicated 
in the identity projects of those around us. And this is especially so where one party holds 
specific means to make those projects go better or worse, not only because they are in a 
position to provide or withhold tools of narrative development, but also because they may be 
able to support us in interpreting and using these constructively. The kind of information I am 
concerned with in this thesis is that to which information subjects do not otherwise have 
unmediated access – even if it is not in itself particularly technical knowledge. Therefore, they 
are reliant on others, and the insights that their expertise or position affords them, to provide, 
withhold or interpret it. In practice, the ways and extent to which particular actors are able to 
support others’ identity interests will vary and so will the extent of their responsibilities – I 
shall return to this in Section 5. 
A beneficence-based responsibility to help 
As described above, the responsibilities to respond to others’ bioinformation-related identity 
interests are based in the principle of beneficence – the moral obligation to act for the benefit 
of others and support them in furthering their significant and legitimate interests.900  
I have argued that our needs in relation to identity development are important, but it must be 
conceded that they are unlikely to be either acute or urgent. The corresponding responsibilities, 
therefore, are not ones to rescue, but rather to aid and support. I propose that a conception of 
beneficence that neatly captures the nature of the responsibilities I have in mind here is the 
‘Principle of Helpfulness’ as formulated by Thomas Scanlon (with some qualifications, which 
                                                             
899 See Chapter 2. 
900 T. Beauchamp, "The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta (Winter 2016 Editon). 
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I shall provide below).901 Scanlon sets out the justifying rationale for this principle using the 
following example:  
“Suppose I learn, in the course of conversation with a person, that I have a piece 
of information that would be of great help to her because it would save her a great 
deal of time and effort in pursuing her life’s project. It would surely be wrong of 
me to fail (simply out of indifference) to give her this information when there is 
no compelling reason not to do so. It would be unreasonable to reject a principle 
requiring us to help others in this way (even when they are not in desperate need), 
since such a principle would involve no significant sacrifice on our part.”902 
Scanlon’s formulation highlights the relative modesty of the kinds of responsibilities I am 
proposing. They hold where the ratio of benefit to the information subject to costs to the 
potential discloser is high, and they are not absolute. Compelling countervailing reasons and 
significant sacrifices could be sufficient to override them. The passage from Scanlon quoted 
above is useful because its constituent steps allow me to structure and clarify what I wish to 
say about the nature and extent of responsibilities to respond to bioinformation-related identity 
interests, and where these might depart from Scanlon’s proposal of a general duty to be helpful. 
“It would surely be wrong of me to fail…to give” 
First I wish to clarify that, although Scanlon’s example happens to be framed in terms of 
information provision, it is not my intention that this should be translated literally into what I 
have to say. I would hold that beneficence also involves offering or withholding potentially 
identity-significant bioinformation and in supplying it in a manner that supports the basic 
identity interest.   
“I have a piece of information that would be of great help to her…” 
The actors or institutions to whom I would ascribe identity-supporting responsibilities are 
those that are in, if not a unique, at least a particularly suitable or privileged position to benefit 
or harm the way an individual’s self-narrative reflects her embodied existence. This is because 
they are in possession of, or could easily come by, bioinformation to which the individual 
herself would not otherwise have direct access. 
                                                             
901 T. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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“…because it would save her a great deal of time and effort in pursuing her life’s project” 
As I have argued, the development of a satisfying and coherent identity narrative is neither a 
luxury, nor just a contingent and inconsequential appropriation of a cluster of social identifiers. 
It is the underpinning condition for finding meaning and purpose in life and the source of our 
motives and commitments. The ‘effort’ that is ‘saved’ is that of struggling to make sense of 
who one is and to inhabit this self-conception as one navigates the experience of embodied 
existence. 
“Suppose I learn…”  
It would be unreasonable to posit identity-related responsibilities if those potentially in a 
position (not) to disclose personal bioinformation had no way of knowing when information 
subjects’ identity interests are engaged and whether disclosure would serve or undermine 
them. Being able to anticipate when these interests are engaged is also important to ensure that 
resources expended in protecting them are allocated where they are most likely to make a 
difference. In the following subsection I will outline the opportunities and challenges facing 
potential disclosers in this regard.  
Discerning others’ identity interests  
In contrast to, for example, the clinical utility of bioinformation, it is undoubtedly not 
straightforward for potential disclosers to know when personal bioinformation would be 
valuable or detrimental to the self-narrative of a particular individual. These qualities are 
neither intrinsic, nor universally and uniformly ascribed attributes of any particular kind of 
bioinformation (see Chapter 8). This does not mean that discerning someone’s identity 
interests is impossible. The first-person, interpretive aspects of ascriptions of identity 
significance and value mean that, in many cases the information subject herself will know 
whether access would be beneficial or detrimental to her identity and be able to communicate 
this to potential disclosers. Nevertheless, there are, two reasons why this will not always be 
the case. 
First, as indicated in Chapter 8, an individual is not an infallible authority as to her identity 
interests. This might be because the impact of the bioinformation on her self-narrative might 
surprise her.903 Or she might be mistaken about the suitability of the bioinformation as a means 
of explaining her experiences or anticipating her future. For example, she may desire 
                                                             
903 Findings from the REVEAL study indicate how people’s reactions to information may differ 
markedly from their expectations (see Chapter 6). 
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information which is false or misleading about biological states of affairs and is therefore 
unlikely to benefit, and might indeed harm, the coherence of her self-narrative. Or she may 
resist exposure to bioinformation, which could help to rectify a non-trivial misapprehension 
about her health, body or biological relationships that is itself detrimental to the coherence of 
her identity.904  
The second reason why disclosers cannot necessarily rely on cues from information subjects 
themselves as to where their interests lie is that sometimes these individuals will be unaware 
that there is information to be known at all, and asking them if they want to know would effect 
precisely the disclosure one might wish to avoid.905  
Despite these two challenges, I do not wish to overstate the impossibility of potential disclosers 
being able to anticipate where identity interests are likely to be engaged. It may be possible to 
make some broad population-level predictions about likely identity significance and detriment. 
This is because, as argued in Chapter 8, as well as being shaped by the nature of an individual’s 
existing self-narrative, identity significance is also likely to be substantially influenced by 
publicly discernible factors. These include the social meaning ascribed to the information and 
the scale of the impact on embodied and relational existence that it conveys. Similarly, it may 
well be possible to anticipate when a category of information is likely to be detrimental, for 
example because it is widely seen as stigmatising, or likely to incur unwarranted fatalism about 
health outcomes. It will also often be possible for potential disclosers to know when 
bioinformation is false, unreliable or fails to speak to the state of affairs it purports to, and 
therefore could be detrimental. Indeed, insofar as their professional skills or position affords 
them insights into the information’s epistemic qualities, potential disclosers might sometimes 
be better placed than information subjects to discern when information is unlikely to contribute 
to the narrative coherence. In addition to these more general insights, tools such as the BRCA 
Self-Concept Scale referred to in Chapter 6, offer possible, evidence-based means of 
identifying how different individuals or population sub-groups are likely to be affected by the 
receipt of particular kinds of bioinformation.906  
These various means might not deliver infallible insights at an individual level. Recipients’ 
reactions could still be idiosyncratic. However, they could help to mark out territory in which 
attention to identity impacts is particularly warranted. And they could be useful for developing 
high-level policies about making information and interpretive support available. Moreover, 
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905 Laurie (2002). 





the fact that potential disclosers cannot always rely on potential recipients’ assertions of where 
their interests lie carries an important implication for the scope of responsibilities. It further 
highlights why it is crucial that disclosure practices are not seen as discrete events of un-
negotiated ‘revelation’, but rather as discursive and deliberative transactions. I shall return to 
discuss the nature of identity-supportive transactions in Section 6. First, I wish to consider the 
limits that apply to the responsibilities of those who might be in a position to provide us with 
bioinformation about ourselves.   
SECTION 5: LIMITS OF RESPONSIBILITIES  
“When there is no compelling reason not to do so…” 
Scanlon’s Principle of Helpfulness does not entail an absolute obligation to help in all 
circumstances. And I similarly do not wish to suggest that potential disclosers’ ethical 
responsibilities to support others’ identity interests are without limits. They are pro tanto 
responsibilities, which hold in the absence of stronger countervailing reasons to do otherwise, 
and carry a greater imperative in some contexts than others. In this section I will consider three 
factors which are each relevant to assessing the limits of responsibilities to protect identity 
interests in any given situation: 
 Countervailing individual, shared and public interests; 
 The nature of the roles of and relationships between disclosers and information 
subjects; and 
 Information subjects’ choices (not) to know. 
Limits of responsibilities I: countervailing interests   
Responsibilities to offer, provide or withhold bioinformation on identity grounds will need to 
be weighed against other interests that might be infringed by such actions.  Perhaps the most 
obvious competing interests are those of third parties for whom the bioinformation is also 
personal. For example, an individual’s identity interests in knowing who her genetic mother 
is will need to be assessed against the interests of that woman in maintaining her own privacy 
and undisturbed familial role. And someone’s desire to maintain a self-conception unmarked 
by the shadow of hereditary cancer needs to be assessed against other family members’ 
interests in being tested to protect their own health. As these examples indicate, it is possible 
that identity interests could be in play on both sides of these equations. It is also conceivable 
that an individual’s own interests – for example in protecting her health – could pull in a 
different direction from her identity interests. There will also be cases in which the 
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impracticability of discharging a responsibility to protect someone’s identity interest will be 
prohibitive due to the personal or material costs of doing so. For example, concealing one’s 
cancer risk from a genetic relative could place overwhelming restrictions on one’s life. Or, 
ensuring that individual research findings are sufficiently robust and comprehensible to be 
returned to participants might be prohibitively resource-intensive.  
The obvious challenge in these kinds of circumstance is assessing when identity interests are 
sufficiently weighty that they should prevail.  I do not pretend that the arguments I have 
provided in this thesis will provide an easy or uncontroversial way of resolving this. My 
intention here is, more modestly, to acknowledge that potential disclosers’ responsibilities to 
protect others’ identity development are not without limits. The weighing of diverse, 
incommensurable and sometimes indeterminate competing interests engaged by information 
(non)disclosure is a notoriously difficult problem – one which is not unique to my identity-
based argument.907 But what I hope to have demonstrated in this thesis is that identity-related 
interests are serious contenders, which need to be addressed alongside the other interests that 
are traditionally considered in such dilemmas. Given their role in serving the fundamental 
nature of the basic identity interest, bioinformation-related identity interests are not trivial. 
They engage disclosers’ ethical responsibilities in ways, for example, that vaguer appeals to 
‘personal utility’ do not.  
Limits of responsibilities II: roles and relationships  
I have suggested that identity-related responsibilities for disclosure are not restricted to those 
acting in a professional capacity. But the nature and scope of the responsibilities accruing to 
different kinds of actors in different contexts will vary. And, I suggest, it may vary, in part, 
because of the professional or institutional role that the potential discloser occupies and their 
relationship (professional or personal) to the information subject. These factors could 
influence, for example, the regularity with which a potential discloser is in a position to 
generate or come into possession of personal bioinformation, or is able to interpret its possible 
identity significance.908 The nature of these roles and relationships will also contribute to 
determining what counts as a “compelling” countervailing reason or a “significant sacrifice” 
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and thus the limits of an actor’s responsibilities.909 For example, clinicians may be particularly 
likely to encounter or generate potentially identity-significant information. Meanwhile, unlike 
clinicians, researchers’ need to ensure that efforts to protect participants’ interests do not 
threaten the achievement of their research aims, while also avoiding incurring the therapeutic 
misconception amongst participants.910 And the sacrifice potentially incurred by someone 
resisting family pressure to participate in genetic ancestry testing could be greater than that of 
a doctor refusing to refer a patient for useless genetic tests. I shall return in Section 6 to 
consider how the different relationships between disclosers and subjects could also influence 
responsibilities with respect to the manner of disclosure.  
Ethical responsibilities to disclose based in beneficence may also be strengthened by the wider 
ethical or legal responsibilities that potential disclosers hold in respect of their professional or 
personal roles or relationships with information subjects. For example, parents may be seen as 
having a particular kind of responsibility to support their children’s identity development. And 
some commentators have argued (in relation to information about donor origins) that the state 
has responsibilities for providing information where it is its own administrative actions that 
have created the circumstances in which individuals are separated from this information. 911 
Protection of bioinformation-related identity interests is not currently part of the professional, 
legally enforceable, duty of care expected of clinicians. But, as noted above, there is a growing 
expectation that the expected standard of care includes supplying information to support 
patients’ autonomy.912  
Limits of responsibilities III: information subjects’ choices   
The discussion thus far still leaves the question of the extent of potential disclosers’ 
responsibilities in two kinds of hard cases: 
 Where the information subject’s choice (not) to know appears contrary to her identity 
interests; and  
 Where the subject is unaware that potentially identity-significant information exists. 
   
                                                             
909 Scanlon (1998), p.224. 
910 F.A. Miller et al. (2008), "Duty to Disclose What? Querying the Putative Obligation to Return 
Research Results to Participants" Journal of Medical Ethics, 34(3): 210-13. 
911 Pennings (2001); V. Ravitsky (2016), "Donor Conception and Lack of Access to Genetic Heritage" 
The American Journal of Bioethics, 16(12): 45-46. 
912 Farrell and Brazier (2016). 
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Navigating the tension between choice and identity value 
It seems plausible that there could be circumstances in which potential disclosers have strong 
reason to believe that an individual’s choice either to seek, or to refuse, particular 
bioinformation runs contrary to her identity interests. An example of the former might be 
where a participant in a psychiatric neuroimaging study wants to receive the results of her scan 
to allay her fears of mental illness, but the researchers know these would provide no reliable 
diagnostic or predictive information. The latter might be illustrated by someone who has an 
implacable belief that her healthy lifestyle will protect her from hereditary cancer and resists 
approaches from her sister to reveal her own (high) risk status.  
Going against the information subjects’ wishes in each of these cases would be paternalistic, 
because it would prioritise (what are assumed to be) their identity interests over their 
autonomous choices. However, it is not obvious why autonomy (thinly-conceived as choice) 
should be a trump card when choices can be misguided, trivial or fail to protect important 
values.913 I would reiterate my earlier assertions that narrative self-constitution is a relational 
undertaking, which entails supporting others’ identity projects, not abandoning them to their 
own devices. The significant word here, though, is ‘supporting’. The account of 
responsibilities that I have sketched above are not those of rescuing information subjects, or 
seeking to perfect their self-narratives, but of helping them to achieve accounts of who they 
are that are satisfying and coherent for them.  
Where does this leave the above dilemmas? Pierre Widmer argues that one has a “right to 
adopt and maintain a subjective image of oneself, which may objectively be false”.914 
However, talk of rights unhelpfully collapses the matter of where our interests lie with how 
we should respond to them. I would contend that it is unlikely to be in our interests to inhabit 
self-narratives built around false beliefs about substantial aspects of our embodied existence. 
And paternalism may be justifiable – particularly if the interests served by infringing 
autonomy are considerable and very likely to be met by doing so, and any infringement of 
autonomy is minimised and is small relative to the interests benefited.915 Given the ethical 
significance of identity interests, I would submit that overriding information subjects’ choices 
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could be justifiable, but the picture of interests and responsibilities sketched in this chapter 
does not offer a single, simple answer and much will depend on the particular circumstances.916  
I would suggest that in the two examples above a key determinative factor is the confidence 
with which the potential discloser can be sure that contravening the subject’s wishes would 
best serve her identity interests. In the latter example, it is not clear that unwanted information 
about the hereditary risk of cancer would be unequivocally valuable to the individual’s self-
narrative such that it provided sufficient grounds to require her sister to divulge her risk status. 
Furthermore, exposure to her sister’s results might not be the only or best way to disabuse her 
of her misconceptions about cancer susceptibility. Information imposition here looks more 
like a potentially misfiring attempt to perfect someone’s self-conception, rather than 
supporting her self-understanding. In contrast, I would suggest that the detriment to narrative 
coherence of providing false or misleading neuroimaging research findings to an individual is 
somewhat more predictable. Furthermore, disclosure of these results without explanation of 
their inability to tell the participant about her mental health interferes with the recipient’s 
capacity to use her own values and judgement in selecting her tools of her narrative 
construction. Therefore, withholding the information could be justifiable in this instance, 
especially if a clear explanation of its epistemic limitations is also provided. 
Unknown unsought information 
The second kind of hard case is where an information subject does not know there is 
information to be known (and offering it would amount to de facto disclosure), but the 
potential discloser has good reason to believe that disclosing it could have a significant impact 
on the information subject’s self-narrative. For example, where does a parent’s responsibility 
lie in respect of telling her adult donor-conceived offspring about the circumstances of her 
conception, or a researcher’s responsibility to tell a participant about an incidental finding with 
potentially serious health implications? These are longstanding dilemmas in the ‘right not to 
know’ debate. 917 Does attending to identity interests add anything new? 
First I would suggest that if the potential discloser has good grounds (for example based on 
their knowledge of the individual’s priorities or awareness of pervasive social norms) to 
believe that the information could be valuable to the individual’s identity, then the fact the 
information is unsought is not necessarily reason enough to withhold bioinformation – any 
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interests are the only things at stake.   
917 See, for example, papers in Chadwick et al. (2014). 
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more than it would were the information to have clear clinical utility. But, on the same basis, 
likely identity detriment could plausibly provide countervailing reasons against unsought 
disclosure that might otherwise be justified on health-related grounds. For example, if it was 
likely that someone would react to learning of a high risk of heart disease by withdrawing from 
family activities and imagining their future curtailed, then avoiding these consequences could 
be more important than giving her the opportunity to adopt health-improvement behaviours.  
If the potential discloser cannot be sure whether the information would be valuable or 
detrimental, recognising the possibility of significant identity impacts will not on its own 
contribute to settling the question of whether to disclose. Indeed, I would suggest that the likely 
presence of substantial, but unpredictable, identity impacts accounts for much of the weight 
and difficulty of the classic dilemma regarding disclosure of unsought unknown information. 
This does not mean that recognising the possibility that identity interests are engaged – albeit 
in an indeterminate way – is without value in such contexts. It alerts potential disclosers to the 
fact that, even if disclosure is, for example, pursued on clinical grounds, this does not exhaust 
the significant interests in play. The manner of disclosure still needs to be managed in such a 
way as to minimise potential harm to the recipients’ self-narrative.  
Indeed, each of these examples in this sub-section indicates that responsibilities to protect 
others’ identity interests cannot be met solely by attending to the bald questions of whether or 
not to disclose personal bioinformation (the ‘whether’ of disclosure). The manner and 
interpretive context within which information is conveyed (the ‘how’ of disclosure) is just as 
important, particularly where seeking to avert possible identity harms. This means that in order 
to complete an ethical framework to guide disclosure decisions, I need to unpack what identity-
supporting disclosure practices might look like. That is the task for the next section.  
SECTION 6: PRINCIPLES AND FEATURES OF IDENTITY-SUPPORTING DISCLOSURE  
Commentators have noted (in the context of genetic research) that ethical attention is 
increasingly turning from the question of whether to share findings with participants, to how 
this should be done.918 The position I have outlined in this and the previous chapter add grist 
to this turn (and does so beyond a narrow focus on genetic research). Attending to the manner 
and context in which personal bioinformation is disclosed is essential to meeting information 
subjects’ identity interests. In this section I shall briefly review why I take this to be the case, 
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before outlining what I will take to be the central ethical considerations for transactions in 
personal bioinformation which would support the basic identity interest. To this end I will:  
 Propose what I take to be the two core principles guiding the manner of disclosure of 
any personal bioinformation that has the potential to be identity-significant;  
 Unpack four key elements of delivering these principles; and  
 Outline some of the ways in which these elements might be realised in practice.  
First, though, I will address the matter of whether it is problematic to suggest that potential 
disclosers have a legitimate and useful role to play in contributing to, or supporting, 
information subjects’ self-conceptions. 
Justifying intervention  
It might appear inappropriate to propose an ethical responsibility to support information 
subjects in how they interpret and use personal bioinformation in the construction of their 
identities. These might seem to be undertakings properly led and shaped by the individual 
herself. Internal to the very idea of narrative self-constitution is the idea that the significance 
and meaning of elements of someone’s self-conception cannot be determined independently 
of what these mean in the context of an individual’s particular story.919  
The inherently personal nature of identity development notwithstanding, I would maintain that 
there are five reasons for holding that the basic identity interest implies an interest in being 
supported in how one interprets and uses personal bioinformation. The first of these is that, as 
discussed in the previous section, an individual’s choices about what she wants (not) to know 
and her identity interests can sometimes diverge. I would suggest that the manner and context 
of disclosure offers possible means of narrowing this gap. Secondly, exposure to potentially 
identity-detrimental bioinformation may not always be avoidable. Here the manner and 
context of disclosure might similarly be used to mitigate potential identity detriment. Thirdly, 
some personal bioinformation will be complex or technical, and its implications for our health 
and bodies may not be unambiguous or easily understood without support. Fourthly, as Jackie 
Leach Scully notes (in discussing disclosure of genetic information), “information is not 
exchanged in an unmediated form”.920 The identity significance, value or detriment of personal 
bioinformation are not wholly within the recipient’s control, nor are they necessarily fixed 
                                                             
919 See Chapter 2. 
920 J.L. Scully, 'Receiving and Interpreting Information: A Joint Enterprise', in Disclosure Dilemmas. 
Ethics of Genetic Prognosis after the ‘Right to Know/Not to Know’ Debate, ed. C. Rehmann-Sutter 
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prior to disclosure. They are rather matters of interpretation to which the context of disclosure 
can contribute. Fifth, and finally, the construction of our self-narratives is a relational 
undertaking.921 Making sense of the identity significance and possible narrative impacts of any 
new experiences – including encounters with personal bioinformation – will often depend on 
discussion with others, drawing on shared experiences and common sources of meaning.  
I would argue, therefore, that those responsible for information disclosure have not only a 
legitimate, but potentially an indispensable role to play in shaping whether and how particular 
personal bioinformation is or is not used in the development, maintenance or restoration of a 
coherent and satisfying self-narrative. This role needs to be one that respects the tension 
between the demands of supporting a self-narrative that makes sense to and ‘works’ for its 
subject, while recognising that this end might not be something that she can achieve alone. It 
is on this basis that I propose that the following two principles should underlie all offers or 
disclosures of potentially identity-significant personal bioinformation.   
Two guiding principles of identity-supporting disclosure 
I. A discloser should not seek to tell the recipient what roles the personal 
bioinformation in question ought (not) to occupy in her self-conception or 
foreclose the kind of story she wishes to construct, but support her own 
(re)construction of her self-narrative in light of the information and what it tells 
her about her health, body and biological relationships. 
  
II. The process should be discursive and collaborative in a way that permits the 
discloser to appreciate the particularities of the recipient’s perspective and 
vulnerabilities, while also providing the recipient the tools and space to work out 
what the bioinformation means for her life and identity. 
These principles reflect the likelihood that some disclosers will be well-placed to help the 
information subject to understand what the bioinformation means in terms of her health, body 
or biological relationships. But, this same professional authority potentially creates a context 
in which the recipient might also be similarly inclined to defer to the discloser on matters of 
identity significance. Even if disclosers are experts in their field of biomedicine, their 
epistemic authority stops short of knowing its relevance and value to others’ identities. These 
principles operate to guide conduct that is responsive to the particularities of the informational 
and narrative needs and comprehension levels of individual recipients. As such, they echo 
                                                             





Leach Scully’s characterisation of the ideal disclosure of genetic information as a “joint 
interpretive and ethical enterprise”, one which embodies “respect for the ontological 
‘otherness’ of the other” and permits both parties “to comprehend as fully as possible the 
others’ worldviews, and recognize their own cognitive and imaginative limits.”922 They also 
bear close resemblance to the principles of shared decision-making and non-directiveness that 
traditionally underpin genetic counselling practices.923 However, the principles I am proposing 
are intended to have a wider scope: applying beyond the communication of genetic 
information, beyond clinical contexts, and to disclosures by actors other than specially trained 
counsellors. 
Four elements of identity-supportive disclosure  
Although I have suggested that non-directivenesss is an important aspect of supporting an 
individual’s narrative interpretation, use or rejection of personal bioinformation, this does not 
mean abandoning information subjects entirely to their own devices. Given what I have said 
up to this point about the kinds of factors that contribute to the identity value or detriment of 
personal bioinformation, I would suggest that it is possible to specify some practices that 
would honour the above principles, while also actively supporting an individual’s identity 
development. The recommendations below aim to maintain an approach that is sufficiently 
flexible to respond to individual circumstances, while acknowledging that there are some basic 
ways in which personal bioinformation can contribute to or detract from the satisfying nature 
and coherence of our self-narratives in the context of embodied existence. I propose that 
delivering the principles above will entail (as far as possible, and where applicable) the 
following four practical elements: 
Supporting understanding of biological implications  
I. Explain what the information means for the recipient’s past, present or future 
health, bodily states and functions, and biological relationships. 
II. Explain what the bioinformation does not or cannot tell the recipient about these 
same things.  
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Supporting identity-related interpretations  
III. Seek to offset or ameliorate distressing or disempowering interpretations of what 
the information means for the recipient’s development and inhabitation of her 
own satisfying self-conception. 
IV. Support the recipient in finding ways to integrate or reject the information from 
her self-narrative in ways that preserve or restore its intelligibility and 
coherence. 
The first and second of these recommendations might not necessarily be straightforward to 
deliver. But their meaning and intention as part of this project should be plain, given what I 
have said in Chapters 8 about the centrality of the epistemic qualities of personal 
bioinformation to its identity value.  
What is entailed by the third and fourth recommendations may be a little less obvious. To 
illustrate what these might entail, I offer an indicative list below. This list is not intended to 
exhaust all ways in which the basic identity interest might be protected or promoted. But I 
hope to capture some of the ways in which more predictable and universal benefits and harms 
could be, respectively, pursued or minimised.  
Examples of practical interpretive support  
In order to be proactive in supporting the basic identity interest, while not pre-empting 
information subject’s self-authorship, disclosers could:  
 Challenge stigmatising connotations directly and by signposting to sources of peer and 
familial support.  
 Divert recipients from reductionist and fatalistic interpretations by highlighting the 
range and complexity of factors contributing to disease susceptibility / traits / kinship 
and to our identities overall.924 
 Minimise recipients’ feelings of inefficacy or insecurity, by providing advice on 
practical steps the recipient might take, for example, pursuing clinical interventions, 
health protection behaviours, or engagement with patients’ groups. 
 Consider how the timing of the disclosure might affect the nature of its narrative 
impacts. For example, would early disclosure facilitate narrative integration (as is 
indicated for knowledge of donor origins)925 or risk undermining the recipients’ sense 
                                                             
924 See the discussion of the REVEAL study in Chapter 6. 





of having an ‘open future’ (a risk posited in respect to childhood testing for late-onset 
conditions).926 
 Ensure, as far as possible, that the extent of the information provided is suitable for 
the identity-related role the recipient hopes it will fulfil. For example, someone’s 
desire to know their genetic origins may be poorly served by merely receiving a 
legalistic confirmation of paternity.927 And what some without dependents might want 
to know about her risk of disease risk could differ from someone who identifies closely 
with her role as a carer.928  
 When providing genetic information with potential significance to more than one 
member of a family, provide support and advice to the recipient on whether and how 
she might share this information with those other members.929 
 Provide further information and support where this might help to ameliorate or repair 
disruption to a recipient’s existing self-conception. For example, some donor-
conceived individuals report that disorientation resulting from discovery of their 
origins is exacerbated by lacking information about their donors.930 
These are only preliminary suggestions based on the literature reviewed for this project. 
Empirical work is needed to develop more detailed, concrete advice on what measures would 
be most beneficial in supporting identity development, to understand which individuals or 
groups might have particular or unexpected needs and vulnerabilities, and to map the 
challenges raised by particular categories of bioinformation.931 
Limits to capacities to provide support   
The picture of responsibilities I have sketched in this section is intended to extend beyond 
relationships where concern for, and a collaborative role in, the self-development projects of 
others is normally assumed. Traditionally these might be recognised as extending to family 
                                                             
926 D.S. Davis (1997), "Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future" Hastings Center 
Report, 27(2): 7-15. 
927 Blauwhoff (2008). 
928 d’Agincourt‐Canning (2001). 
929 C. Dupras and V. Ravitsky (2013), "Disclosing Genetic Information to Family Members: The Role 
of Empirical Ethics" eLS 
930 See Chapter 6. 
931 The interpretive contexts that contribute in both positive and negative ways to the meaning that 
particular personal bioinformation have for someone’s self-conception extend well beyond specific 
disclosures. It might be considered that ethical responsibilities could hold in respect of the way that 
various actors contribution to this wider interpretive framework in ways that impact negatively on the 
basic identity interest. However, as the focus of this thesis is interests and responsibilities relating to 
information access, these arguments lie beyond its scope. 
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members and, on some views, clinicians.932 As I have stated, it is my intention that the 
recommendations and principles suggested above apply (as far as possible) to all groups of 
potential disclosers – including professionals and those acting in a personal capacity. However, 
it is undeniable that there are likely to be disparities in skills and capacities that will place 
some limits on the practicability and legitimacy of different groups of disclosers fulfilling the 
above principles and recommendations the same way or to the same extent. In particular, the 
resources required to disclose information in an identity-supportive way may be prohibitive in 
some contexts. 
It is not possible to unpack all the nuances of difference here. But, for example, we might 
appreciate that clinicians could be better equipped in terms of analytical skills than family 
members or researchers to discern and communicate information’s reliability as a source of 
insights into one’s health. Meanwhile, family members may well be better equipped than other 
disclosers to help recipients work out what the information implies for their future and their 
relationships, particularly if the discloser and recipient have shared experiences of a family 
history of a particular condition. 933 And there may also be disparities in the resources available 
to different categories of discloser. For example, provision of counselling might be accounted 
for as part of clinical care, but represent a significant diversion of limited personnel or funds 
in a research context.  
This means that it may be unrealistic or unreasonable to expect every disclosure of potentially 
identity-significant personal bioinformation to adhere to the principles and recommendations 
outlined above. This then raises the question of whether, if a potential discloser does not or 
cannot adhere to the principles proposed above, information provision would be ethically 
justifiable. In contrast with what I have said in Section 5 above – where the presence of strong 
countervailing reasons could relieve an actor of the responsibility to disclose or withhold 
bioinformation – I wish to suggest here that where a potential discloser is unable to adhere to 
the principles and recommendations of identity-supportive disclosure, this does not mean that 
they would be justified in proceeding with disclosure with impunity. On the contrary, in cases 
in which doing so would incur significant identity detriment, I submit that it could provide 
sufficient grounds for a responsibility not to disclose. In Section 8 I offer some examples of 
instances in which this may be the case. 
                                                             
932 A. Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law:A Relational Challenge, Cambridge 
Law, Medicine, and Ethics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  





This brings to a close my discussion of the broad considerations underlying the ethical 
responsibilities of those who (potentially) hold personal bioinformation about others. I wish 
now to bring together everything I have said up to this point in the chapter in an ethical 
framework for the protection of information subjects’ identity interests. 
SECTION 7: AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE DISCLOSURE  
The following framework is intended to inform and guide decisions-making, policies and 
practices about disclosure of personal bioinformation to information subjects in light of the 
potentially significant impacts of this information on the identities of those to whom it pertains. 
This framework is founded on the basic and bioinformation-related interests as characterised 
in Section 2. It unpacks the practical implications of the broad responsibilities outlined in 
Section 4 and the limits to these, as discussed in Section 5.  
THE BASIC IDENTITY INTEREST 
 
 An interest in developing, maintaining and restoring a coherent and satisfying self-
narrative. 
- Where the coherence of the self-narrative pertains particularly to the extent to which 
an individual is able to make sense of and inhabit who she is in the context of her 
embodied and relational existence and experiences. And where perfect coherence 
is likely, in practice, to be an unattainable ideal. 
- And a satisfying self-narrative is one that comprises descriptive, relational and role-
based characteristics and contents with which the individual is comfortable, as far 
as this is possible within the constraints of coherence. 
 
 
BIOINFORMATION-RELATED IDENTITY INTERESTS  
 
I. The information subject’s interest in being able to access personal bioinformation 
that would contribute to her development, maintenance or restoration of a coherent 
and satisfying self-narrative  
II. The information subject’s interest in being protected from exposure to personal 
bioinformation that would undermine her development, maintenance or restoration 
of a coherent and satisfying self-narrative  
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III. The information subject’s interest in receiving personal bioinformation in a manner 
that supports her in using it in, or excluding it from, her development, maintenance 
or restoration of a coherent and satisfying self-narrative.  
 
 
OUTLINE OF KEY ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES  
 
A. There is an ethical responsibility to provide personal bioinformation when:  
i. The information subject seeks access to it on identity grounds and there are no good 
reasons to believe that it would be detrimental to her identity; or 
ii. The information subject does not know that the bioinformation exists, but there are 
good reasons to believe it could be of significant value to her identity, and offering 
it would entail de facto disclosure.  
 Each of these is subject to the following conditions: 
o disclosing this personal bioinformation would not disproportionately 
harm the recipient’s*, the discloser’s**, or third parties’*** 
legitimate interests; and 
o disclosure can**** be conducted in a manner likely to support the 
recipient’s basic identity interest, where this entails adherence to the 
principles and practical considerations listed below.    
 
B. There is an ethical responsibility to offer personal bioinformation when the information 
subject does not know the bioinformation exists, but there are good reasons to believe 
that it could be of value to her identity and offering can be achieved without disclosure, 
 Provided that: 
o disclosing the bioinformation would not disproportionately harm the 
recipient’s, the discloser’s, or third parties’ legitimate interests;  
o the subject is made aware of any possibility of identity detriment; and 
o disclosure can be conducted in a manner likely to support the 
recipient’s basic identity interest. 
 
C. There is an ethical responsibility to withhold personal bioinformation when: 
i. The information subject seeks access to it on identity grounds, but there are good 





ii. The information subject does not know that the bioinformation exists, offering it 
would entail de facto disclosure, and there are good reasons to believe that it could 
be detrimental to her identity. 
 Each of these is subject to the following conditions: 
o withholding would not disproportionately harm the recipient’s, the 
discloser’s, or third parties’ legitimate interests; and 
o it is not possible to disclose it in a way likely to reduce or mitigate 
this detriment. 
 
D. It may be permissible to disclose personal bioinformation to the information subject 
when there are reasons to believe disclosure could be somewhat detrimental the 
information subject’s identity, 
 If: 
o withholding would disproportionately harm the recipient’s other 
legitimate interests; and  
o provided disclosure is conducted in a in a way likely to reduce or 
mitigate this detriment. 934 
 
* Information subjects’ interests that could operate as a limiting condition might include, 
for example, those in protecting her health. 
** Where the disclosers’ interests appear as a limiting condition, these might involve, for 
example, the disproportionate effort or cost of preparing the information or locating the 
information subject. Where disclosers are private individuals these interests could include, 
for example, those in their own privacy or identity development.  
*** Where third parties’ interests operate as a limiting condition, these might include the 
interests of other individuals – for example the privacy or health-related interests of genetic 
relatives – and also those of groups and the public interest in, for example, protecting patient 
confidentiality, or the disproportionate expenditure of public resources. 
****If disclosure cannot be conducted in a manner likely to support the recipient’s basic 
identity interest (for example because it is disproportionately costly or burdensome to do 
so) then providing or offering personal bioinformation might not be justifiable.  
 
                                                             
934 This framework does not spell out all the permissible courses of action implied by the conditions 
attaching to the responsibilities. For example, it might be permissible to withhold potentially identity 




GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF IDENTITY-SUPPORTING DISCLOSURE 
 
I. A discloser should not seek to tell the recipient what roles the personal 
bioinformation in question ought (not) to occupy in her self-conception or foreclose 
the kind of story she wishes to construct, but support her own (re)construction of 
her self-narrative in light of the information and what it tells her about her health, 
body and biological relationships.  
II. The process should be discursive and collaborative in a way that permits the 
discloser to appreciate the particularities of the recipient’s perspective and 
vulnerabilities, while also providing the recipient the tools and space to work out 
what the bioinformation means for her life and identity. 
 
PRACTICAL ELEMENTS OF IDENTITY-SUPPORTING DISCLOSURE 
 
I. Explaining what the information means for the recipient’s past, present or future 
health, bodily states and functions, and biological relationships. 
II. Explaining what the bioinformation does not or cannot tell the recipient about these 
same things.  
III. Seeking to offset or ameliorate distressing or disempowering interpretations of what 
the information means for the recipient’s development and inhabitation of her own 
self-conception. 
IV. Supporting the recipient in finding ways to integrate or reject the information from 
her self-narrative in ways that preserve or restore its intelligibility and coherence. 
  
It is not possible to provide examples to illustrate every permutation of this summary of the 
ethical responsibilities that emerge from this framework. But in the final section of the last 
substantive chapter of the thesis I will now revisit the three examples discussed in Part II to 
sketch in brief what this framework brings to consideration of potential disclosers’ ethical 







SECTION 8: APPLYING THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE ILLUSTRATIVE 
EXAMPLES 
The ethical framework that I am proposing will not usually generate single, blanket 
(non)disclosure policy for any particular category of personal bioinformation. The 
recommended course of action is likely to vary depending on the particularities of any given 
situation. The following reflections on the existing accessibility of the three categories of 
personal bioinformation discussed in the illustrative examples are, therefore, necessarily 
schematic. I seek chiefly to indicate where my analysis provides a useful fresh emphasis or 
perspective.   
Illustrative example I: Information about donor origins  
The regulation of donor-conceived individuals’ access to information about the fact of their 
donor conception in the UK is already explicitly informed by consideration of its impacts on 
these individuals’ identities.935 I have argued that the precise nature of identity interests has 
hitherto been inadequately articulated in this context.936 Nevertheless, given that the sense in 
which identity appears to be intended is broadly that of self-characterisation, it is unsurprising 
that there are intersections between the current legal and regulatory position and what the 
present thesis would recommend. However, I suggest that current provisions may not go far 
enough, in ways I will indicate below.    
The existing policy position in the UK, that parents must be advised of the importance of 
telling their donor-conceived children about their conception as early as possible and offered 
guidance doing so, accords with the contention of this thesis that allowing someone to premise 
their self-narrative on false beliefs represents an identity harm, which should be averted where 
possible.937 However, positing such an identity harm might seem to recommend the stronger 
requirement of a legally-enforceable obligation on parents or the regulator, the HFEA, to 
disclose donor conception.938 Despite the threat to narrative coherence from false beliefs, I 
would suggest that coercive measures to secure or pre-empt parental disclosure (such as 
annotating birth certificates) are likely to be disproportionate and insufficiently context-
sensitive. They could infringe parents’ identity, autonomy or privacy and interests. Moreover, 
if enforced disclosure increased the likelihood of donor-conceived individuals’ being 
                                                             
935 See Chapters 1 and 5. 
936 See Chapter 1. 
937 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 'Code of Practice' (2015). 
938 Some have argued that there are plausible grounds for the state having such an obligation, given 
that it too has the information and is complicit in activities which mean that donor offspring lack it. 
See, Ravitsky (2016). 
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confronted by information about their origins in unsupported ways, it is not clear that it would 
serve their interests in constructing coherent, satisfying self-narratives.  
Attending to the potential role of this information in the development of donor-conceived 
individuals’ self-narratives could, however, be a reason to revisit the minimum age at which 
they are legally entitled to apply to the HFEA to learn if they are donor-conceived, or for 
identifying information about their donors. This is currently eighteen in each case.939 The 
arguments in this thesis suggests that the age threshold should be informed by empirical 
evidence of: what donor-conceived individuals wish to know and when; when access to this 
information is likely best to support identity-development; and the impacts of knowing about 
one’s donor origins while lacking information about one’s donor.  
It is already a legal requirement that those seeking information from the HFEA about the fact 
of their donor conception or for information about their donors or donor siblings must “be 
given suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling about the implications of compliance 
with the request”. 940 This is broadly in tune with my recommendations for identity-supportive 
disclosure. But again it may not go far enough. In recognition of the difficulties many parents 
experience in telling and the strength of their children’s potential identity interests, this thesis 
endorses recommendations from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics that the state should fund 
specialist support and counselling to help parents to tell, and donor-conceived individuals to 
make sense of what they are told.941   
Illustrative example II: Genetic disease susceptibility testing 
Current policies, practices and professional obligations to supply information subjects with the 
results of genetic analysis for susceptibility to multifactorial conditions vary widely depending 
on the context in which this information arises. My ethical framework generates similarly 
diverse, context-dependent recommendations. So, it is not possible to speak comprehensively 
to how the latter would modify the former.  
One headline implication of my position, however, is that information about genetic disease 
risk could have identity value, and therefore potentially warrant disclosure, even when it lacks 
clinical utility. This would have implications for, for example, decisions about which intended 
or incidental findings should be offered or fed back to research participants. This might raise 
concerns about an impossibly broad requirement to provide such findings. However, it is 
                                                             
939 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended), s.31. 
940 Ibid. 





important to recall that responsibilities to disclose on identity grounds are subject to limits. 
First, for identity interests to be engaged, the results must exhibit clinical validity – that is, 
they must provide reliable and meaningful information about health risks or traits in question. 
Secondly, the identity interests served must be sufficiently probable and significant to warrant 
the costs, effort, and potential harm to competing interests entailed by providing the test 
results. And this includes the costs and effort of meeting the corollary responsibility to 
communicate potentially identity-significant results in ways that accord with the principles of 
identity-supportive disclosure outlined in Section 6. So, my ethical framework might indeed 
recommend returning findings about a genetic risk of Alzheimer’s disease to participants in 
primary research involving families of Alzheimer’s patients. In contrast, the framework is 
likely to recommend against feeding back similar findings generated in secondary analysis of 
biobank data where doing so in a way that managed any potentially detrimental identity 
impacts would be disproportionately burdensome.  
My ethical framework might also recommend the prohibition of some kinds of susceptibility 
testing by DTC genomic testing services, at least at their current stage of development and 
under existing marketing practices. Currently, DTC services potentially represent a ‘perfect 
storm’ of identity-detrimental circumstances. These include a communication environment in 
which the identity significance of test results is accentuated; the provision of results of 
questionable clinical validity or that are so broad as to be meaningless; obfuscation about these 
epistemic limitations; multiple results delivered concurrently; and the absence of clinical 
support or counselling to help recipients interpret their results.942 As noted in Chapter 6, the 
US Food and Drug Administration took action to stop some commercial operators offering 
tests for some conditions, including BRCA-linked cancers, because of the risk of “unreasonable 
harm” to health from “incorrect test results or unsupported clinical interpretations”.943 This 
action has been criticised by some as paternalistic.944 And supra-clinical interests are 
sometimes invoked as justification for the value of DTC genomic testing.945 I would hold, 
however, that attending to identity interests strengthens the ethical justification for such 
regulatory restrictions. 
                                                             
942 Kalf et al. (2013); Skirton et al. (2012). 
943 "U.S. Food and Drug Administration - Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal 
Investigations - Warning Letter to 23&Me - Document Number: Gen1300666 22 November 2013". 
944 N.A. Farahany (2014), "The FDA Is Overcautious on Consumer Genomics" Nature, 505: 286-87; 
P.J. Zettler et al. (2014), "23andme, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Future of Genetic 
Testing" JAMA Internal Medicine, 174(4): 493-94. 
945 Vayena (2014). 
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Illustrative example III: Psychiatric neuroimaging  
Currently, in the UK, the only context in which neuroimaging findings indicative of 
psychiatric diagnoses could plausibly be made available is in studies investigating the clinical 
applicability of this technology.946 The evidence considered in Chapter 7 indicates that 
neuroimaging-based diagnoses are likely to be accorded considerable identity-significance by 
patients. But with this comes potential for identity detriment. Neuroimaging is not yet able to 
provide robust, unambiguous diagnoses. And features of the research environment (including 
limited resources or clinical skills) could present obstacles to participants receiving findings 
in a way that explains their epistemic limitations and averts unwarrantedly deterministic or 
neuro-reductive inferences by participants.  
According to my ethical framework, this constellation of factors implies a responsibility not 
to offer findings from psychiatric neuroimaging studies to participants. There is no indication 
that such findings are routinely offered. But I would suggest that practices, such as giving 
research participants printed neuroimages as thanks for taking part, could be unethical if they 
are likely to result in unwarranted personal investment in diagnostically meaningless 
information.947 The same conclusion would apply a fortiori to direct-to-consumer diagnostic 
neuroimaging, where the same constellation of detrimental factors seems even more likely to 
obtain.       
Even if current methodological problems with neuroimaging-based diagnostic techniques are 
rectified, concerns about neuro-reductive explanations of mental illness may persist.948 This 
means that patients’ reliance on such diagnoses in the construction of their self-narratives 
could remain problematic to the extent that these narratives might still fail to accord with their 
lived experience of mental illness or to include unwelcome or disempowering fatalism about 
the nature of their illness. If these concerns are warranted and psychiatric neuroimaging enters 
clinical practice, the ethical framework I have proposed would recommend that this is an area 
in which it would be particularly important to attend to the possibility of identity detriment, 
and to seek to mitigate this through the manner of information disclosure.  
SECTION 9: CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
In this thesis I have argued that we all have an ethically significant interest in developing, 
maintaining and restoring a coherent and satisfying account of who we are, because this is a 
                                                             
946 See Chapter 7. 
947 Cohn (2010). 





condition for leading a rich, fulfilling and practically engaged life. And, because our embodied 
experiences impinge on our lives, and our self-narratives provide the foundations from which 
we navigate these experiences, this basic interest is engaged both by whether and how we are 
able to access bioinformation about our health, bodies and biological relationships. In this 
chapter I have proposed that, as a consequence, we have three derived bioinformation-related 
interests: in receiving bioinformation which would serve the basic identity interest; in being 
protected from that which would undermine it; and in receiving bioinformation in a manner 
that supports our narrative development.  
It is my contention that these three interests warrant ethical attention in policies and practices 
concerned with disclosure of personal bioinformation, alongside the attention currently given 
to the impacts of bioinformation on our health-related decisions, our emotional wellbeing, our 
privacy and on our capacities to act in self-determining ways. In this chapter, I have sought to 
demonstrate that our identity interests are not reducible to or coextensive with any of these 
existing considerations. Therefore, protection of these other interests does not provide 
sufficient protection of our identity interests – attending to identity impacts brings something 
new to the ethical landscape.     
On these grounds I have argued that bioinformation-related identity interests are sufficient to 
give rise to distinct ethical responsibilities amongst those who are in a position to generate or 
who hold personal bioinformation about us. These responsibilities hold in virtue of the strength 
of the identity interests involved and the capacities of those who hold bioinformation about us 
to promote or harm these interests through their decisions about whether to make this 
information available to us and, no less importantly, the manner in which they do so.  
Despite the ethical weight of identity interests in whether and how we access bioinformation 
about ourselves, it is not my position that they should trump all other legitimate considerations 
in defining the responsibilities of potential disclosers. They must be considered alongside and 
weighed against the other interests and costs associated with providing or withholding 
bioinformation. Furthermore, the capacities of different potential disclosers to discern and 
respond to these interests will vary depending on the nature of the bioinformation in question, 
their role, skills, resources, and relationships to the information subject. Moreover, I have 
argued that whether or not identity interests prevail in decisions about whether bioinformation 
should be disclosed, the sheer fact that they are engaged at all provides grounds to attend to 
identity impacts in the manner in which bioinformation is communicated. I have proposed here 
a suite of principles and practical considerations to guide disclosure practices that would 
support the development of coherent and satisfying self-narratives. 
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It is not possible in abstract terms to specify a single, uniform policy in respect of the disclosure 
of all personal bioinformation or even particular categories. Much will depend on the kind of 
bioinformation in question, the needs and circumstances of the particular information subject 
and the contexts in which bioinformation arises and is communicated. This is not to say that, 
in any particular context, policies or best practice guidance directed at protecting identity 
interests could not be developed – whether these are national policies such as those on access 
to information about donor origins or, more local ones, such as a research study’s policy on 
feedback of individual findings to participants. It is my intention that the ethical framework 
proposed in this chapter will provide a robust conceptual and normative foundation for 
working out how such policies or guidance might be developed and the matters they ought to 






CHAPTER 10: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND LOOKING 
FORWARD  
 
In this thesis I have set out to address a gap in the ethical landscape surrounding the governance 
of individuals’ access to information about their own health, bodies and biological 
relationships. This gap is a lack of attention to, and thus protection of, the identity-related 
interests of information subjects. I have sought to fill this gap by developing a normative 
account of the impacts of personal bioinformation on identity construction, and by providing 
an ethical framework to guide information disclosure practices in responding to the interests 
arising from these impacts. 
In this final concluding chapter I will first review the arguments and recommendations of this 
thesis. I will then highlight the original contributions I have sought to make. I will indicate 
where my conclusions entail changes in existing information disclosure practices and policies. 
Finally, I will outline fruitful areas for applying my arguments and pursuing further research.  
SECTION 1: MY ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSIONS 
Questions about whether personal bioinformation can or should be provided to those to whom 
it pertains arise in myriad healthcare, research, commercial, administrative and familial 
contexts. Yet, currently, it is only access to information about genetic parentage that receives 
legal protection on explicitly identity-related grounds. And, even in that context, the role of 
information in identity remains contested, ambiguous, and peculiarly exceptionalist. 
Corresponding to the four headline research questions in Chapter 1, my aims in this thesis have 
been: to develop a plausible and robust conception of the relationship between a broad range 
of personal bioinformation and identity (qua self-characterisation); to characterise the nature 
and scope of individuals’ interests in accessing their personal bioinformation and the 
corresponding responsibilities of parties who hold this information; and thus to make 
recommendations  as to how information disclosure practices can protect information subjects’ 
capacities to develop their identities.  
I have argued that personal bioinformation can impact on our development of our own 
identities in ways that are sufficiently significant to warrant attention in decisions about our 
access to this information. My argument is rooted in philosophical accounts that hold that our 
identities are constituted by self-constructed narratives. As outlined in Chapter 2, these 
accounts entail, what I have termed, a ‘double normativity’. First they indicate why being able 
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to develop, sustain and inhabit an identity-constituting narrative is necessary to leading a rich, 
fulfilling and practically engaged life. Secondly, they hold that, in order to be identity-
constituting, a self-narrative must be reasonably coherent. My own argument, in Chapter 3, 
builds on this conceptual foundation. I have proposed that, given the embodied nature of our 
lives, personal bioinformation has a critical role to play in helping us to develop, maintain or 
restore coherent self-narratives, because the information helps us to anticipate, make sense of 
and navigate our embodied experiences. The normativity of the underlying theory explains 
why access to bioinformation matters. 
To test the plausibility of, to illustrate, and to refine my theoretically-based argument, I have 
drawn on empirical social science literature reporting information subjects’ attitudes and 
responses to three categories of personal bioinformation (Chapters 4-7). These were: 
information about donor conception; results from genetic disease susceptibility tests; and 
diagnostic indications from psychiatric neuroimaging. These categories were chosen to 
represent diverse kinds of bioinformation, thereby allowing me to draw generalisable 
inferences beyond the specifics of each, as well as highlighting the variation between them 
and the limits of identity value.  
My analysis of these examples suggests that individuals’ responses to these categories of 
personal bioinformation are broadly congruent with my proposition that diverse kinds of 
bioinformation can play important roles in the development of our self-narratives. However, 
as detailed in Chapter 8, these examples also introduce refinements to my starting proposition. 
They indicate that the impacts of bioinformation on our self-narratives are neither uniform not 
universal, but vary between kinds of information, individuals and contexts. They also highlight 
the potential for bioinformation to be detrimental as well as valuable to our self-conceptions. 
And the examples indicate that multiple factors may be instrumental in shaping whether 
bioinformation is experienced as being relevant to someone’s identity at all. Importantly, these 
factors include the manner in which it is communicated, insofar as it contributes to the 
interpretive and supportive context for recipients’ narrative use of this information 
I have argued that the valuable and detrimental roles that personal bioinformation can play in 
on our self-narratives extend beyond contributing narrative ‘contents’ in the form of discrete, 
revised self-descriptors. This information can also play an interpretive and structural role by 
enhancing or detracting from the coherence of our identities as a whole. While the effects of 
bioinformation on the contents and coherence of our self-conceptions may well be intertwined 





capacities to lead full and practically-engaged lives – it is the latter that chiefly accounts for 
ethical weight of our interests in accessing personal bioinformation. 
Based on my analysis of the three illustrative examples, I have concluded that whether and 
how we are able to access diverse kinds of personal bioinformation can impact on our basic 
interest in developing coherent and satisfying self-narratives in ways that are neither 
improbable nor trivial. I have proposed that we have three specific bioinformation-related 
interests derived from this basic interest (Chapter 9). The first of these is that in having the 
opportunity to access bioinformation that would enhance the coherence and satisfying nature 
of our self-narratives. The second lies in being protected from bioinformation that would be 
detrimental to this end. And, thirdly, we have an interest in receiving bioinformation in a 
manner that supports our identity development. I have indicated how these identity interests 
differ sufficiently from the other interests (for example, in exercising our autonomy or 
protecting our health) currently taken into account by laws, policies and practices governing 
disclosure of bioinformation, that they warrant attention in their own right. 
What is this ‘attention’ entails is captured by the ethical framework that I have proposed in 
Chapter 9. This framework characterises the nature and extent of the interests, responsibilities, 
principles and practical considerations that ought to inform identity-supporting disclosure. I 
have argued that those who are in possession of potentially identity-significant personal 
bioinformation have pro tanto responsibilities corresponding to each of the three identity-
related interests. These responsibilities arise when a potential discloser is in a position to 
supply and help to interpret bioinformation to which the potential recipient would not 
otherwise have access. And they are rooted in the principle of beneficence and in the relational 
nature of narrative self-constitution. These responsibilities are strong, but not absolute. They 
must be weighed against responsibilities to protect competing interests. And, the costs of 
meeting them ought not to be disproportionate. 
In constructing this ethical framework I have acknowledged the variability in the precise 
location of different individuals’ bioinformation-related identity interest presents challenges 
in discharging responsibilities to protect them. However, I have suggested these challenges 
not insurmountable and have proposed ways in which some of these may be negotiated. Not 
least amongst these is recognising the value of discursive, collaborative, non-directive 
disclosure practices. I have held that such practices must play a central role in the governance 
of potentially identity-significant personal bioinformation. I have concluded Chapter 9 by 
offering high-level principles and concrete recommendations to indicate what identity-
supporting disclosure practices would look like and to guide their delivery.  
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SECTION 2: ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis makes four original contributions to bioethical and policy debates about 
individuals’ interests in accessing their personal bioinformation: the first establishing identity 
interests as a relevant and significant ethical consideration; the second providing a fresh 
conceptual and normative analysis of these interests; the third broadening the field of attention 
beyond information about genetic origins; and the fourth offering practical ethical guidance. 
In doing so, I have also contributed a fresh angle to narrative identity theory. 
My first contribution has been to add to existing debates about our interests in accessing   
bioinformation about ourselves by articulating the nature of the one of the key interests that 
may be at stake – that in developing a coherent and satisfying account of who one is.  
Recognition of identity interests brings something new to the ethical landscape. This thesis 
highlights that failures to attend to the possibility that identity interests might be engaged by 
decisions about disclosure of personal bioinformation represent a significant omission.  
My second contribution has been to provide a plausible means for conceptualising the 
normative role of personal bioinformation in our identities. There are plentiful existing 
discussions in the literature of the ways in which some specific kinds of personal 
bioinformation could make a difference to specific aspects of self-characterisation. This thesis, 
however, has sought to explain why our access to personal bioinformation (of many kinds) 
can affect our abilities to make sense of and inhabit identities as a whole, in ways that make a 
real difference to our lives and, therefore, engage significant interests. My claims do not 
depend upon the contentious premise that any particular kind of bioinformation is uniquely 
important or essential to understanding who we are, and can accommodate diverse means of 
self-characterisation.  
My third contribution has been to demonstrate that potentially identity-significant 
bioinformation extends beyond the ‘usual suspects’ on which policy-makers and the law have 
hitherto focused – chief amongst these being information about genetic origins. Through the 
illustrative examples I have provided, I have indicated that the kinds of bioinformation 
considered in these examples are significant to individuals’ self-conceptions to the extent that 
they occupy a range of roles in the construction of our self-narratives. The information in those 
examples occupy these narrative roles by virtue of exhibiting a range of explanatory, 
predictive, descriptive or interpretive qualities, linked but not restricted to the particular 
genetic and neurological nature of this information. This means that these roles could be 





I have also offered an analysis of why some kinds or instances of bioinformation may be seen 
by information subjects as especially significant to their self-conceptions.   
My fourth contribution has been to deliver an ethical framework for addressing the impacts of 
personal bioinformation on identity. This framework applies my argument to practical ends. It 
characterises the nature and extent of the ethical responsibilities of potential disclosers. It 
pinpoints the possibility of identity impacts as a significant reason why information providers’ 
responsibilities to protect the interests of information subjects do not stop at the decision of 
whether to disclose, and extend to the manner in which they do so. This ethical framework 
proposes both high-level principles and concrete recommendations intended to guide identity-
supporting disclosure practices in ways that support the constructive application of personal 
bioinformation to self-development, and minimise its detrimental impacts.  
In constructing this account, I have also sought to contribute to philosophical discussions of 
narrative identity. I have argued that, because we lead embodied lives (not only rational and 
relational ones), the coherence of our self-narratives depends not only on their internal 
intelligibility and congruence with how others see the world, but also upon these narratives 
making sense in light of our own experiences of embodiment. This exposes a narrative role for 
information about our embodied states, previously unacknowledged in the narrative identity 
literature. Personal bioinformation does not tell us who we are, but it can help us to develop 
self-narratives that are resilient and intelligible in the face of embodied experiences.  
SECTION 3: WHAT WOULD CHANGE AS A CONSEQUENCE? 
If the arguments and recommendations of this thesis were taken up, how would this change 
the management of personal bioinformation? 
The chief change would be that consideration of information subjects’ identity interests would 
comprise a standard aspect of bioinformation disclosure practices or policies (for example, 
those relating to returning individual findings from health research to participants) alongside 
the other interests currently taken into account. This still allows those making assessments 
about disclosure to judge that identity interests are unlikely to be affected to a significant 
degree in the given circumstances. And it does not preclude the assessment that meeting them 
would be disproportionately burdensome or impracticable, or that other interests carry more 
weight. But a wholesale failure to consider potential identity-related impacts would be 
recognised as a significant omission.  
This change requires identity interests being dealt with on their own terms, not subsumed 
within – for example – nascent moves to take the ‘personal utility’ of bioinformation into 
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account in disclosure decisions. The meaning and normative significance of the portmanteau 
concept of personal utility remains unsatisfactorily inchoate, and identity ends are unlikely to 
be well-served by being bundled within it.   
A further significant change entailed by my arguments is a greater emphasis on the manner 
and informational context of information disclosure practices across a broader range of 
bioinformation and, by association, the nature of the relationship between the information 
subject and the disclosing party. The kind of interpretive support I have proposed involves a 
greater level of explanation and provision of supplementary information than is common 
outwith genetic counselling. This relationship implied is closer to that of an interpretive 
partnership than that of mere provider and recipient.  
My recommendations relating to provision of interpretive support are in step with increased 
emphasis in bioethics on relational autonomy and shared decision-making.949 Nevertheless, 
these recommendations undoubtedly carry significant implications for training, resource 
allocation and cultural change. This poses important questions about the practicability of 
providing identity-supportive disclosure in some settings – for example, in large-scale research 
projects. Addressing these questions has not been possible within the scope of this thesis. This 
is an area where further, empirically-informed, research could be fruitfully pursued: first, to 
explore in greater detail what communicating bioinformation in an identity-supporting way 
would entail; and, secondly, to determine the opportunities for, or barriers to, delivering such 
an approach in different clinical, research or administrative contexts. I indicate additional areas 
for further research below. 
The arguments of this thesis do not point to a need for legislative changes to secure blanket 
(non)disclosure policies in particular sectors or in relation to particular categories of 
bioinformation. Legislation is likely to be too blunt an instrument to protect the kinds of 
interests I have described. These interests will often vary according to the needs of individual 
recipients, the nature of the bioinformation, and the contexts and relationships within which 
the information is communicated. I have suggested that protection of bioinformation-related 
identity interests is likely to be best achieved through polices and professional guidelines, 
which can be more flexible and sensitive to needs arising in particular contexts.  
 
                                                             
949 A. Donchin, 'Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic Decision Making ', in 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Automony, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. C. 





SECTION 4: AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
Beyond the illustrative examples  
The conclusions of this thesis are intended to apply to personal bioinformation far beyond my 
three illustrative examples. I would suggest that they could make useful contributions to 
contemporary debates about provision of bioinformation in several other contexts, including 
but not limited to the following: 
 Mitochondrial donation: The arguments I have presented in this thesis carry 
implications for the bioinformation-related interests of individuals conceived using 
mitochondrial donation.950 Under UK law these individuals would be entitled to 
request non-identifying information about their donors.951 Scepticism about identity 
interests related to mitochondrial donation often focuses on the assumption that 
mitochondrial DNA is not trait-conferring.952 However, I have argued that when 
viewed from a narrative perspective, the interest in knowing one’s genetic origins is 
not necessarily narrowly focused on inherited traits, but on wider biographical 
concerns and the ability to construct an identity that accords with facts about one’s 
embodied existence.953 This suggests that there could be identity-based grounds for 
treating access to knowledge of mitochondrial donor origins and donors as analogous 
to information about gamete donation.954 
 
 Prenatal and neonatal genetic screening: Further work is needed to unpack what a 
narrative account entails for children’s identity interests and parental responsibilities 
beyond the narrow scope of information about genetic origins. Non-invasive prenatal 
testing and whole genome screening of new-borns pose a potential dilemma for my 
analysis. Does the potential availability of large quantities of health information from, 
                                                             
950 No individuals have yet been conceived in this way in the UK. 
951 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015. 
952 J.B. Appleby (2016), "Should Mitochondrial Donation Be Anonymous" Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, Forthcoming; Department of Health 'Mitochondrial Donation: Government Response to 
the Consultation on Draft Regulations to Permit the Use of New Treatment Techniques to Prevent the 
Transmission of a Serious Mitochondrial Disease from Mother to Child' (2014). 
953 See Chapter 5. 
954 John Appleby argues that ‘sense of self’ could ground an interest in knowledge of mitochondrial 
donor origins, though his argument is not based on a narrative conception, Appleby (2016). Jackie 
Leach Scully discusses the impacts of mitochondrial donation on narrative identity, focusing on the 
social availability narratives from which those conceived this new way might construct their stories, 
J.L. Scully (2017), "A Mitochondrial Story: Mitochondrial Replacement, Identity and Narrative" 
Bioethics, 31(1): 37-45. 
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or before, birth represents an opportunity for its early narrative integration, or 
foreclose an individual’s “open future” and ability to define herself?955  
 
 ‘The quantified self’: I have highlighted the importance of identity-protecting 
interpretive support where potentially identity-significant bioinformation is disclosed. 
One context in which concerns about the unmediated availability of vast quantities of 
such information are especially acute is that of wearable digital devices for monitoring 
and measuring our bodies and biology. It would be timely to explore the identity-
significance of the information generated in this way, who should be responsible for 
managing the quality of this information and how it is interpreted by users, and by what 
means. 
 
 Diagnosis of rare diseases: There is some scepticism that whole genome sequencing 
offers a panacea to the distressing ‘diagnostic odysseys’ of families with rare diseases, 
if diagnosis does not bring clinical benefits.956 A narrative identity analysis offers a 
possible means of understanding how such odysseys need not be in vain, if they meet 
interests in obtaining information that may fill narrative gaps by supplying valued self-
descriptors or opportunities for solidarity.   
These examples are only indicative of some further fields of application of my analysis. There 
is not space to do them justice here. They each represent areas in which further research might 
be usefully pursued to explore what fresh angles a narrative conception of identity impacts 
might bring to current ethical and regulatory debates about which (and whose) interests are at 
stake in these contexts. These inquiries, in turn, could benefit from empirical research that 
explores the extent and nature of the identity impacts of the kinds of personal bioinformation 
in question. 
Considering a role for the law 
If the law is to have a role in protecting identity development, it seems most likely to be 
through offering remedy for failures of those who hold bioinformation about us to provide or 
withhold this information. Remedy might be sought through two routes. The first of these 
would be through appeal to the right to identity qua self-development, nested within the Article 
8 right to respect for private life under the European Convention on Human Rights and, in the 
                                                             
955 Dena S Davis, "Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future," Hastings Center 
Report 27, no. 2 (1997). 





UK, the Human Rights Act 1998. However, information subjects’ entitlements to 
bioinformation under this right have hitherto only been recognised in respect of that about 
genetic parentage and are limited in a number of other respects outlined in Chapter 1. The 
second route would be through action in negligence. However, this would depend on identity 
detriment being recognised as a relevant category harm or head of damage, and the 
responsibility to prevent it being a conceived as a duty that it would be fair, just and reasonable 
to expect of non-disclosing parties.957 It is unlikely that these conditions would be met as the 
law currently stands.958 The presents a further area in which research could be usefully 
pursued. Legal analysis of the relationship between the duties of potential disclosers as 
currently recognised in law, and the ethical responsibilities I have proposed here, would be a 
valuable next step towards addressing the practical application of my arguments. 
Beyond individual access  
Finally, in this thesis I have had to set aside a number of important questions about the impacts 
on identity of uses and communication of personal bioinformation that lie outwith its specific 
concern with individual information subjects’ access to information. For example, it has not 
been possible to consider how information subjects’ identity narratives might be impacted by 
the ways that other people use personal bioinformation about them. Conversely, it has not been 
possible to address how individuals’ uses of bioinformation in their self-conceptions might 
impact upon others, including groups with who they share means of self-characterisation. 
These are each questions that warrant further attention, not only because they illuminate 
interests that may need to be weighed against individuals’ identity interests, but also because 
they further unpack the relational nature of our identity interests that I have started to explore 
here. 
***** 
In this thesis I have sought to meet Heather Widdows’s challenge quoted in Chapter 1 – the 
challenge to present a picture of the self that is ‘right’, such that the legal and ethical structures 
built upon it protect the interests that really matter.959 It is not possible to prove that a narrative 
conception of identity, and the role of personal bioinformation in it, that I have developed here 
are true. But I hope to have demonstrated that it least accords with our intuitions and 
experiences of what it means, and what it takes, to develop, to make sense of and to inhabit 
                                                             
957 G.T. Laurie et al., Mason and Mccall Smith's Law and Medical Ethics (10th Edition), 8th ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
958 See Chapter 9. 
959 Widdows (2013) 
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who we are in light of our health, bodily experiences and biological relationships. And, in 
doing so, I have offered a robust and plausible conception of identity interests, the recognition 
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